Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 sysopsandClaude Sonnet 5
|
3d5f53f103 | ||
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sysopsandClaude Sonnet 5
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d63fcbb49e | ||
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sysopsandClaude Sonnet 5
|
ed67887385 | ||
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sysopsandClaude Sonnet 5
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e4793303fc |
+10
-1
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/config"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/db"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/tenant"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
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)
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func main() {
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@@ -34,12 +35,20 @@ func main() {
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provisioner := tenant.NewProvisioner(adminPool, registry, cfg.TenantDSNTemplate)
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tenantHandler := tenant.NewHandler(provisioner)
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// Superadmin-Konten leben mandantenuebergreifend in der Registry-DB.
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// Tenant-User-CRUD (user.TenantUserStore) braucht Connection-Routing pro
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// Mandant (TEN-06, noch nicht gebaut) und wird hier bewusst noch nicht
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// verdrahtet — Package ist bereits eigenstaendig nutzbar/testbar.
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superadmins := user.NewSuperadminStore(registryPool)
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userHandler := user.NewHandler(nil, superadmins)
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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})
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// Vorlaeufiger Pfad ohne Versionierung/Auth — wird mit API-01/IAM-01 abgeloest.
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// Vorlaeufige Pfade ohne Versionierung/Auth — werden mit API-01/IAM-02 abgeloest.
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mux.HandleFunc("/internal/tenants", tenantHandler.CreateTenant)
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mux.HandleFunc("/internal/superadmins", userHandler.CreateSuperadmin)
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log.Printf("nexarch-core listening on %s", cfg.ListenAddr)
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if err := http.ListenAndServe(cfg.ListenAddr, mux); err != nil {
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@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
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// Package audit implementiert Core AUD-01: das zentrale, vom allgemeinen
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// Anwendungs-Log getrennte Audit-Datenmodell fuer sicherheits- und
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// compliancerelevante Ereignisse (wer, was, wann, an welchem Tenant).
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// Unveraenderlichkeit (Append-only) ist AUD-02, Export/Filter-API ist AUD-03
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// — dieses Paket liefert nur das Datenmodell und den EINEN zentralen
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// Schreibpfad (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
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package audit
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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// SystemTenant ist der reservierte Tenant-Bezug fuer mandantenuebergreifende
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// Ereignisse (z.B. Superadmin-Aktionen) — es gibt bewusst KEINEN Weg, ein
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// Ereignis ganz ohne Tenant-Bezug zu schreiben (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
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const SystemTenant = "system"
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var ErrMissingTenant = errors.New("audit: tenant_slug darf nicht leer sein")
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var ErrMissingActor = errors.New("audit: actor darf nicht leer sein")
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var ErrMissingAction = errors.New("audit: action darf nicht leer sein")
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// Event ist ein strukturiertes Audit-Ereignis (Akzeptanzkriterium 1: Akteur,
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// Aktion, Zielobjekt, Zeitpunkt, Tenant).
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type Event struct {
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TenantSlug string
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Actor string
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Action string
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Target string
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Metadata map[string]any
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OccurredAt time.Time
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}
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// Log ist der EINE zentrale Schreibpfad fuer Audit-Ereignisse — es gibt
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// bewusst keine zweite Schreibmoeglichkeit, damit kein Handler versehentlich
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// direkt in audit_events schreibt und dabei die Validierung umgeht
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// (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
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type Log struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewLog(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Log {
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return &Log{pool: pool}
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}
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// Record persistiert genau einen Audit-Eintrag. Fehlender Tenant-Bezug wird
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// bereits hier abgewiesen (klarer Fehler statt Constraint-Verletzung im
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// Normalfall) — die Datenbank-CHECK-Constraint aus der Migration ist die
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// zweite, unumgehbare Verteidigungslinie (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 / Pruefung 2).
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func (l *Log) Record(ctx context.Context, e Event) error {
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if e.TenantSlug == "" {
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return ErrMissingTenant
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}
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if e.Actor == "" {
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return ErrMissingActor
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}
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if e.Action == "" {
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return ErrMissingAction
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}
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if e.Metadata == nil {
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e.Metadata = map[string]any{}
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}
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metadataJSON, err := json.Marshal(e.Metadata)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("metadaten serialisieren: %w", err)
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}
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if e.OccurredAt.IsZero() {
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e.OccurredAt = time.Now()
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}
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_, err = l.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO audit_events (occurred_at, tenant_slug, actor, action, target, metadata)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
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`, e.OccurredAt, e.TenantSlug, e.Actor, e.Action, e.Target, metadataJSON)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("audit-ereignis schreiben: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// CountByTenant ist eine schlanke Lesehilfe fuer Tests/Diagnose — die
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// eigentliche Filter-/Export-API ist AUD-03, hier bewusst nicht vorgezogen.
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func (l *Log) CountByTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantSlug string) (int, error) {
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var n int
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if err := l.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT count(*) FROM audit_events WHERE tenant_slug = $1
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`, tenantSlug).Scan(&n); err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("audit-ereignisse zaehlen: %w", err)
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}
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return n, nil
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}
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@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
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package audit
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"os"
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"testing"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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func setupAuditTest(t *testing.T) (*Log, *pgxpool.Pool, func()) {
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t.Helper()
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adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
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if adminDSN == "" {
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t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
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}
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ctx := context.Background()
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pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
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occurred_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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tenant_slug TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (tenant_slug <> ''),
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actor TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor <> ''),
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action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action <> ''),
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target TEXT NOT NULL,
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metadata JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
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)`); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
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}
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cleanup := func() {
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_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM audit_events WHERE tenant_slug LIKE 'test\_%' ESCAPE '\' OR tenant_slug = $1`, SystemTenant)
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pool.Close()
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}
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return NewLog(pool), pool, cleanup
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 1: ein sicherheitsrelevanter Vorgang
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// (hier: fehlgeschlagener Login) erzeugt zuverlaessig genau einen Eintrag.
