Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 sysopsandClaude Sonnet 5
|
95275407b1 |
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
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// Package ldapsync implementiert Core IAM-05: LDAP/Active-Directory-
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// Anbindung je Tenant fuer Benutzer-Synchronisation, Login-Delegation und
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// Rollenzuordnung aus Gruppen ueber eine explizite Erlaubnis-Matrix.
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//
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// WICHTIGER HINWEIS: In dieser Umgebung steht kein echter LDAP/AD-Server zur
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// Verfuegung (analog zur Archive-Engine bei AUD-05). Client ist deshalb eine
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// Schnittstelle — die Sync-/Rollenzuordnungs-Logik ist gegen einen Fake in
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// den Tests vollstaendig geprueft, eine echte Verbindungspruefung gegen
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// LDAP/AD steht noch aus.
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package ldapsync
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// Entry ist ein aus LDAP gelesener Benutzerdatensatz.
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type Entry struct {
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Email string
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Name string
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Groups []string
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Disabled bool
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}
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// Client abstrahiert die eigentliche LDAP-Verbindung (Bind + Search).
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type Client interface {
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// Search liefert alle Benutzer, die dem konfigurierten Filter
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// entsprechen. Ein Fehler bedeutet "Quelle nicht erreichbar oder
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// fehlerhaft" — Run() bricht dann komplett und folgenlos ab
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// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
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Search() ([]Entry, error)
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}
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@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
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package ldapsync
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
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)
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type fakeClient struct {
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entries []Entry
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err error
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}
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func (f *fakeClient) Search() ([]Entry, error) {
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if f.err != nil {
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return nil, f.err
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}
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return f.entries, nil
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}
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func setupTest(t *testing.T) (*user.TenantUserStore, *rbac.Store, *RoleMappingStore, func()) {
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t.Helper()
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adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
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if adminDSN == "" {
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t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
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}
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ctx := context.Background()
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pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, name TEXT NOT NULL,
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status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active', password_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignments (
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user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id), role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin')),
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granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignment_history (
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), user_id UUID NOT NULL, role TEXT NOT NULL,
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granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ldap_group_role_mapping (
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ldap_group TEXT PRIMARY KEY, role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin'))
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);
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`); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
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}
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cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
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return user.NewTenantUserStore(pool), rbac.NewStore(pool), NewRoleMappingStore(pool), cleanup
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}
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func uniqueEmail() string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("ldap-test-%d@example.com", time.Now().UnixNano())
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 1: Rollen-Erlaubnis-Matrix mit Positiv- und
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// Negativfaellen — keine Privilege-Escalation ueber Gruppenmitgliedschaft.
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func TestRoleMapping_PositiveAndNegativeCases(t *testing.T) {
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_, _, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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if err := mappings.SetMapping(ctx, "cn=IT-Admins,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com", rbac.RoleTenantAdmin); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("set mapping: %v", err)
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}
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// Positivfall: gemappte Gruppe liefert die konfigurierte Rolle.
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role, ok, err := mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, []string{"cn=IT-Admins,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("highest role: %v", err)
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}
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if !ok || role != rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet tenant_admin, habe ok=%v role=%q", ok, role)
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}
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// Negativfall 1: unbekannte Gruppe vergibt keine Rolle.
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_, ok, err = mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, []string{"cn=Praktikanten,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("highest role (unbekannt): %v", err)
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}
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if ok {
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t.Fatal("erwartet KEINE rolle fuer nicht gemappte gruppe")
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}
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// Negativfall 2 (Privilege-Escalation-Versuch): eine Gruppe, die zufaellig
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// wie eine interne Rolle heisst, aber NIE explizit gemappt wurde, darf
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// keine Rolle vergeben.
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_, ok, err = mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, []string{"tenant_admin", "superadmin"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("highest role (namens-trick): %v", err)
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}
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if ok {
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t.Fatal("erwartet KEINE privilege-escalation ueber gruppennamen, die wie rollen aussehen")
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 1: Synchronisationslauf legt Benutzer an.
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func TestSyncer_CreatesUsers(t *testing.T) {
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users, roles, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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email := uniqueEmail()
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client := &fakeClient{entries: []Entry{{Email: email, Name: "LDAP Nutzer"}}}
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syncer := NewSyncer(client, users, roles, mappings)
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result, err := syncer.Run(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("run: %v", err)
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}
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if result.Created != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet 1 angelegten benutzer, habe %d", result.Created)
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}
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if _, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("benutzer sollte existieren: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2: fehlerhafte/nicht erreichbare LDAP-
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// Quelle bricht kontrolliert ab, ohne bestehende Konten zu beschaedigen.
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func TestSyncer_AbortsCleanlyOnSourceError(t *testing.T) {
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users, roles, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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// Ein bereits bestehendes Konto, das UNBERUEHRT bleiben muss.
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existingEmail := uniqueEmail()
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existing, err := users.Create(ctx, existingEmail, "Bestehender Nutzer")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("create existing: %v", err)
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}
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client := &fakeClient{err: errors.New("ldap-server nicht erreichbar (simuliert)")}
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syncer := NewSyncer(client, users, roles, mappings)
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if _, err := syncer.Run(ctx); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei nicht erreichbarer ldap-quelle")
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}
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// Bestehendes Konto unveraendert (noch aktiv, keine geloeschten/neuen Zeilen).
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got, err := users.Get(ctx, existing.ID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("bestehendes konto sollte weiterhin existieren: %v", err)
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}
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if got.Status != user.StatusActive {
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t.Fatalf("bestehendes konto sollte unveraendert aktiv sein, ist %q", got.Status)
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 3: Deaktivierung in LDAP wird bei
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// naechster Synchronisation korrekt uebernommen.
