patrickandClaude Opus 4.8
fcda813ba6
Mandantenfähigkeit ausgebaut: - Neue Rolle RESELLER (company_id NULL); companies.reseller_id + is_active - RLS-Erweiterung (Migration 0034): companies/users zusätzlich auf app.reseller_id gefenced → Reseller sieht/verwaltet DB-seitig nur eigene Firmen, keine personenbezogenen Zeit-/Abwesenheitsdaten (DSGVO: nur Verwaltung) - get_current_user setzt app.reseller_id + Bypass aus für RESELLER - tenant_service: Firma + Erst-Admin (Einladung), Übersicht mit Kennzahlen - Router /reseller/* (Self-Service) und /admin/* (SUPER_ADMIN: Mandanten + Reseller) - Login-Sperre bei deaktiviertem Mandanten - Frontend: TenantsPage (/admin/tenants), eigene ResellerCompaniesPage (/reseller), rollenbasierte Login-Weiterleitung, Nav "Mandanten" für SUPER_ADMIN - 4 neue Tests inkl. Cross-Reseller-RLS-Isolation; 172/172 grün Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
110 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
110 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
import uuid as _uuid
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from typing import Annotated
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from uuid import UUID
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from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
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from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
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from jose import JWTError
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from sqlalchemy import text
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.core.database import get_db
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from app.core.security import decode_access_token
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from app.models.user import User, UserRole
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bearer_scheme = HTTPBearer()
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def get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Liest die echte Client-IP auch hinter nginx-Proxy.
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nginx setzt X-Real-IP auf die ursprüngliche Client-IP.
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Ohne diesen Header würde request.client.host hinter nginx immer
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127.0.0.1 zurückgeben, womit AuditLog-Einträge wertlos wären.
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"""
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real_ip = request.headers.get("X-Real-IP")
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if real_ip:
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return real_ip.strip()
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forwarded_for = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
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if forwarded_for:
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return forwarded_for.split(",")[0].strip()
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return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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async def get_current_user(
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credentials: Annotated[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, Depends(bearer_scheme)],
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db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
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) -> User:
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credentials_exception = HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Could not validate credentials",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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try:
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payload = decode_access_token(credentials.credentials)
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user_id: str = payload.get("sub")
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if user_id is None:
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raise credentials_exception
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except JWTError:
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raise credentials_exception
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# User lookup happens while bypass_rls = 'on' (set in get_db), so the
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# SELECT on users is unrestricted — necessary because we don't yet know
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# the company_id at this point.
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user = await db.get(User, UUID(user_id))
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if user is None or not user.is_active:
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raise credentials_exception
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# ── RLS context ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# SUPER_ADMIN can see all companies → keep bypass_rls = 'on'.
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# Every other role gets the RLS fence applied: set company_id and disable
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# bypass so subsequent queries in the same transaction are automatically
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# filtered to the user's company.
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if user.role == UserRole.RESELLER:
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# Reseller ist an keine Firma gebunden (company_id IS NULL), darf aber
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# NICHT alles sehen. Statt company_id setzen wir app.reseller_id und
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# deaktivieren den Bypass → RLS-Policies geben nur Firmen frei, deren
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# reseller_id == diesem User entspricht (plus deren User zum Verwalten).
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safe_reseller_id = str(_uuid.UUID(str(user.id)))
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await db.execute(text(f"SET LOCAL app.reseller_id = '{safe_reseller_id}'"))
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await db.execute(text("SET LOCAL app.bypass_rls = 'off'"))
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elif user.role != UserRole.SUPER_ADMIN and user.company_id is not None:
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# Sicherheits-Invariante: safe_company_id muss eine valide UUID sein.
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# Der _uuid.UUID()-Round-Trip verhindert SQL-Injection auch bei zukünftigen
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# Refactorings (z.B. falls user.company_id einmal ein String aus einem
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# anderen Pfad käme). SET LOCAL akzeptiert keine Bind-Parameter in
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# PostgreSQL, daher ist String-Interpolation hier unvermeidlich —
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# der UUID-Round-Trip ist die kryptographische Absicherung dagegen.
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safe_company_id = str(_uuid.UUID(str(user.company_id)))
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await db.execute(text(f"SET LOCAL app.company_id = '{safe_company_id}'"))
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await db.execute(text("SET LOCAL app.bypass_rls = 'off'"))
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return user
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CurrentUser = Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)]
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def require_role(*roles: UserRole):
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"""Dependency factory: require_role(UserRole.MANAGER, UserRole.COMPANY_ADMIN)"""
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async def checker(current_user: CurrentUser) -> User:
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if current_user.role not in roles:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="Insufficient permissions",
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)
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return current_user
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return Depends(checker)
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def require_same_company(target_company_id: UUID, current_user: User) -> None:
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"""Raise 403 if user tries to access another company's data."""
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if (
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current_user.role != UserRole.SUPER_ADMIN
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and current_user.company_id != target_company_id
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):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="Access to this resource is not allowed",
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)
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