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func TestRecord_PersistsExactlyOneEventPerSecurityIncident(t *testing.T) {
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log, pool, cleanup := setupAuditTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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err := log.Record(ctx, Event{
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TenantSlug: "test_acme",
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Actor: "alice@example.com",
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Action: "iam.login_failed",
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Target: "user:alice@example.com",
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Metadata: map[string]any{"reason": "falsches passwort"},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("record: %v", err)
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}
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count, err := log.CountByTenant(ctx, "test_acme")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("count: %v", err)
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}
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if count != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet genau 1 audit-eintrag, habe %d", count)
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}
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var actor, action, target string
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if err := pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT actor, action, target FROM audit_events WHERE tenant_slug = 'test_acme'
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`).Scan(&actor, &action, &target); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("eintrag lesen: %v", err)
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}
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if actor != "alice@example.com" || action != "iam.login_failed" || target != "user:alice@example.com" {
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t.Fatalf("eintrag unerwartet: actor=%q action=%q target=%q", actor, action, target)
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2 (App-Ebene): fehlender Tenant-Bezug wird
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// bereits vom zentralen Schreibpfad abgewiesen.
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func TestRecord_RejectsMissingTenant(t *testing.T) {
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log, _, cleanup := setupAuditTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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err := log.Record(ctx, Event{TenantSlug: "", Actor: "alice", Action: "irgendwas"})
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingTenant) {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrMissingTenant, habe %v", err)
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2 (DB-Ebene): selbst ein direkter INSERT,
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// der Log.Record umgeht, wird durch die CHECK-Constraint verhindert — der
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// Schutz haengt nicht allein von der Go-Validierung ab.
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func TestConstraint_RejectsMissingTenantAtDatabaseLevel(t *testing.T) {
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_, pool, cleanup := setupAuditTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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_, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO audit_events (tenant_slug, actor, action, target)
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VALUES ('', 'alice', 'irgendwas', 'ziel')
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`)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("erwartet fehler durch CHECK-constraint bei leerem tenant_slug, habe nil")
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}
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}
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func TestRecord_RejectsMissingActorAndAction(t *testing.T) {
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log, _, cleanup := setupAuditTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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if err := log.Record(ctx, Event{TenantSlug: "test_acme", Actor: "", Action: "x"}); !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingActor) {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrMissingActor, habe %v", err)
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}
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if err := log.Record(ctx, Event{TenantSlug: "test_acme", Actor: "alice", Action: ""}); !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingAction) {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrMissingAction, habe %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestRecord_SystemTenantForCrossTenantEvents(t *testing.T) {
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log, _, cleanup := setupAuditTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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if err := log.Record(ctx, Event{TenantSlug: SystemTenant, Actor: "superadmin", Action: "tenant.provisioned", Target: "tenant:acme"}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("record mit SystemTenant: %v", err)
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}
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}
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@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
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package audit
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/csv"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"time"
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)
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// Filter grenzt einen Export ein (Akzeptanzkriterium 1). Leere/Nil-Felder
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// bedeuten "kein Filter auf diesem Feld".
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type Filter struct {
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TenantSlug string
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Actor string
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Action string
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From *time.Time
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To *time.Time
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}
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func buildFilterQuery(f Filter) (string, []any) {
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query := `SELECT occurred_at, tenant_slug, actor, action, target, metadata FROM audit_events WHERE 1=1`
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var args []any
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|
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if f.TenantSlug != "" {
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args = append(args, f.TenantSlug)
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query += fmt.Sprintf(" AND tenant_slug = $%d", len(args))
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}
|
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if f.Actor != "" {
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args = append(args, f.Actor)
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query += fmt.Sprintf(" AND actor = $%d", len(args))
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}
|
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if f.Action != "" {
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args = append(args, f.Action)
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query += fmt.Sprintf(" AND action = $%d", len(args))
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}
|
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if f.From != nil {
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args = append(args, *f.From)
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query += fmt.Sprintf(" AND occurred_at >= $%d", len(args))
|
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}
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if f.To != nil {
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args = append(args, *f.To)
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query += fmt.Sprintf(" AND occurred_at <= $%d", len(args))
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}
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query += " ORDER BY occurred_at"
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return query, args
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}
|
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|
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// StreamCSV schreibt gefilterte Audit-Eintraege direkt als CSV in w, Zeile
|
||||
// fuer Zeile ueber rows.Next() — es wird zu keinem Zeitpunkt das gesamte
|
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// Ergebnis im Speicher aufgebaut (Akzeptanzkriterium 3 / Pruefung 1).
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func (l *Log) StreamCSV(ctx context.Context, filter Filter, w io.Writer) error {
|
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query, args := buildFilterQuery(filter)
|
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rows, err := l.pool.Query(ctx, query, args...)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("export abfragen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
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defer rows.Close()
|
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|
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cw := csv.NewWriter(w)
|
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if err := cw.Write([]string{"occurred_at", "tenant_slug", "actor", "action", "target", "metadata"}); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("csv-header schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
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var occurredAt time.Time
|
||||
var tenantSlug, actor, action, target string
|
||||
var metadataJSON []byte
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&occurredAt, &tenantSlug, &actor, &action, &target, &metadataJSON); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("zeile lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cw.Write([]string{
|
||||
occurredAt.Format(time.RFC3339), tenantSlug, actor, action, target, string(metadataJSON),
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("csv-zeile schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
cw.Flush()
|
||||
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("export lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cw.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// exportRecord ist die JSON-Repraesentation einer exportierten Zeile.
|
||||
type exportRecord struct {
|
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OccurredAt time.Time `json:"occurred_at"`
|
||||
TenantSlug string `json:"tenant_slug"`
|
||||
Actor string `json:"actor"`
|
||||
Action string `json:"action"`
|
||||
Target string `json:"target"`
|
||||
Metadata json.RawMessage `json:"metadata"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// StreamJSON schreibt gefilterte Audit-Eintraege als JSON Lines (ein
|
||||
// JSON-Objekt pro Zeile) — bewusst kein einzelnes grosses JSON-Array, da
|
||||
// dessen korrektes Streaming (Kommas/Klammern ohne Zwischenpufferung)
|
||||
// unnoetige Komplexitaet fuer denselben Zweck waere. Wie StreamCSV
|
||||
// zeilenweise ueber rows.Next(), kein Aufbau im Speicher.