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func TestSyncer_AppliesDeactivationOnNextRun(t *testing.T) {
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users, roles, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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email := uniqueEmail()
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client := &fakeClient{entries: []Entry{{Email: email, Name: "Wird Deaktiviert"}}}
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syncer := NewSyncer(client, users, roles, mappings)
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if _, err := syncer.Run(ctx); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("erster lauf: %v", err)
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}
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u, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("benutzer nach erstem lauf: %v", err)
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}
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if u.User.Status != user.StatusActive {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet aktiv nach erstem lauf, habe %q", u.User.Status)
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}
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// Zweiter Lauf: derselbe Benutzer ist jetzt in LDAP deaktiviert.
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client.entries[0].Disabled = true
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result, err := syncer.Run(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("zweiter lauf: %v", err)
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}
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if result.Deactivated != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet 1 deaktivierung, habe %d", result.Deactivated)
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}
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u, err = users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("benutzer nach zweitem lauf: %v", err)
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}
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if u.User.Status != user.StatusInactive {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet inaktiv nach deaktivierung in ldap, habe %q", u.User.Status)
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}
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}
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@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
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package ldapsync
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
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)
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// RoleMappingStore verwaltet die Erlaubnis-Matrix LDAP-Gruppe -> Rolle
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// (Akzeptanzkriterium 3). Nur explizit gemappte Gruppen vergeben eine Rolle
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// — der Schutz gegen Privilege-Escalation ist strukturell: es gibt keinen
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// Code-Pfad, der eine unbekannte Gruppe irgendeiner Rolle zuordnet.
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type RoleMappingStore struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewRoleMappingStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *RoleMappingStore {
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return &RoleMappingStore{pool: pool}
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}
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// SetMapping ordnet eine LDAP-Gruppe genau einer NEXARCH-Rolle zu. Nur
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// 'user'/'tenant_admin' sind zuweisbar (dieselbe Matrix wie RBAC-01/03) —
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// 'superadmin' bleibt mandantenuebergreifend und nie ueber LDAP erreichbar.
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func (s *RoleMappingStore) SetMapping(ctx context.Context, ldapGroup string, role rbac.Role) error {
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if role != rbac.RoleUser && role != rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
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return fmt.Errorf("ldapsync: rolle %q ist ueber ldap nicht zuweisbar", role)
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}
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_, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO ldap_group_role_mapping (ldap_group, role) VALUES ($1, $2)
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ON CONFLICT (ldap_group) DO UPDATE SET role = $2
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`, ldapGroup, string(role))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("gruppenzuordnung speichern: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// roleFor liefert die einer LDAP-Gruppe zugeordnete Rolle, sofern konfiguriert.
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func (s *RoleMappingStore) roleFor(ctx context.Context, ldapGroup string) (rbac.Role, bool, error) {
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var role string
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err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT role FROM ldap_group_role_mapping WHERE ldap_group = $1`, ldapGroup).Scan(&role)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return "", false, nil
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}
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return "", false, fmt.Errorf("gruppenzuordnung lesen: %w", err)
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}
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return rbac.Role(role), true, nil
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}
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// HighestRoleFor bestimmt aus einer Liste von LDAP-Gruppen die hoechste
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// zugeordnete Rolle (tenant_admin > user). Gruppen ohne Eintrag in der
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// Matrix tragen NICHTS bei — auch nicht, wenn ihr Name zufaellig wie eine
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// interne Rolle aussieht (Akzeptanzkriterium 3 / Pruefung 1: keine
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// Privilege-Escalation ueber Gruppenmitgliedschaft).
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func (s *RoleMappingStore) HighestRoleFor(ctx context.Context, ldapGroups []string) (rbac.Role, bool, error) {
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var best rbac.Role
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found := false
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for _, g := range ldapGroups {
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role, ok, err := s.roleFor(ctx, g)
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if err != nil {
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return "", false, err
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}
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if !ok {
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continue
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}
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if !found || role == rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
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best = role
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found = true
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}
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}
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return best, found, nil
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}
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@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
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package ldapsync
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
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)
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// SyncResult fasst das Ergebnis eines Synchronisationslaufs zusammen.
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type SyncResult struct {
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Created int
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Updated int
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Deactivated int
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Failed []string // Email-Adressen, bei denen die Verarbeitung fehlschlug
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}
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// Syncer fuehrt die Benutzer-/Rollen-Synchronisation aus LDAP aus.
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type Syncer struct {
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client Client
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users *user.TenantUserStore
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roles *rbac.Store
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mappings *RoleMappingStore
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}
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func NewSyncer(client Client, users *user.TenantUserStore, roles *rbac.Store, mappings *RoleMappingStore) *Syncer {
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return &Syncer{client: client, users: users, roles: roles, mappings: mappings}
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}
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// Run synchronisiert Benutzer aus LDAP (Akzeptanzkriterium 1). Ist die
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// LDAP-Quelle nicht erreichbar/fehlerhaft, wird SOFORT und OHNE jede
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// Aenderung an bestehenden Konten abgebrochen (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 /
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// Pruefung 2) — Search() wird als allererstes aufgerufen, bevor irgendein
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// Schreibzugriff stattfindet.
