fix(capture): end special-scheme URL authorities at a backslash (#2767)

* fix(capture): end special-scheme URL authorities at a backslash

The native mitmproxy adapter removed transport userinfo with
`^(...//)[^/?#]*@`, so the authority ran to the last "@" before "/", "?"
or "#". For `https://example.test\part@tail` it treated
`example.test\part` as userinfo, reported `https://tail` as the
Location, and withdrew the original bytes as a transport credential.
WHATWG URL parsing, used by the shared TypeScript owner
(recordedTransportUrl.ts) and by HAR captures, ends a special-scheme or
scheme-relative authority at a backslash, so that "@" is ordinary path
text.

Locate the authority with the same boundary rule before removing
userinfo. Bytes are handled as Latin-1 text so unrelated bytes stay
identical. Userinfo before the backslash is still removed and redacted.
Add source unit tests for the adapter projection to test:python.

Fixes #2671

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(capture): skip special-scheme leading slashes before userinfo

Ending the authority at a backslash exposed a credential: for
`https://\user:pass@host/path`, WHATWG parsing skips every leading "/"
or "\" after a special scheme (and in scheme-relative references), so
`user:pass` is userinfo, but the new boundary stopped at the first
backslash and found no "@". The same applied to `https:\\user:pass@host`
and `https:user:pass@host`.

Start the authority after that whole slash run for non-file special
schemes and scheme-relative references. File URLs keep their "//"
boundary because they carry no userinfo. Load the adapter in tests with
fresh mitmproxy stand-ins scoped to its import instead of leaving them
in sys.modules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(capture): parse URL controls and mixed network authorities

* fix(capture): distinguish native paths and URL base authorities

* fix(capture): preserve file-relative path evidence after separators

* fix(comparison): recheck historical calls-only changes (#2223)

* fix(comparison): preserve incomplete function call evidence

Keep missing, unknown, partial and unresolved call relationships unknown in function comparisons and reconstruction claims. Aggregate IDA caller and callee coverage without overwriting uncertainty.

Validate with 144 focused tests, typecheck/lint, docs checks and test discovery. Real providers were not verified; the full headless IDA session suite requires unavailable Windows native controls.

* fix(comparison): recheck historical calls-only changes

---------

Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(android): make DEX descriptor pattern portable

* fix(ci): isolate Linux Hopper process fixture inventory

* fix(capture): remove empty URL userinfo markers

* test(capture): cover empty URL userinfo markers

* test(ci): isolate Hopper process inventory fixtures

* fix(ci): declare process inventory callback

* test(ci): isolate alternate launcher process fixture

* fix(capture): keep URLs that WHATWG rejects instead of redacting userinfo

File URLs cannot carry userinfo (an "@" in a file host fails the parse),
and a special authority whose host or port WHATWG rejects fails the whole
URL. Neither has credentials, so the bridge now keeps their source text
and byte sidecar. Checked against Node's URL over 30,000 spellings: no
under-redaction, over-redaction 20,540 -> 5,865 (remaining: empty
userinfo, IPv4 range, IDNA, non-special and baseless references).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(capture): strip trailing URL whitespace and validate IP hosts and ports

The previous host check counted trailing C0 controls and spaces, which
WHATWG strips, so `https://user:pw@host ` kept its password. Trailing
C0/space is now removed from the parse view (raw offsets are unchanged).

Special hosts now also follow the WHATWG IPv4 parser (ends-in-a-number,
hex/octal parts, range) and IPv6 literal syntax (zone IDs rejected), and
ports are bounded lexically before int(), which raised ValueError past
4300 digits on Python 3.11+ and failed the whole capture.

Node URL differential over 126,000 spellings: under-redaction 8,084 -> 0,
ValueError 2,550 -> 0; remaining special-scheme over-redaction is IDNA
and the pinned empty-userinfo case. Cost: +0.6 us per URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(capture): redact userinfo before hosts that need Unicode mapping

A non-ASCII special host may map under UTS #46 to an accepted host
(fullwidth digits, ideographic full stops, ignored code points), so
treat it as accepted instead of running the ASCII IPv4 check on it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lucien <164857476+dakjdakd@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-13 21:46:15 -07:00
1 parent 767fe0f0cc
commit 77be0f6666
2 files changed
+180 -7