|
||||
func (l *Log) StreamJSON(ctx context.Context, filter Filter, w io.Writer) error {
|
||||
query, args := buildFilterQuery(filter)
|
||||
rows, err := l.pool.Query(ctx, query, args...)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("export abfragen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var rec exportRecord
|
||||
var metadataJSON []byte
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&rec.OccurredAt, &rec.TenantSlug, &rec.Actor, &rec.Action, &rec.Target, &metadataJSON); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("zeile lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rec.Metadata = metadataJSON
|
||||
if err := enc.Encode(rec); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("json-zeile schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package audit
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Authorize entscheidet, ob caller den Export ausfuehren darf. Die
|
||||
// eigentliche Rollen-/Rechtepruefung (RBAC-02 Policy-Enforcement) ist nicht
|
||||
// Teil dieser Kachel — ExportHandler kennt nur diese schmale Schnittstelle,
|
||||
// analog zum RetentionRegistrar-Muster aus AUD-05.
|
||||
type Authorize func(ctx context.Context, caller string) bool
|
||||
|
||||
// ExportHandler stellt den Export als HTTP-Endpunkt bereit
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2: fuer berechtigte Rollen verfuegbar).
|
||||
type ExportHandler struct {
|
||||
log *Log
|
||||
authorize Authorize
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewExportHandler(log *Log, authorize Authorize) *ExportHandler {
|
||||
return &ExportHandler{log: log, authorize: authorize}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Export liest Filter-Query-Parameter (tenant, actor, action, from, to,
|
||||
// format) und schreibt DIREKT auf den ResponseWriter (io.Writer) — dieselbe
|
||||
// Streaming-Funktion wie in export.go, kein zusaetzlicher Pufferungsschritt.
|
||||
func (h *ExportHandler) Export(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
// "caller" identifiziert die anfragende Person fuer die Berechtigungs-
|
||||
// pruefung — bewusst getrennt vom Filterfeld "actor" (das den
|
||||
// AUDIT-Akteur meint, ueber den gefiltert wird).
|
||||
caller := r.URL.Query().Get("caller")
|
||||
if caller == "" || !h.authorize(r.Context(), caller) {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "keine berechtigung fuer audit-log-export", http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
filter := Filter{
|
||||
TenantSlug: r.URL.Query().Get("tenant"),
|
||||
Actor: r.URL.Query().Get("actor"),
|
||||
Action: r.URL.Query().Get("action"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if from := r.URL.Query().Get("from"); from != "" {
|
||||
t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, from)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "ungueltiges from-datum, erwartet RFC3339", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
filter.From = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
if to := r.URL.Query().Get("to"); to != "" {
|
||||
t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, to)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "ungueltiges to-datum, erwartet RFC3339", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
filter.To = &t
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch r.URL.Query().Get("format") {
|
||||
case "json":
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-ndjson")
|
||||
if err := h.log.StreamJSON(r.Context(), filter, w); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "export fehlgeschlagen", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/csv")
|
||||
if err := h.log.StreamCSV(r.Context(), filter, w); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "export fehlgeschlagen", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package audit
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/csv"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupExportTest(t *testing.T) (*Log, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
occurred_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
tenant_slug TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (tenant_slug <> ''),
|
||||
actor TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor <> ''),
|
||||
action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action <> ''),
|
||||
target TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
metadata JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
|
||||
)`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
|
||||
return NewLog(pool), cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 2: Filterkombinationen liefern korrekte
|
||||
// Teilmengen.
|
||||
func TestExport_FilterCombinations(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
log, cleanup := setupExportTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
run := fmt.Sprintf("_%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
tenantA, tenantB := "test_fa"+run, "test_fb"+run
|
||||
alice, bob := "alice"+run, "bob"+run
|
||||
|
||||
events := []Event{
|
||||
{TenantSlug: tenantA, Actor: alice, Action: "login", Target: "x"},
|
||||
{TenantSlug: tenantA, Actor: bob, Action: "login", Target: "x"},
|
||||
{TenantSlug: tenantA, Actor: alice, Action: "logout", Target: "x"},
|
||||
{TenantSlug: tenantB, Actor: alice, Action: "login", Target: "x"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, e := range events {
|
||||
if err := log.Record(ctx, e); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("record: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
filter Filter
|
||||
wantLen int
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"nach tenant", Filter{TenantSlug: tenantA}, 3},
|
||||
{"nach tenant+actor", Filter{TenantSlug: tenantA, Actor: alice}, 2},
|
||||
{"nach tenant+actor+action", Filter{TenantSlug: tenantA, Actor: alice, Action: "login"}, 1},
|
||||
{"nach actor ueber beide tenants", Filter{Actor: alice, Action: "login"}, 2},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, c := range cases {
|
||||
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
if err := log.StreamCSV(ctx, c.filter, &buf); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("stream: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rows, err := csv.NewReader(&buf).ReadAll()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("csv parsen: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got := len(rows) - 1 // Header abziehen
|
||||
if got != c.wantLen {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet %d zeilen, habe %d", c.wantLen, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 2: Zeitraum-Filter.
|
||||
func TestExport_TimeRangeFilter(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
log, cleanup := setupExportTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
tenant := fmt.Sprintf("test_tr_%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
past := time.Now().Add(-48 * time.Hour)
|
||||
future := time.Now().Add(48 * time.Hour)
|
||||
|
||||
if err := log.Record(ctx, Event{TenantSlug: tenant, Actor: "a", Action: "x", Target: "t", OccurredAt: time.Now()}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("record: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
if err := log.StreamCSV(ctx, Filter{TenantSlug: tenant, From: &past, To: &future}, &buf); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("stream (innerhalb range): %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := countLines(buf.String()) - 1; got != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 1 eintrag innerhalb des zeitraums, habe %d", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
farPast := time.Now().Add(-96 * time.Hour)
|
||||
buf.Reset()
|
||||
if err := log.StreamCSV(ctx, Filter{TenantSlug: tenant, From: &farPast, To: &past}, &buf); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("stream (ausserhalb range): %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := countLines(buf.String()) - 1; got != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 0 eintraege ausserhalb des zeitraums, habe %d", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func countLines(s string) int {
|
||||
s = strings.TrimRight(s, "\n")
|
||||
if s == "" {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
return len(strings.Split(s, "\n"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 1: Export mit hoher Eintragszahl ohne
|
||||
// uebermaessigen Speicherverbrauch — Stichprobe per runtime.MemStats.