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func (s *Syncer) Run(ctx context.Context) (SyncResult, error) {
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entries, err := s.client.Search()
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if err != nil {
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return SyncResult{}, fmt.Errorf("ldap-quelle nicht erreichbar, synchronisation abgebrochen: %w", err)
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}
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var result SyncResult
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for _, entry := range entries {
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if err := s.syncOne(ctx, entry, &result); err != nil {
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// Ein fehlerhafter Einzeleintrag isoliert sich selbst — er
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// beschaedigt weder bereits verarbeitete noch nachfolgende
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// Konten (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
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result.Failed = append(result.Failed, entry.Email)
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}
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}
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return result, nil
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}
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func (s *Syncer) syncOne(ctx context.Context, entry Entry, result *SyncResult) error {
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existing, err := s.users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, entry.Email)
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isNew := errors.Is(err, user.ErrNotFound)
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if err != nil && !isNew {
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return err
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}
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var userID string
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if isNew {
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created, err := s.users.Create(ctx, entry.Email, entry.Name)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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userID = created.ID
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result.Created++
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} else {
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userID = existing.User.ID
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result.Updated++
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}
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// Deaktivierung in LDAP wird uebernommen (Akzeptanzkriterium 3 / Pruefung 3).
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if entry.Disabled {
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if _, err := s.users.Deactivate(ctx, userID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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result.Deactivated++
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}
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role, ok, err := s.mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, entry.Groups)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if ok {
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if _, err := s.roles.Assign(ctx, userID, role, "ldap-sync"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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||||
}
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return nil
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}
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@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
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// Package oidc implementiert Core IAM-06: SSO-Anmeldung ueber OpenID
|
||||
// Connect gegen externe Identity-Provider.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// WICHTIGER HINWEIS: In dieser Umgebung ist kein registrierter externer
|
||||
// OIDC-Provider (Client-ID/Secret bei Google/Okta/Azure AD o.ae.) verfuegbar,
|
||||
// gegen den ein echter Authorization-Code-Redirect-Flow end-to-end
|
||||
// durchgefuehrt werden koennte (analog AUD-05/Archive, IAM-05/LDAP). ANDERS
|
||||
// als bei LDAP/Archive ist die eigentliche Token-VALIDIERUNG (JWKS-
|
||||
// Signaturpruefung, Ablauf, Claims, Nonce/State) aber ein rein
|
||||
// kryptographischer Vorgang ohne Netzwerkabhaengigkeit zur Testzeit — die
|
||||
// Tests unten erzeugen ein eigenes RSA-Schluesselpaar, signieren ein
|
||||
// ID-Token selbst und pruefen es exakt so, wie es ein echter Provider
|
||||
// liefern wuerde. Nur der Redirect zu einem echten externen Provider bleibt
|
||||
// ungeprueft.
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"math/big"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type jwk struct {
|
||||
Kid string `json:"kid"`
|
||||
Kty string `json:"kty"`
|
||||
N string `json:"n"`
|
||||
E string `json:"e"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type jwkSet struct {
|
||||
Keys []jwk `json:"keys"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrUnsupportedKeyType = errors.New("oidc: nicht unterstuetzter jwk-schluesseltyp")
|
||||
|
||||
// ParseJWKS dekodiert eine JWKS-Antwort (RFC 7517) in kid -> RSA-Public-Key.
|
||||
// Nur RSA-Schluessel (kty=RSA, Standard bei allen gaengigen OIDC-Providern
|
||||
// fuer ID-Tokens) werden unterstuetzt.
|
||||
func ParseJWKS(data []byte) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
|
||||
var set jwkSet
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &set); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("jwks parsen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out := make(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, len(set.Keys))
|
||||
for _, k := range set.Keys {
|
||||
if k.Kty != "RSA" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub, err := decodeRSAKey(k)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("schluessel %q dekodieren: %w", k.Kid, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out[k.Kid] = pub
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func decodeRSAKey(k jwk) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
|
||||
nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.N)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("modulus dekodieren: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.E)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("exponent dekodieren: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
eBuf := make([]byte, 8)
|
||||
copy(eBuf[8-len(eBytes):], eBytes)
|
||||
e := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(eBuf))
|
||||
|
||||
return &rsa.PublicKey{N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes), E: e}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/auth"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/ldapsync"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// CompleteOIDCLogin verifiziert das ID-Token (Signatur, Ablauf, Aussteller,
|
||||
// Nonce — Akzeptanzkriterium 3), loest den State einmalig ein
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3), legt bei Bedarf einen lokalen Benutzer an
|
||||
// und mapped Rollen aus den OIDC-Claims ueber DIESELBE Erlaubnis-Matrix wie
|
||||
// IAM-05/LDAP (ldapsync.RoleMappingStore — kein zweiter, paralleler
|
||||
// Mapping-Mechanismus, Akzeptanzkriterium 2). Bei Erfolg wird ein normales
|
||||
// IAM-02-Sitzungs-Token ausgestellt.
|
||||
func CompleteOIDCLogin(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
verifier *Verifier,
|
||||
states *StateStore,
|
||||
users *user.TenantUserStore,
|
||||
roles *rbac.Store,
|
||||
roleMapping *ldapsync.RoleMappingStore,
|
||||
issuer *auth.TokenIssuer,
|
||||
tenantSlug, state, idToken string,
|
||||
) (token string, err error) {
|
||||
nonce, err := states.Consume(ctx, state)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims, err := verifier.VerifyWithNonce(idToken, nonce)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if claims.Email == "" {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: id-token ohne e-mail-claim", ErrInvalidToken)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u, err := findOrCreateUser(ctx, users, claims.Email)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if role, ok, err := roleMapping.HighestRoleFor(ctx, claims.Roles); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
} else if ok {
|
||||
if _, err := roles.Assign(ctx, u.ID, role, "oidc-sso"); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return issuer.Issue(u.ID, tenantSlug)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func findOrCreateUser(ctx context.Context, users *user.TenantUserStore, email string) (user.User, error) {
|
||||
creds, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
return creds.User, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, user.ErrNotFound) {
|
||||
return user.User{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return users.Create(ctx, email, email)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/auth"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/ldapsync"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupLoginTest(t *testing.T) (*pgxpool.Pool, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active', password_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignments (
|
||||
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id), role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin')),
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignment_history (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), user_id UUID NOT NULL, role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ldap_group_role_mapping (
|
||||
ldap_group TEXT PRIMARY KEY, role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin'))
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oidc_states (
|
||||
state TEXT PRIMARY KEY, nonce TEXT NOT NULL, expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
|
||||
used_at TIMESTAMPTZ, created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
|
||||
return pool, cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + 3: End-to-End-Login gegen ein (selbst signiertes,
|
||||
// aber protokollkorrektes) ID-Token — Signatur, Nonce, State, Rollen-Mapping,
|
||||
// Sitzungs-Token-Ausstellung.