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+89 -7
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@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ The containing mitmdump process and its configuration directory are REA-owned.
import base64
import hashlib
import ipaddress
import json
import math
import re
import resource
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import unquote_to_bytes
from mitmproxy import ctx, version
from mitmproxy.io import tnetstring
@@ -46,6 +48,8 @@ SCHEME_PREFIX = r"^[\x00-\x20]*([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):"
NETWORK_PREFIX = r"^[\x00-\x20]*[/\\]{2}"
URL_IGNORABLE_CONTROLS = "\t\n\r"
URL_CONTROL_TRANSLATION = {ord(char): None for char in URL_IGNORABLE_CONTROLS}
C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE = "".join(chr(code) for code in range(0x21))
FORBIDDEN_DOMAIN_CODE_POINTS = set(C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE) | set("#%/:<>?@[\\]^|\x7f")
def authority_start(text, base_scheme=None):
@@ -54,11 +58,14 @@ def authority_start(text, base_scheme=None):
Follows WHATWG URL parsing as src/domain/recordedTransportUrl.ts does:
special schemes (and scheme-relative references) skip every leading "/"
or "\\" before the authority, so `https://\\user:pass@host` still has
userinfo. File URLs carry no userinfo and keep their "//" boundary.
userinfo. File URLs never carry userinfo: an "@" in a file host makes
WHATWG reject the whole URL, so there are no credentials to remove.
"""
scheme = re.match(SCHEME_PREFIX, text, flags=re.I)
name = scheme.group(1).lower() if scheme is not None else None
if name is not None and name in SPECIAL_SCHEMES and name != "file":
if name == "file" or (name is None and base_scheme == "file"):
return None
if name is not None and name in SPECIAL_SCHEMES:
# A same-scheme Location without two slash-equivalent separators is
# relative to the recorded request, so its @ belongs to the path.
following = text[scheme.end():scheme.end() + 2]
@@ -69,7 +76,7 @@ def authority_start(text, base_scheme=None):
if scheme is not None:
if text[scheme.end():scheme.end() + 2] != "//":
return None
return scheme.end() + 2, name in SPECIAL_SCHEMES
return scheme.end() + 2, False
# A non-special base treats backslashes as authority data and only
# recognizes two forward slashes as a network reference.
if base_scheme is not None and base_scheme not in SPECIAL_SCHEMES:
@@ -79,13 +86,87 @@ def authority_start(text, base_scheme=None):
if prefix is None:
return None
start = prefix.end()
if base_scheme == "file":
return start, True
while start < len(text) and text[start] in "/\\":
start += 1
return start, True
IPV4_DIGITS = {8: "01234567", 10: "0123456789", 16: "0123456789abcdefABCDEF"}
def ipv4_number(part):
"""WHATWG IPv4 number parser: decimal, 0x hex or 0-prefixed octal, else None."""
if part == "":
return None
radix, digits = 10, part
if part[:2] in ("0x", "0X"):
radix, digits = 16, part[2:]
elif len(part) > 1 and part[0] == "0":
radix, digits = 8, part[1:]
if digits == "":
return 0
if any(char not in IPV4_DIGITS[radix] for char in digits):
return None
# Bound decimal text before int(): Python limits decimal conversions to
# 4300 digits, and anything past 10 significant digits exceeds IPv4.
significant = digits.lstrip("0")
if radix == 10 and len(significant) > 10:
return 2**32
return int(digits, radix)
def domain_parses(domain):
"""Apply WHATWG's ends-in-a-number check and IPv4 parser to a domain."""
parts = domain.split(".")
if parts[-1] == "" and len(parts) > 1:
parts.pop()
last = parts[-1]
if not ((last != "" and last.isascii() and last.isdigit()) or ipv4_number(last) is not None):
return True
numbers = [ipv4_number(part) for part in parts]
if len(parts) > 4 or any(number is None for number in numbers):
return False
return all(number <= 255 for number in numbers[:-1]) and numbers[-1] < 256 ** (5 - len(numbers))
def special_host_parses(host_port):
"""Whether WHATWG could accept a special authority's host and port.
A rejected host fails the whole URL, so it has no credentials to remove.
This mirrors the forbidden-code-point, empty-host, IPv4, IPv6 and port
rules for ASCII hosts. UTS #46 mapping is not modeled: a non-ASCII host
may map to an accepted one (fullwidth digits, ideographic full stops,
ignored code points), so it is treated as accepted and still redacts.
"""
if host_port.startswith("["):
host_end = host_port.find("]") + 1
literal = host_port[1 : host_end - 1]
if host_end == 0 or "%" in literal:
return False
try:
ipaddress.IPv6Address(literal)
except ValueError:
return False
else:
colon = host_port.find(":")
host_end = len(host_port) if colon < 0 else colon
host = unquote_to_bytes(host_port[:host_end]).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
# Mapping never removes ASCII, so these rejections hold either way.
if host == "" or any(char in FORBIDDEN_DOMAIN_CODE_POINTS for char in host):
return False
if host.isascii() and not domain_parses(host.lower()):
return False
port = host_port[host_end:]
if port == "":
return True
digits = port[1:]
if port[0] != ":" or not (digits == "" or (digits.isascii() and digits.isdigit())):
return False
# Bound the text first: int() refuses decimal strings over 4300 digits.
significant = digits.lstrip("0")
return len(significant) <= 5 and int(significant or "0") <= 65535
def without_userinfo(value, base_scheme=None):