|
||||
func TestExport_StreamsLargeResultWithoutExcessiveMemory(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
log, cleanup := setupExportTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
tenant := fmt.Sprintf("test_large_%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||
const n = 20000
|
||||
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
|
||||
if err := log.Record(ctx, Event{TenantSlug: tenant, Actor: "bulk", Action: "test.bulk", Target: fmt.Sprintf("obj-%d", i)}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("record %d: %v", i, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
runtime.GC()
|
||||
var before runtime.MemStats
|
||||
runtime.ReadMemStats(&before)
|
||||
|
||||
lineCount := 0
|
||||
cw := &countingWriter{onWrite: func(p []byte) { lineCount += strings.Count(string(p), "\n") }}
|
||||
if err := log.StreamCSV(ctx, Filter{TenantSlug: tenant}, cw); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("stream: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
runtime.GC()
|
||||
var after runtime.MemStats
|
||||
runtime.ReadMemStats(&after)
|
||||
|
||||
if lineCount != n+1 { // +1 Header
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet %d zeilen (inkl. header), habe %d", n+1, lineCount)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grobe Stichprobe: ein NICHT streamender Export haette hier locker
|
||||
// mehrere MB an einmal gehaltenen Zeilen/Strings erzeugt. Grosszuegige
|
||||
// Schwelle, da Go-Heap-Messungen naturgemaess rauschen.
|
||||
const maxAcceptableGrowth = 3 * 1024 * 1024 // 3 MB
|
||||
growth := int64(after.HeapAlloc) - int64(before.HeapAlloc)
|
||||
t.Logf("heap-wachstum waehrend export von %d zeilen: %d bytes (schwelle: %d)", n, growth, maxAcceptableGrowth)
|
||||
if growth > maxAcceptableGrowth {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("heap ist um %d bytes gewachsen, erwartet unter %d (hinweis auf vollstaendige pufferung statt streaming)", growth, maxAcceptableGrowth)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type countingWriter struct {
|
||||
onWrite func(p []byte)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (w *countingWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
w.onWrite(p)
|
||||
return len(p), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 3: Zugriff ohne passende Berechtigung wird abgewiesen.
|
||||
func TestExportHandler_RejectsWithoutAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
log, cleanup := setupExportTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
handler := NewExportHandler(log, func(ctx context.Context, caller string) bool {
|
||||
return caller == "berechtigte-person@example.com"
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/audit/export?caller=unberechtigt@example.com", nil)
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
handler.Export(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unberechtigt: status = %d, want 403", rec.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reqNoCaller := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/audit/export", nil)
|
||||
recNoCaller := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
handler.Export(recNoCaller, reqNoCaller)
|
||||
if recNoCaller.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("ohne caller: status = %d, want 403", recNoCaller.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reqOK := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/audit/export?caller=berechtigte-person@example.com", nil)
|
||||
recOK := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
handler.Export(recOK, reqOK)
|
||||
if recOK.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("berechtigt: status = %d, want 200", recOK.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
|
||||
// Package flag implementiert Core LIC-02: einen Feature-Flag-Dienst mit
|
||||
// Strategien (global an/aus, Prozentsatz, Tenant-Zielgruppe) als Kernfunktion
|
||||
// des Core-Dienstes selbst — keine zusaetzliche Infrastruktur (Unleash-Server
|
||||
// + eigene DB), siehe "bewusst vermeiden" im LIC-02-Ticket.
|
||||
package flag
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"hash/fnv"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrNotFound = errors.New("flag: nicht gefunden")
|
||||
|
||||
// Flag ist die zentrale Definition — Auswertung (Evaluate) ist bewusst davon
|
||||
// getrennt (Unleash-Prinzip: Flag-Verwaltung vs. Flag-Auswertung).
|
||||
type Flag struct {
|
||||
Key string
|
||||
Enabled bool
|
||||
RolloutPercentage int
|
||||
TargetTenantSlugs []string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Store ist die Verwaltungsseite (Admin): Flags definieren/lesen.
|
||||
type Store struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Store {
|
||||
return &Store{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) Set(ctx context.Context, f Flag) error {
|
||||
if f.TargetTenantSlugs == nil {
|
||||
f.TargetTenantSlugs = []string{} // pgx uebertraegt ein nil-Slice sonst als SQL NULL statt leerem Array.
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO feature_flags (key, enabled, rollout_percentage, target_tenant_slugs, updated_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, now())
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE SET
|
||||
enabled = $2, rollout_percentage = $3, target_tenant_slugs = $4, updated_at = now()
|
||||
`, f.Key, f.Enabled, f.RolloutPercentage, f.TargetTenantSlugs)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("flag speichern: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) Get(ctx context.Context, key string) (Flag, error) {
|
||||
var f Flag
|
||||
row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT key, enabled, rollout_percentage, target_tenant_slugs
|
||||
FROM feature_flags WHERE key = $1
|
||||
`, key)
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&f.Key, &f.Enabled, &f.RolloutPercentage, &f.TargetTenantSlugs); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return Flag{}, ErrNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Flag{}, fmt.Errorf("flag lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return f, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// evaluate wendet die Strategien in fester Reihenfolge an: globaler
|
||||
// An/Aus-Schalter zuerst, dann Tenant-Zielgruppe, dann Prozentsatz-Rollout.
|
||||
// Ein unbekannter/nicht getroffener Fall ergibt false — Fail-Safe-Default,
|
||||
// kein Feature wird versehentlich aktiv.