|
||||
func TestCompleteOIDCLogin_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
pool, cleanup := setupLoginTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
states := NewStateStore(pool)
|
||||
users := user.NewTenantUserStore(pool)
|
||||
roles := rbac.NewStore(pool)
|
||||
roleMapping := ldapsync.NewRoleMappingStore(pool)
|
||||
issuer := auth.NewTokenIssuer("test-secret-nur-fuer-tests")
|
||||
|
||||
if err := roleMapping.SetMapping(ctx, "sso-admins", rbac.RoleTenantAdmin); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("set mapping: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
state, nonce, err := states.Generate(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("generate state: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
email := fmt.Sprintf("oidc-test-%d@example.com", time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "idp-subject-123",
|
||||
Email: email,
|
||||
Nonce: nonce,
|
||||
Roles: []string{"sso-admins"},
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
idToken := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
token, err := CompleteOIDCLogin(ctx, verifier, states, users, roles, roleMapping, issuer, "acme", state, idToken)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("complete oidc login: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if token == "" {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet nicht-leeres sitzungs-token")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assignment, err := roles.Get(ctx, mustGetUserID(t, ctx, users, email))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("rollenzuweisung lesen: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if assignment.Role != rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet tenant_admin aus sso-admins-mapping, habe %q", assignment.Role)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Replay desselben state schlaegt fehl.
|
||||
if _, err := CompleteOIDCLogin(ctx, verifier, states, users, roles, roleMapping, issuer, "acme", state, idToken); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei wiederverwendetem state (replay)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 1: keine Privilege-Escalation ueber
|
||||
// manipulierte/unbekannte Rollen-Claims.
|
||||
func TestCompleteOIDCLogin_UnmappedRoleGrantsNothing(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
pool, cleanup := setupLoginTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
states := NewStateStore(pool)
|
||||
users := user.NewTenantUserStore(pool)
|
||||
roles := rbac.NewStore(pool)
|
||||
roleMapping := ldapsync.NewRoleMappingStore(pool)
|
||||
issuer := auth.NewTokenIssuer("test-secret-nur-fuer-tests")
|
||||
|
||||
state, nonce, err := states.Generate(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("generate state: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
email := fmt.Sprintf("oidc-test-%d@example.com", time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Email: email,
|
||||
Nonce: nonce,
|
||||
// Versuch, sich ueber einen manipulierten Rollen-Claim
|
||||
// hochzustufen — diese Gruppen wurden NIE gemappt.
|
||||
Roles: []string{"tenant_admin", "superadmin"},
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
idToken := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := CompleteOIDCLogin(ctx, verifier, states, users, roles, roleMapping, issuer, "acme", state, idToken); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("complete oidc login: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
userID := mustGetUserID(t, ctx, users, email)
|
||||
if _, err := roles.Get(ctx, userID); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet KEINE rollenzuweisung fuer nicht gemappte claims (privilege-escalation-versuch)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func mustGetUserID(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, users *user.TenantUserStore, email string) string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
creds, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("get user by email: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return creds.User.ID
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrStateInvalid = errors.New("oidc: state ungueltig, bereits verwendet oder abgelaufen")
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultStateTTL begrenzt, wie lange ein ausgestellter State/Nonce fuer den
|
||||
// Redirect-Umweg zum Identity-Provider gueltig bleibt.
|
||||
const DefaultStateTTL = 10 * time.Minute
|
||||
|
||||
type StateStore struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewStateStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *StateStore {
|
||||
return &StateStore{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate stellt state+nonce fuer einen neuen Login-Redirect aus. state
|
||||
// wird als OAuth2-"state"-Parameter mitgeschickt (CSRF-Schutz), nonce
|
||||
// erscheint spaeter im ID-Token und muss exakt uebereinstimmen (Replay-Schutz).
|
||||
func (s *StateStore) Generate(ctx context.Context) (state, nonce string, err error) {
|
||||
state, err = randomValue()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
nonce, err = randomValue()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err = s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO oidc_states (state, nonce, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
|
||||
`, state, nonce, time.Now().Add(DefaultStateTTL))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("state speichern: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return state, nonce, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Consume loest einen State EINMALIG ein (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3:
|
||||
// Replay-Schutz) — atomar ueber WHERE used_at IS NULL, analog IAM-03/IAM-09.
|
||||
// Ein zweiter Callback mit demselben state (z.B. durch einen Angreifer, der
|
||||
// die Redirect-URL abgefangen hat) schlaegt fehl.
|
||||
func (s *StateStore) Consume(ctx context.Context, state string) (nonce string, err error) {
|
||||
err = s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
UPDATE oidc_states SET used_at = now()
|
||||
WHERE state = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > now()
|
||||
RETURNING nonce
|
||||
`, state).Scan(&nonce)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return "", ErrStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("state einloesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nonce, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func randomValue() (string, error) {
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupStateTest(t *testing.T) (*StateStore, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oidc_states (
|
||||
state TEXT PRIMARY KEY, nonce TEXT NOT NULL, expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
|
||||
used_at TIMESTAMPTZ, created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
)`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
|
||||
return NewStateStore(pool), cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3: State/Nonce-Handling gegen CSRF und Replay.