"""Remove an authority's userinfo using the WHATWG authority boundary.
@@ -96,7 +177,8 @@ def without_userinfo(value, base_scheme=None):
text = value.decode("latin-1") if binary else value
# WHATWG removes these controls before interpreting scheme/separators.
# Keep that parse view separate from the exact source spelling and bytes.
parsed_text = text.translate(URL_CONTROL_TRANSLATION)
# It also drops trailing C0 controls and spaces; offsets are unchanged.
parsed_text = text.translate(URL_CONTROL_TRANSLATION).rstrip(C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE)
located = authority_start(parsed_text, base_scheme)
if located is None:
return value
@@ -106,7 +188,7 @@ def without_userinfo(value, base_scheme=None):
while end < len(parsed_text) and parsed_text[end] not in terminators:
end += 1
at = parsed_text.rfind("@", start, end)
if at < start:
if at < start or (special and not special_host_parses(parsed_text[at + 1 : end])):
return value
parsed_offset = 0
raw_start = 0
+91
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@@ -165,6 +165,97 @@ class TransportUserinfoTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_file_urls_keep_path_text(self):
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo("file:///a@b"), "file:///a@b")
def test_file_urls_reject_userinfo_and_keep_their_source(self):
# WHATWG rejects an "@" in a file host, so nothing parses as credentials.
self.assertEqual(
capture.without_userinfo("file://user:pass@host/x"), "file://user:pass@host/x"
)
for value in [b"\\\\user:pass@host/x", b"/\\user:pass@host/x", b"//user:pass@host/x"]:
with self.subTest(value=value):
text, sidecar, redactions = location(value, b"file")
self.assertEqual(text, value.decode("ascii"))
self.assertEqual(sidecar["state"], "retained")
self.assertEqual(redactions, [])
def test_rejected_special_hosts_keep_their_source(self):
# A rejected host or port fails the whole URL, so it has no userinfo.
for value in [
"https:user@%",
"https://user@",
"https://user:pass@h^st/x",
"https://user@ho st/x",
"https://user@host:99999/x",
"https://user@host:12a",
"https://user@[::1",
]:
with self.subTest(value=value):
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo(value), value)
text, sidecar, redactions = location(b"https://user:pass@h^st/x", b"https")
self.assertEqual(text, "https://user:pass@h^st/x")
self.assertEqual(sidecar["state"], "retained")
self.assertEqual(redactions, [])
def test_accepted_special_hosts_still_remove_userinfo(self):
for value, expected in [
("https:user@%41", "https:%41"),
("https://user@[::1]:8443/x", "https://[::1]:8443/x"),
("https://user@host:/x", "https://host:/x"),
("wss://user:pass@host:65535", "wss://host:65535"),
("https://user@0x7f.1/", "https://0x7f.1/"),
("https://user@1.2.3.4./", "https://1.2.3.4./"),
("https://user@4294967295/", "https://4294967295/"),
("https://user@1.2.3.08a/", "https://1.2.3.08a/"),
("https://user@[::ffff:1.2.3.4]/", "https://[::ffff:1.2.3.4]/"),
]:
with self.subTest(value=value):
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo(value), expected)
def test_unicode_hosts_that_may_map_to_accepted_hosts_remove_userinfo(self):
# UTS #46 maps these to 1.2.3.4; mapping is not modeled, so redact.
for host in ["%EF%BC%91.2.3.4", "1。2.3.4", "%C2%AD1.2.3.4", "1.2.3.4"]:
with self.subTest(host=host):
self.assertEqual(
capture.without_userinfo(f"https://user:pw@{host}/"), f"https://{host}/"
)
text, sidecar, redactions = location(b"https://user:pw@%EF%BC%91.2.3.4/", b"https")
self.assertEqual(text, "https://%EF%BC%91.2.3.4/")
self.assertEqual(sidecar["state"], "redacted")
self.assertEqual(len(redactions), 1)
# ASCII rejections still hold for non-ASCII hosts.
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo("https://user@1^/"), "https://user@1^/")
def test_trailing_controls_and_spaces_do_not_hide_userinfo(self):
# WHATWG strips trailing C0 controls and spaces before parsing.
for suffix in [b" ", b"\x01", b"\x00 \x1f"]:
with self.subTest(suffix=suffix):
value = b"https://user:pw@example.test" + suffix
text, sidecar, redactions = location(value, b"https")
self.assertEqual(text, "https://example.test" + suffix.decode("latin-1"))
self.assertEqual(sidecar["state"], "redacted")
self.assertEqual(len(redactions), 1)
def test_rejected_ip_literals_keep_their_source(self):
for value in [
"https://user:pass@256.256.256.256/path",
"https://user@1.2.3.4.5/",
"https://user@1.2.3.09/",
"https://user@4294967296/",
"https://user@a.0x/",
"https://user@1..2/",
"https://user@1." + "9" * 5000 + "/",
"https://user@[1::2::3]/",
"https://user@[::1%25eth0]/",
]:
with self.subTest(value=value[:40]):
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo(value), value)
def test_overlong_ports_are_compared_without_numeric_overflow(self):
# Python 3.11+ refuses int() on decimal strings over 4300 digits.
accepted = "https://user@host:" + "0" * 5000 + "80/x"
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo(accepted), "https://host:" + "0" * 5000 + "80/x")
rejected = "https://user@host:" + "9" * 5000 + "/x"
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo(rejected), rejected)
def test_non_special_schemes_keep_backslashes_in_the_authority(self):
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo("foo://a\\b@host/x"), "foo://host/x")
self.assertEqual(capture.without_userinfo(b"//a\\b@host"), b"//a\\b@host")