|
||||
func evaluate(f Flag, tenantSlug string) bool {
|
||||
if f.Enabled {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, target := range f.TargetTenantSlugs {
|
||||
if target == tenantSlug {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if f.RolloutPercentage > 0 {
|
||||
h := fnv.New32a()
|
||||
_, _ = h.Write([]byte(f.Key + "|" + tenantSlug))
|
||||
return int(h.Sum32()%100) < f.RolloutPercentage
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
|
||||
package flag
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultCacheTTL ist die dokumentierte Cache-Invalidierungszeit
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2/3): eine Aenderung wirkt spaetestens nach dieser
|
||||
// Zeit auf allen Core-Instanzen, ohne dass ein Dienst neu gestartet werden
|
||||
// muss (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
const DefaultCacheTTL = 5 * time.Second
|
||||
|
||||
type cacheEntry struct {
|
||||
flag Flag
|
||||
expiresAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Service ist die Auswertungsseite (SDK/Client-Analogon zu Unleash) mit
|
||||
// lokalem TTL-Cache. Bewusst getrennt von Store (Verwaltung).
|
||||
type Service struct {
|
||||
store *Store
|
||||
ttl time.Duration
|
||||
|
||||
mu sync.RWMutex
|
||||
cache map[string]cacheEntry
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewService(store *Store, ttl time.Duration) *Service {
|
||||
if ttl <= 0 {
|
||||
ttl = DefaultCacheTTL
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Service{store: store, ttl: ttl, cache: make(map[string]cacheEntry)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsEnabled wertet ein Flag fuer einen Tenant aus. Liefert IMMER einen
|
||||
// bool ohne Fehlerwert — ein nicht erreichbarer Flag-Dienst darf abhaengige
|
||||
// Aufrufer nicht zum Absturz bringen oder zu Fehlerbehandlungscode zwingen,
|
||||
// der leicht vergessen wird (Akzeptanzkriterium 3 / Pruefung 3: dokumentiertes
|
||||
// Fallback-Verhalten = false, ggf. aus dem zuletzt bekannten Zwischenspeicher).
|
||||
func (s *Service) IsEnabled(ctx context.Context, tenantSlug, key string) bool {
|
||||
f, ok := s.resolve(ctx, key)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return evaluate(f, tenantSlug)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Service) resolve(ctx context.Context, key string) (Flag, bool) {
|
||||
s.mu.RLock()
|
||||
entry, exists := s.cache[key]
|
||||
fresh := exists && time.Now().Before(entry.expiresAt)
|
||||
s.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if fresh {
|
||||
return entry.flag, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f, err := s.store.Get(ctx, key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if exists {
|
||||
slog.Warn("feature-flag-dienst nicht erreichbar, nutze zwischengespeicherten stand",
|
||||
"flag_key", key, "error", err)
|
||||
return entry.flag, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
slog.Warn("feature-flag-dienst nicht erreichbar, kein zwischengespeicherter stand vorhanden, fallback: deaktiviert",
|
||||
"flag_key", key, "error", err)
|
||||
return Flag{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
s.cache[key] = cacheEntry{flag: f, expiresAt: time.Now().Add(s.ttl)}
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return f, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Invalidate erzwingt beim naechsten IsEnabled-Aufruf ein sofortiges Neuladen
|
||||
// aus der Datenbank statt auf den TTL-Ablauf zu warten — wird nach Store.Set
|
||||
// auf derselben Instanz aufgerufen, damit der Schreiber die eigene Aenderung
|
||||
// ohne Wartezeit sieht. Andere Core-Instanzen sehen sie spaetestens nach
|
||||
// DefaultCacheTTL (siehe Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
func (s *Service) Invalidate(key string) {
|
||||
s.mu.Lock()
|
||||
delete(s.cache, key)
|
||||
s.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
||||
package policy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrDenied wird geliefert, wenn keine Regel role+permission erlaubt —
|
||||
// Default-Deny (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
|
||||
var ErrDenied = errors.New("policy: zugriff verweigert")
|
||||
|
||||
// Enforcer ist die EINE zentrale Entscheidungs- und Durchsetzungsschicht
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 1). Repository-/Query-Code ruft ausschliesslich Guard
|
||||
// bzw. GuardTenantScoped auf, nie eine Rohabfrage direkt.
|
||||
type Enforcer struct {
|
||||
store *Store
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewEnforcer(store *Store) *Enforcer {
|
||||
return &Enforcer{store: store}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Authorize entscheidet erlaubt/verboten — unabhaengig von jeder konkreten
|
||||
// Query, rein anhand der deklarativen Regeln (Akzeptanzkriterium 2: fuer
|
||||
// sich genommen testbar, ohne Anwendungslogik).
|
||||
func (e *Enforcer) Authorize(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission) error {
|
||||
allowed, err := e.store.IsAllowed(ctx, role, perm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !allowed {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: rolle %q hat kein recht %q", ErrDenied, role, perm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Guard ist die zentrale Enforcement-Funktion (Akzeptanzkriterium 1): query
|
||||
// wird NUR aufgerufen, wenn Authorize zustimmt. Es gibt keinen Weg, query
|
||||
// ausserhalb von Guard aufzurufen und trotzdem den Aufrufer als autorisiert
|
||||
// zu behandeln — die Autorisierungsentscheidung steht immer VOR dem
|
||||
// Datenzugriff, nie danach.
|
||||
func Guard[T any](ctx context.Context, e *Enforcer, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission, query func(ctx context.Context) (T, error)) (T, error) {
|
||||
var zero T
|
||||
if err := e.Authorize(ctx, role, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
return zero, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return query(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GuardTenantScoped erzwingt zusaetzlich, dass tenantSlug TEIL der Query-
|
||||
// Funktion selbst ist (Akzeptanzkriterium 3): der Funktionstyp verlangt,
|
||||
// dass die Repository-Implementierung tenantSlug in ihre eigene WHERE-
|
||||
// Klausel einbaut — ein nachgelagerter Filter auf dem Ergebnis (der
|
||||
// archivmail-Fehler aus "Bekannte Fehler vermeiden") ist mit dieser
|
||||
// Signatur nicht moeglich, da die Query-Funktion tenantSlug selbst
|
||||
// entgegennimmt und dafuer verantwortlich ist, statt ihn hinterher
|
||||
// anzuwenden.