|
||||
func TestStateStore_ConsumeIsSingleUse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, cleanup := setupStateTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
state, nonce, err := store.Generate(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gotNonce, err := store.Consume(ctx, state)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("consume (erste einloesung): %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if gotNonce != nonce {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("nonce = %q, want %q", gotNonce, nonce)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Consume(ctx, state); !errors.Is(err, ErrStateInvalid) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrStateInvalid bei erneutem einloesen (replay), habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestStateStore_RejectsUnknownState(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, cleanup := setupStateTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Consume(ctx, "niemals-ausgestellter-state"); !errors.Is(err, ErrStateInvalid) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrStateInvalid, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrInvalidToken = errors.New("oidc: id-token ungueltig, abgelaufen oder falscher aussteller")
|
||||
|
||||
// Claims sind die fuer NEXARCH relevanten OIDC-ID-Token-Claims.
|
||||
type Claims struct {
|
||||
Subject string `json:"sub"`
|
||||
Email string `json:"email"`
|
||||
Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
|
||||
Roles []string `json:"roles"` // providerabhaengiger Claim-Name, hier vereinfacht fest "roles"
|
||||
jwt.RegisteredClaims
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verifier prueft ID-Tokens gegen den JWKS-Schluesselsatz eines konfigurierten
|
||||
// Providers (Akzeptanzkriterium 3: fehlerhafte/abgelaufene Tokens werden
|
||||
// abgewiesen).
|
||||
type Verifier struct {
|
||||
keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
|
||||
issuer string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewVerifier(keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, issuer string) *Verifier {
|
||||
return &Verifier{keys: keys, issuer: issuer}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify prueft Signatur (gegen JWKS), Ablauf (jwt-Bibliothek lehnt
|
||||
// abgelaufene Tokens automatisch ab) und Aussteller.
|
||||
func (v *Verifier) Verify(idToken string) (*Claims, error) {
|
||||
claims := &Claims{}
|
||||
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(idToken, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
|
||||
if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodRSA); !ok {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
kid, _ := t.Header["kid"].(string)
|
||||
key, ok := v.keys[kid]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil || !token.Valid {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
if claims.Issuer != v.issuer {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unerwarteter aussteller %q", ErrInvalidToken, claims.Issuer)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return claims, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerifyWithNonce prueft zusaetzlich, dass der nonce-Claim im Token exakt
|
||||
// dem bei der Anfrage ausgestellten Nonce entspricht — verhindert Replay
|
||||
// eines fremden, gueltigen ID-Tokens (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3).
|
||||
func (v *Verifier) VerifyWithNonce(idToken, expectedNonce string) (*Claims, error) {
|
||||
claims, err := v.Verify(idToken)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if claims.Nonce == "" || claims.Nonce != expectedNonce {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: nonce stimmt nicht ueberein", ErrInvalidToken)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return claims, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func generateTestKey(t *testing.T) *rsa.PrivateKey {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("generate rsa key: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return key
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func signTestToken(t *testing.T, key *rsa.PrivateKey, kid string, claims Claims) string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
|
||||
token.Header["kid"] = kid
|
||||
s, err := token.SignedString(key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("sign token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVerify_AcceptsValidToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
Email: "person@example.com",
|
||||
Nonce: "erwarteter-nonce",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
got, err := verifier.Verify(tok)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.Email != "person@example.com" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("email = %q", got.Email)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 2: Token-Signatur- und Ablaufpruefung.
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)), // abgelaufen
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei abgelaufenem token")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsWrongSigningKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
realKey := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
attackerKey := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
// Verifier kennt NUR den echten oeffentlichen Schluessel.
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &realKey.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Mit dem Angreifer-Schluessel signiert, aber unter demselben kid wie der echte.
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, attackerKey, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei fremd signiertem token")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsWrongIssuer(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://ganz-anderer-idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei unerwartetem aussteller")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3: Nonce-Handling gegen Replay.
|
||||
func TestVerifyWithNonce_RejectsMismatch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
Nonce: "nonce-a",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.VerifyWithNonce(tok, "nonce-b"); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei nonce-mismatch (moeglicher replay eines fremden tokens)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.VerifyWithNonce(tok, "nonce-a"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet erfolg bei passendem nonce: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
|
||||
nBytes := key.PublicKey.N.Bytes()
|
||||
eBuf := make([]byte, 8)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(eBuf, uint64(key.PublicKey.E))
|
||||
// Fuehrende Nullbytes des Exponenten abschneiden (ueblich bei JWK-Kodierung).
|
||||
eStart := 0
|
||||
for eStart < len(eBuf)-1 && eBuf[eStart] == 0 {
|
||||
eStart++
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
set := jwkSet{Keys: []jwk{{
|
||||
Kid: "kid-1",
|
||||
Kty: "RSA",
|
||||
N: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(nBytes),
|
||||
E: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(eBuf[eStart:]),
|
||||
}}}
|
||||
data, err := json.Marshal(set)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
parsed, err := ParseJWKS(data)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("parse jwks: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got, ok := parsed["kid-1"]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet kid-1 im ergebnis")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.E != key.PublicKey.E || got.N.Cmp(key.PublicKey.N) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet identischen oeffentlichen schluessel nach roundtrip")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Der wiederhergestellte Schluessel muss ein damit signiertes Token auch tatsaechlich verifizieren.
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(parsed, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
claims := Claims{Subject: "x", RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com", ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
}}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("verify mit aus jwks wiederhergestelltem schluessel: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Package rbac implementiert Core RBAC-01: das Rollenmodell mit
|
||||
// Grundrollen/-rechten, Hierarchie und Zuweisung. Die eigentliche
|
||||
// Durchsetzung (erlaubt/verboten je Request) ist RBAC-02, dieses Paket
|
||||
// liefert nur Modell + Zuweisung (Casbin-Prinzip: Policy-Modell getrennt
|
||||
// von der Entscheidungsfunktion).
|
||||
package rbac
|
||||
|
||||
// Role ist eine der drei Grundrollen. Superadmin lebt mandantenuebergreifend
|
||||
// (siehe internal/user.SuperadminStore aus IAM-01) und wird deshalb NICHT
|
||||
// ueber Store (tenant-gescoped) zugewiesen — die Existenz eines Superadmin-
|
||||
// Kontos IST die Rollenzuweisung.
|
||||
type Role string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
RoleSuperadmin Role = "superadmin"
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin Role = "tenant_admin"
|
||||
RoleUser Role = "user"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type Permission string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
PermSelfRead Permission = "self.read"
|
||||
PermSelfUpdate Permission = "self.update"
|
||||
PermManageUsers Permission = "tenant.manage_users"
|
||||
PermManageSettings Permission = "tenant.manage_settings"
|
||||
PermManageTenants Permission = "platform.manage_tenants"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// parent bildet die Rollenhierarchie ab (Akzeptanzkriterium 2): eine Rolle
|
||||
// erbt alle Rechte ihrer Elternrolle. tenant_admin erbt von user,
|
||||
// superadmin erbt von tenant_admin.
|
||||
var parent = map[Role]Role{
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin: RoleUser,
|
||||
RoleSuperadmin: RoleTenantAdmin,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// direct sind die einer Rolle direkt (ohne Vererbung) zugeordneten Rechte.
|
||||
var direct = map[Role][]Permission{
|
||||
RoleUser: {PermSelfRead, PermSelfUpdate},
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin: {PermManageUsers, PermManageSettings},
|
||||
RoleSuperadmin: {PermManageTenants},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// EffectivePermissions liefert die vollstaendige, ueber die Hierarchie
|
||||
// aufgeloeste Rechtemenge einer Rolle (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 / Pruefung 2).
|
||||
func EffectivePermissions(role Role) []Permission {
|
||||
seen := make(map[Permission]bool)
|
||||
var out []Permission
|
||||
|
||||
for r, ok := role, true; ok; r, ok = parent[r] {
|
||||
for _, p := range direct[r] {
|
||||
if !seen[p] {
|
||||
seen[p] = true
|
||||
out = append(out, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HasPermission prueft, ob eine Rolle (inklusive geerbter Rechte) ein
|
||||
// bestimmtes Recht besitzt.
|
||||
func HasPermission(role Role, perm Permission) bool {
|
||||
for _, p := range EffectivePermissions(role) {
|
||||
if p == perm {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package rbac
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope wird geliefert, wenn versucht wird,
|
||||
// eine mandantenuebergreifende Rolle (superadmin) ueber den tenant-
|
||||
// gescopten Store zu vergeben — die erlaubte Matrix laesst hier nur
|
||||
// user/tenant_admin zu (Akzeptanzkriterium 1 / Pruefung 1).
|
||||
ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope = errors.New("rbac: rolle ist in diesem geltungsbereich nicht zuweisbar")
|
||||
ErrNotFound = errors.New("rbac: keine rollenzuweisung gefunden")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// assignableRoles ist die erlaubte Matrix fuer Store (tenant-gescoped).
|
||||
var assignableRoles = map[Role]bool{
|
||||
RoleUser: true,
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Assignment struct {
|
||||
UserID string
|
||||
Role Role
|
||||
GrantedBy string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Store verwaltet Rollenzuweisungen innerhalb GENAU EINER Tenant-Datenbank —
|
||||
// analog zu internal/user.TenantUserStore (Modell C: der Pool bestimmt den
|
||||
// Tenant, keine tenant_id-Spalte noetig).
|
||||
type Store struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Store {
|
||||
return &Store{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assign vergibt eine Rolle an einen Benutzer. grantedBy identifiziert den
|
||||
// Akteur, der die Zuweisung vorgenommen hat (Akzeptanzkriterium 3). Jede
|
||||
// Zuweisung wird zusaetzlich in role_assignment_history festgehalten, auch
|
||||
// wenn sie eine vorherige Rolle ersetzt.
|
||||
func (s *Store) Assign(ctx context.Context, userID string, role Role, grantedBy string) (Assignment, error) {
|
||||
if !assignableRoles[role] {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope
|
||||
}
|
||||
if grantedBy == "" {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, errors.New("rbac: grantedBy darf nicht leer sein")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("transaktion starten: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback(ctx) }()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_assignments (user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET role = $2, granted_by = $3, granted_at = now()
|
||||
`, userID, string(role), grantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("rolle zuweisen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_assignment_history (user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
|
||||
`, userID, string(role), grantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("historie schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("transaktion committen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Assignment{UserID: userID, Role: role, GrantedBy: grantedBy}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) Get(ctx context.Context, userID string) (Assignment, error) {
|
||||
var a Assignment
|
||||
var role string
|
||||
a.UserID = userID
|
||||
if err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT role, granted_by FROM role_assignments WHERE user_id = $1
|
||||
`, userID).Scan(&role, &a.GrantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, ErrNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("rollenzuweisung lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.Role = Role(role)
|
||||
return a, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// History liefert jede Rollenzuweisung eines Benutzers in chronologischer
|
||||
// Reihenfolge — die Grundlage fuer "wer hat wann welche Rolle vergeben"
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
func (s *Store) History(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Assignment, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT role, granted_by FROM role_assignment_history
|
||||
WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY granted_at
|
||||
`, userID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historie abfragen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
var out []Assignment
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var role string
|
||||
a := Assignment{UserID: userID}
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&role, &a.GrantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historieneintrag lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.Role = Role(role)
|
||||
out = append(out, a)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
|
||||
// Package serviceaccount implementiert Core IAM-09: Service-Accounts als
|
||||
// eigenstaendige Identitaeten (getrennt von menschlichen Benutzern, siehe
|
||||
// internal/user) sowie API-Token mit Scopes und optionaler Ablaufzeit zur
|
||||
// programmatischen Authentifizierung.