|
||||
func GuardTenantScoped[T any](ctx context.Context, e *Enforcer, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission, tenantSlug string, query func(ctx context.Context, tenantSlug string) (T, error)) (T, error) {
|
||||
var zero T
|
||||
if err := e.Authorize(ctx, role, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
return zero, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return query(ctx, tenantSlug)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
|
||||
package policy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/flag"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ModuleScope verknuepft eine Policy-Regel mit einem Feature-Flag: existiert
|
||||
// ein ModuleScope fuer (role, permission), gilt die Regel nur zusaetzlich zur
|
||||
// Grundberechtigung, wenn FlagKey fuer den jeweiligen Tenant aktiv ist
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 1: Rechte folgen der Lizenz).
|
||||
type ModuleScope struct {
|
||||
Role rbac.Role
|
||||
Permission rbac.Permission
|
||||
Module string
|
||||
FlagKey string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetModuleScope verknuepft eine bestehende Policy-Regel mit einem Modul/
|
||||
// Feature-Flag. Die Regel selbst (Store.Grant) muss unabhaengig davon
|
||||
// existieren — ModuleScope schraenkt sie nur zusaetzlich ein.
|
||||
func (s *Store) SetModuleScope(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission, module, flagKey string) error {
|
||||
_, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO policy_module_scopes (role, permission, module, flag_key)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role, permission) DO UPDATE SET module = $3, flag_key = $4
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm), module, flagKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("modul-scope setzen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) GetModuleScope(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission) (ModuleScope, bool, error) {
|
||||
var ms ModuleScope
|
||||
ms.Role, ms.Permission = role, perm
|
||||
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT module, flag_key FROM policy_module_scopes WHERE role = $1 AND permission = $2
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm)).Scan(&ms.Module, &ms.FlagKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return ModuleScope{}, false, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ModuleScope{}, false, fmt.Errorf("modul-scope lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ms, true, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthorizeForTenant ist dieselbe zentrale Entscheidungsfunktion wie
|
||||
// Authorize (Akzeptanzkriterium 3: keine zweite Enforcement-Schicht),
|
||||
// erweitert um die Modul-Scoping-Pruefung: eine sonst passende Regel greift
|
||||
// NICHT, wenn das zugehoerige Modul fuer den Tenant nicht aktiviert ist
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 1). Feature-Flag-Aenderungen wirken ohne Neustart
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2), da flag.Service dieselbe TTL-Cache-Instanz der
|
||||
// aufrufenden Core-Instanz nutzt.
|
||||
func (e *Enforcer) AuthorizeForTenant(ctx context.Context, flags *flag.Service, tenantSlug string, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission) error {
|
||||
if err := e.Authorize(ctx, role, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
scope, found, err := e.store.GetModuleScope(ctx, role, perm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !found {
|
||||
return nil // keine Modul-Bindung fuer diese Regel — Grundberechtigung reicht.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !flags.IsEnabled(ctx, tenantSlug, scope.FlagKey) {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: modul %q ist fuer diesen mandanten nicht aktiviert", ErrDenied, scope.Module)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GuardModuleScoped ist Guard mit zusaetzlicher Modul-Scoping-Pruefung —
|
||||
// dieselbe zentrale Enforcement-Funktion, kein paralleler Mechanismus
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
func GuardModuleScoped[T any](ctx context.Context, e *Enforcer, flags *flag.Service, tenantSlug string, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission, query func(ctx context.Context) (T, error)) (T, error) {
|
||||
var zero T
|
||||
if err := e.AuthorizeForTenant(ctx, flags, tenantSlug, role, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
return zero, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return query(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
package policy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/flag"
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupModuleScopeTest(t *testing.T) (*Store, *Enforcer, *flag.Store, *flag.Service, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS policy_rules (
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL, permission TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY (role, permission)
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS policy_rule_changes (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), role TEXT NOT NULL, permission TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action IN ('grant','revoke')), actor TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
version INT NOT NULL, changed_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS policy_module_scopes (
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL, permission TEXT NOT NULL, module TEXT NOT NULL, flag_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY (role, permission)
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS feature_flags (
|
||||
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
|
||||
rollout_percentage INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, target_tenant_slugs TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
store := NewStore(pool)
|
||||
flagStore := flag.NewStore(pool)
|
||||
flagService := flag.NewService(flagStore, 10*time.Millisecond) // kurze TTL fuer testbare invalidierung
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup := func() {
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM policy_module_scopes WHERE role LIKE 'test\_%' ESCAPE '\'`)
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM policy_rule_changes WHERE role LIKE 'test\_%' ESCAPE '\'`)
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM policy_rules WHERE role LIKE 'test\_%' ESCAPE '\'`)
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM feature_flags WHERE key LIKE 'test\_%' ESCAPE '\'`)
|
||||
pool.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return store, NewEnforcer(store), flagStore, flagService, cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 1: Berechtigung fuer nicht aktiviertes
|
||||
// Modul greift nicht, selbst bei sonst passender Rolle.
|
||||
func TestAuthorizeForTenant_DeniesWhenModuleNotActivated(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, enforcer, _, flagService, cleanup := setupModuleScopeTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
role := rbac.Role("test_dms_nutzer")
|
||||
perm := rbac.Permission("test_dokumente_lesen")
|
||||
if err := store.Grant(ctx, role, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("grant: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := store.SetModuleScope(ctx, role, perm, "dms", "test_dms_enabled"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("set module scope: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Flag existiert nicht/ist nicht gesetzt -> IsEnabled liefert false (Fail-Safe-Default).
|
||||
|
||||
queryCalled := false
|
||||
_, err := GuardModuleScoped(ctx, enforcer, flagService, "acme", role, perm, func(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
|
||||
queryCalled = true
|
||||
return "daten", nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDenied) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrDenied bei deaktiviertem modul, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if queryCalled {
|
||||
t.Fatal("query haette bei deaktiviertem modul nicht aufgerufen werden duerfen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2: Aktivierung des Moduls macht die
|
||||
// Berechtigung ohne Neustart wirksam.