|
||||
package serviceaccount
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
ErrTokenInvalid = errors.New("serviceaccount: token ungueltig, widerrufen oder abgelaufen")
|
||||
ErrScopeInsufficient = errors.New("serviceaccount: token hat nicht den erforderlichen scope")
|
||||
ErrServiceAccountNotFound = errors.New("serviceaccount: nicht gefunden")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type ServiceAccount struct {
|
||||
ID string
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Token struct {
|
||||
ID string
|
||||
ServiceAccountID string
|
||||
Scopes []string
|
||||
ExpiresAt *time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Store struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Store {
|
||||
return &Store{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CreateServiceAccount legt eine neue, eigenstaendige Identitaet an
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 1) — lebt in service_accounts, nicht in users.
|
||||
func (s *Store) CreateServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, name string) (ServiceAccount, error) {
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return ServiceAccount{}, errors.New("serviceaccount: name darf nicht leer sein")
|
||||
}
|
||||
var sa ServiceAccount
|
||||
sa.Name = name
|
||||
if err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO service_accounts (name) VALUES ($1) RETURNING id
|
||||
`, name).Scan(&sa.ID); err != nil {
|
||||
return ServiceAccount{}, fmt.Errorf("service-account anlegen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return sa, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IssueToken erzeugt ein neues API-Token fuer einen Service-Account.
|
||||
// scopes beschraenkt, wofuer das Token verwendet werden darf; ttl ist
|
||||
// optional (nil = kein Ablauf) — beides Akzeptanzkriterium 2. Der
|
||||
// Klartext-Token wird NUR hier zurueckgegeben, gespeichert wird ausschliesslich
|
||||
// der Hash (Akzeptanzkriterium 1 / Pruefung 1).
|
||||
func (s *Store) IssueToken(ctx context.Context, serviceAccountID string, scopes []string, ttl *time.Duration) (id, plaintext string, err error) {
|
||||
plaintext, err = randomToken()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("token erzeugen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hash := hashToken(plaintext)
|
||||
if scopes == nil {
|
||||
scopes = []string{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var expiresAt *time.Time
|
||||
if ttl != nil {
|
||||
t := time.Now().Add(*ttl)
|
||||
expiresAt = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO api_tokens (service_account_id, token_hash, scopes, expires_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
|
||||
RETURNING id
|
||||
`, serviceAccountID, hash, scopes, expiresAt).Scan(&id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("token speichern: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return id, plaintext, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify prueft ein Token gegen einen benoetigten Scope. Widerruf und Ablauf
|
||||
// werden bei JEDEM Aufruf direkt gegen die Datenbank geprueft — es gibt
|
||||
// keinen Cache, ein widerrufenes Token wird beim naechsten Request sofort
|
||||
// abgewiesen (Akzeptanzkriterium 3). requiredScope == "" ueberspringt die
|
||||
// Scope-Pruefung.
|
||||
func (s *Store) Verify(ctx context.Context, tokenString, requiredScope string) (Token, error) {
|
||||
hash := hashToken(tokenString)
|
||||
|
||||
var tok Token
|
||||
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, service_account_id, scopes, expires_at
|
||||
FROM api_tokens
|
||||
WHERE token_hash = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > now())
|
||||
`, hash).Scan(&tok.ID, &tok.ServiceAccountID, &tok.Scopes, &tok.ExpiresAt)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return Token{}, ErrTokenInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Token{}, fmt.Errorf("token pruefen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if requiredScope != "" && !hasScope(tok.Scopes, requiredScope) {
|
||||
return Token{}, ErrScopeInsufficient
|
||||
}
|
||||
return tok, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Revoke widerruft ein Token sofort — Verify schlaegt ab dem naechsten
|
||||
// Aufruf fehl (Akzeptanzkriterium 3 / Pruefung 2).
|
||||
func (s *Store) Revoke(ctx context.Context, tokenID string) error {
|
||||
_, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE api_tokens SET revoked_at = now() WHERE id = $1`, tokenID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("token widerrufen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func hasScope(scopes []string, want string) bool {
|
||||
for _, s := range scopes {
|
||||
if s == want {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func randomToken() (string, error) {
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func hashToken(token string) []byte {
|
||||
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
|
||||
return sum[:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
|
||||
package serviceaccount
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupTest(t *testing.T) (*Store, *pgxpool.Pool, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS service_accounts (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active', created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS api_tokens (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), service_account_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES service_accounts(id),
|
||||
token_hash BYTEA NOT NULL UNIQUE, scopes TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
|
||||
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ, revoked_at TIMESTAMPTZ, created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
|
||||
return NewStore(pool), pool, cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1: Service-Account anlegen, eigenes gehashtes Token erhalten.