|
||||
func TestAuthorizeForTenant_BecomesActiveWithoutRestart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, enforcer, flagStore, flagService, cleanup := setupModuleScopeTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
role := rbac.Role("test_dms_nutzer2")
|
||||
perm := rbac.Permission("test_dokumente_schreiben")
|
||||
if err := store.Grant(ctx, role, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("grant: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := store.SetModuleScope(ctx, role, perm, "dms", "test_dms_enabled2"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("set module scope: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := enforcer.AuthorizeForTenant(ctx, flagService, "acme", role, perm); !errors.Is(err, ErrDenied) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("vor aktivierung: erwartet ErrDenied, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Modul "im laufenden Betrieb" aktivieren — derselbe Prozess, kein Neustart.
|
||||
if err := flagStore.Set(ctx, flag.Flag{Key: "test_dms_enabled2", Enabled: true}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("flag setzen: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) // TTL abwarten statt Neustart
|
||||
|
||||
if err := enforcer.AuthorizeForTenant(ctx, flagService, "acme", role, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("nach aktivierung sollte erlaubt sein: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 3: Zusammenspiel Modul-Scope + Rollenscope
|
||||
// in Kombinationsfaellen.
|
||||
func TestAuthorizeForTenant_CombinationsOfRoleAndModuleScope(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, enforcer, flagStore, flagService, cleanup := setupModuleScopeTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
scopedRole := rbac.Role("test_scoped_rolle")
|
||||
unscopedRole := rbac.Role("test_unscoped_rolle")
|
||||
perm := rbac.Permission("test_kombiniert")
|
||||
|
||||
// Fall 1: Rolle ohne jegliche Regel -> verboten, unabhaengig vom Flag.
|
||||
if err := enforcer.AuthorizeForTenant(ctx, flagService, "acme", rbac.Role("test_unbekannt"), perm); !errors.Is(err, ErrDenied) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("fall 1: erwartet ErrDenied (keine regel), habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fall 2: Regel vorhanden, KEIN Modul-Scope -> immer erlaubt (Grundrecht ohne Lizenzbindung).
|
||||
if err := store.Grant(ctx, unscopedRole, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("grant unscoped: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := enforcer.AuthorizeForTenant(ctx, flagService, "acme", unscopedRole, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("fall 2: erwartet erlaubt ohne modul-scope, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fall 3: Regel + Modul-Scope, Flag aus -> verboten.
|
||||
if err := store.Grant(ctx, scopedRole, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("grant scoped: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := store.SetModuleScope(ctx, scopedRole, perm, "mail", "test_mail_enabled"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("set module scope: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := enforcer.AuthorizeForTenant(ctx, flagService, "acme", scopedRole, perm); !errors.Is(err, ErrDenied) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("fall 3: erwartet ErrDenied (modul aus), habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fall 4: Regel + Modul-Scope, Flag an -> erlaubt.
|
||||
if err := flagStore.Set(ctx, flag.Flag{Key: "test_mail_enabled", Enabled: true}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("flag setzen: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
if err := enforcer.AuthorizeForTenant(ctx, flagService, "acme", scopedRole, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("fall 4: erwartet erlaubt (modul an), habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
|
||||
package policy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupTest(t *testing.T) (*Store, *Enforcer, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS policy_rules (
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL, permission TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY (role, permission)
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS policy_rule_changes (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), role TEXT NOT NULL, permission TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action IN ('grant','revoke')), actor TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
version INT NOT NULL, changed_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
store := NewStore(pool)
|
||||
cleanup := func() {
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM policy_rule_changes WHERE role LIKE 'test\_%' ESCAPE '\'`)
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM policy_rules WHERE role LIKE 'test\_%' ESCAPE '\'`)
|
||||
pool.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return store, NewEnforcer(store), cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2: Anfrage ohne passende Policy wird
|
||||
// zuverlaessig abgewiesen (Default-Deny), nicht standardmaessig erlaubt.
|
||||
func TestAuthorize_DefaultDeny(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, enforcer, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
err := enforcer.Authorize(ctx, rbac.Role("test_niemand"), rbac.Permission("test_irgendwas"))
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDenied) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrDenied ohne konfigurierte regel, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 1: Guard ruft query NUR bei Autorisierung
|
||||
// auf — kein Datenzugriffs-Pfad umgeht die Enforcement-Schicht.
|
||||
func TestGuard_NeverCallsQueryWithoutAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, enforcer, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
role := rbac.Role("test_rolle_guard")
|
||||
perm := rbac.Permission("test_lesen")
|
||||
|
||||
queryCalled := false
|
||||
_, err := Guard(ctx, enforcer, role, perm, func(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
|
||||
queryCalled = true
|
||||
return "geheime-daten", nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDenied) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrDenied, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if queryCalled {
|
||||
t.Fatal("query haette bei fehlender autorisierung NICHT aufgerufen werden duerfen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := store.Grant(ctx, role, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("grant: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
result, err := Guard(ctx, enforcer, role, perm, func(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
|
||||
queryCalled = true
|
||||
return "geheime-daten", nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("guard nach grant: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !queryCalled || result != "geheime-daten" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet query-aufruf mit ergebnis nach autorisierung, habe queryCalled=%v result=%q", queryCalled, result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + 3: Policy-Entscheidungen deklarativ und unabhaengig
|
||||
// von Anwendungslogik testbar — Regelwechsel wirkt ohne Codeaenderung,
|
||||
// Historie ist versioniert nachvollziehbar.