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 1: Token ausschliesslich gehasht gespeichert.
|
||||
func TestIssueToken_StoresOnlyHash(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, pool, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
sa, err := store.CreateServiceAccount(ctx, "ci-pipeline")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("create service account: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tokenID, plaintext, err := store.IssueToken(ctx, sa.ID, []string{"read"}, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("issue token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if plaintext == "" {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet nicht-leeren klartext-token")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var storedHash []byte
|
||||
if err := pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT token_hash FROM api_tokens WHERE id = $1`, tokenID).Scan(&storedHash); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("hash lesen: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if string(storedHash) == plaintext {
|
||||
t.Fatal("token_hash enthaelt den klartext-token — verstoss gegen akzeptanzkriterium 1")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(storedHash) != 32 { // sha256
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 32-byte sha256-hash, habe %d bytes", len(storedHash))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tok, err := store.Verify(ctx, plaintext, "")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if tok.ServiceAccountID != sa.ID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("service account id = %q, want %q", tok.ServiceAccountID, sa.ID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 3: Scope-Verletzung wird abgewiesen.
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsInsufficientScope(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, _, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
sa, err := store.CreateServiceAccount(ctx, "readonly-bot")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("create service account: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, plaintext, err := store.IssueToken(ctx, sa.ID, []string{"read"}, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("issue token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Verify(ctx, plaintext, "read"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet erfolg fuer passenden scope: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := store.Verify(ctx, plaintext, "write"); !errors.Is(err, ErrScopeInsufficient) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrScopeInsufficient fuer fehlenden scope, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2: optionale zeitliche Befristung wird durchgesetzt.
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, _, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
sa, err := store.CreateServiceAccount(ctx, "temp-bot")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("create service account: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
ttl := -1 * time.Second // sofort abgelaufen
|
||||
_, plaintext, err := store.IssueToken(ctx, sa.ID, nil, &ttl)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("issue token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Verify(ctx, plaintext, ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrTokenInvalid) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrTokenInvalid bei abgelaufenem token, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 2: widerrufenes Token wird sofort abgewiesen.
|
||||
func TestRevoke_TakesEffectImmediately(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, _, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
sa, err := store.CreateServiceAccount(ctx, "revoke-bot")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("create service account: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
tokenID, plaintext, err := store.IssueToken(ctx, sa.ID, nil, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("issue token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Verify(ctx, plaintext, ""); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("verify vor widerruf: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := store.Revoke(ctx, tokenID); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("revoke: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Verify(ctx, plaintext, ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrTokenInvalid) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrTokenInvalid sofort nach widerruf, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsUnknownToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, _, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Verify(ctx, "niemals-ausgestelltes-token", ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrTokenInvalid) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrTokenInvalid, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_assignment_history;
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_assignments;
|
||||
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-- Rollenzuweisung pro Benutzer (RBAC-01, siehe core-kanban/tickets/RBAC-01.md).
|
||||
-- Nur 'user' und 'tenant_admin' sind hier zuweisbar — 'superadmin' lebt
|
||||
-- mandantenuebergreifend in der Registry (IAM-01 SuperadminStore) und hat
|
||||
-- daher bewusst KEINE Zeile in dieser tenant-lokalen Tabelle (Akzeptanz-
|
||||
-- kriterium 1: nur Zuweisungen innerhalb der erlaubten Matrix).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE role_assignments (
|
||||
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id),
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user', 'tenant_admin')),
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-- Vollstaendige Historie jeder Rollenaenderung (Akzeptanzkriterium 3: wer
|
||||
-- hat wann welche Rolle vergeben).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE role_assignment_history (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
user_id UUID NOT NULL,
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX role_assignment_history_user_idx ON role_assignment_history (user_id, granted_at);
|
||||
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ldap_group_role_mapping;
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ldap_config;
|
||||
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-- LDAP/Active-Directory-Anbindung (IAM-05, siehe core-kanban/tickets/IAM-05.md).
|
||||
-- Bind-Credentials liegen NIE in dieser Tabelle im Klartext — bind_password_env
|
||||
-- nennt nur den Namen einer Umgebungsvariable, aus der das Passwort zur
|
||||
-- Laufzeit gelesen wird (Projekt-Konvention: Secrets nur ueber Env-Vars).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE ldap_config (
|
||||
id BOOLEAN PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT true CHECK (id),
|
||||
url TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
bind_dn TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
bind_password_env TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
base_dn TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
user_filter TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '(objectClass=person)',
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-- Erlaubnis-Matrix LDAP-Gruppe -> NEXARCH-Rolle (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
-- Eine LDAP-Gruppe OHNE Eintrag hier vergibt KEINE Rolle — kein impliziter
|
||||
-- Zugriff durch Gruppennamen-Zufall (Privilege-Escalation-Schutz, siehe
|
||||
-- "Bekannte Fehler vermeiden" im Ticket).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE ldap_group_role_mapping (
|
||||
ldap_group TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user', 'tenant_admin'))
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS api_tokens;
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS service_accounts;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
-- Service-Accounts & API-Token (IAM-09, siehe core-kanban/tickets/IAM-09.md).
|
||||
-- Service-Accounts sind eine eigenstaendige Identitaetsklasse neben
|
||||
-- menschlichen Benutzern (users), nicht dieselbe Tabelle (Zitadel-Vorbild).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE service_accounts (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-- token_hash enthaelt NIEMALS den Klartext-Token, nur dessen SHA-256-Hash.
|
||||
CREATE TABLE api_tokens (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
service_account_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES service_accounts(id),
|
||||
token_hash BYTEA NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||||
scopes TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
|
||||
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
|
||||
revoked_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS oidc_states;
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-- CSRF-/Replay-Schutz fuer OIDC-Login (IAM-06, siehe
|
||||
-- core-kanban/tickets/IAM-06.md). Einmal-Verwendung erzwungen ueber
|
||||
-- used_at IS NULL in der Consume-Abfrage, analog IAM-03/IAM-09.
|
||||
CREATE TABLE oidc_states (
|
||||
state TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
|
||||
used_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user