|
||||
func TestGrantRevoke_ChangesBehaviorWithoutCodeChange(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, enforcer, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
role := rbac.Role("test_rolle_history")
|
||||
perm := rbac.Permission("test_schreiben")
|
||||
|
||||
allowed, err := store.IsAllowed(ctx, role, perm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("is allowed (vorher): %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if allowed {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet nicht erlaubt vor grant")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := store.Grant(ctx, role, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("grant: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := enforcer.Authorize(ctx, role, perm); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("authorize nach grant sollte erlauben: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := store.Revoke(ctx, role, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("revoke: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := enforcer.Authorize(ctx, role, perm); !errors.Is(err, ErrDenied) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("authorize nach revoke sollte verweigern, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
history, err := store.History(ctx, role, perm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("history: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(history) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 2 historieneintraege (grant, revoke), habe %d", len(history))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if history[0].Action != "grant" || history[0].Version != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("history[0] unerwartet: %+v", history[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if history[1].Action != "revoke" || history[1].Version != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("history[1] unerwartet: %+v", history[1])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 3 (Tenant-Scoping): GuardTenantScoped
|
||||
// zwingt tenantSlug in die Query-Funktion selbst, kein Post-Filter moeglich.
|
||||
func TestGuardTenantScoped_IsolatesDataBetweenTenants(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, enforcer, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
// Simuliertes Repository: die WHERE-Klausel (hier: Map-Lookup) liegt
|
||||
// INNERHALB der Query-Funktion, nicht als nachgelagerter Filter.
|
||||
data := map[string][]string{
|
||||
"acme": {"dokument-a1", "dokument-a2"},
|
||||
"globex": {"dokument-b1"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
repoQuery := func(ctx context.Context, tenantSlug string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
return data[tenantSlug], nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role := rbac.Role("test_tenant_rolle")
|
||||
perm := rbac.Permission("test_dokumente_lesen")
|
||||
if err := enforcer.store.Grant(ctx, role, perm, "admin@example.com"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("grant: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gotAcme, err := GuardTenantScoped(ctx, enforcer, role, perm, "acme", repoQuery)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("guard tenant scoped (acme): %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(gotAcme) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 2 dokumente fuer acme, habe %d", len(gotAcme))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gotGlobex, err := GuardTenantScoped(ctx, enforcer, role, perm, "globex", repoQuery)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("guard tenant scoped (globex): %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(gotGlobex) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 1 dokument fuer globex, habe %d", len(gotGlobex))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
|
||||
// Package policy implementiert Core RBAC-02: die zentrale Policy-
|
||||
// Entscheidungs- und Durchsetzungsschicht. Regeln liegen deklarativ in der
|
||||
// Datenbank (Casbin-Prinzip: Policy als Modell+Regeln getrennt vom Code),
|
||||
// versioniert und auditierbar — anders als Casbin-Dateien im Dateisystem
|
||||
// (siehe "bewusst vermeiden" im Ticket).
|
||||
package policy
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Rule ist eine gewaehrte Regel: role darf permission.
|
||||
type Rule struct {
|
||||
Role rbac.Role
|
||||
Permission rbac.Permission
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RuleChange ist ein Eintrag der Aenderungshistorie (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
type RuleChange struct {
|
||||
Role rbac.Role
|
||||
Permission rbac.Permission
|
||||
Action string // "grant" oder "revoke"
|
||||
Actor string
|
||||
Version int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Store verwaltet den deklarativen Regelsatz. IsAllowed schaut NUR in die
|
||||
// Datenbank — es gibt keinen hartcodierten Go-Fallback, ein Regelwechsel
|
||||
// wirkt sich ohne Codeaenderung sofort aus (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 / 3).
|
||||
type Store struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Store {
|
||||
return &Store{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsAllowed prueft, ob role das Recht permission besitzt. Default-Deny:
|
||||
// existiert keine passende Regel, ist der Zugriff verboten
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 / Pruefung 2) — es gibt keinen impliziten
|
||||
// "erlaubt, wenn nichts anderes gesagt"-Pfad.
|
||||
func (s *Store) IsAllowed(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission) (bool, error) {
|
||||
var exists bool
|
||||
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM policy_rules WHERE role = $1 AND permission = $2)
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm)).Scan(&exists)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, fmt.Errorf("policy pruefen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return exists, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grant gewaehrt role das Recht permission — deklarativ, ohne Codeaenderung
|
||||
// wirksam. actor wird fuer die Aenderungshistorie festgehalten.
|
||||
func (s *Store) Grant(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission, actor string) error {
|
||||
return s.change(ctx, role, perm, "grant", actor, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO policy_rules (role, permission, granted_by, granted_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (role, permission) DO UPDATE SET granted_by = $3, granted_at = now()
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm), actor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Revoke entzieht role das Recht permission.
|
||||
func (s *Store) Revoke(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission, actor string) error {
|
||||
return s.change(ctx, role, perm, "revoke", actor, `
|
||||
DELETE FROM policy_rules WHERE role = $1 AND permission = $2
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) change(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission, action, actor, sql string, args ...any) error {
|
||||
tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("transaktion starten: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback(ctx) }()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, sql, args...); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("regel aendern: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var version int
|
||||
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT COALESCE(MAX(version), 0) + 1 FROM policy_rule_changes WHERE role = $1 AND permission = $2
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm)).Scan(&version); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("naechste version ermitteln: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO policy_rule_changes (role, permission, action, actor, version, changed_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, now())
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm), action, actor, version); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("historie schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return tx.Commit(ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// History liefert die vollstaendige, versionierte Aenderungshistorie einer
|
||||
// Regel (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
func (s *Store) History(ctx context.Context, role rbac.Role, perm rbac.Permission) ([]RuleChange, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT action, actor, version FROM policy_rule_changes
|
||||
WHERE role = $1 AND permission = $2 ORDER BY version
|
||||
`, string(role), string(perm))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historie abfragen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
var out []RuleChange
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
c := RuleChange{Role: role, Permission: perm}
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&c.Action, &c.Actor, &c.Version); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historieneintrag lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
// Package rbac implementiert Core RBAC-01: das Rollenmodell mit
|
||||
// Grundrollen/-rechten, Hierarchie und Zuweisung. Die eigentliche
|
||||
// Durchsetzung (erlaubt/verboten je Request) ist RBAC-02, dieses Paket
|
||||
// liefert nur Modell + Zuweisung (Casbin-Prinzip: Policy-Modell getrennt
|
||||
// von der Entscheidungsfunktion).
|
||||
package rbac
|
||||
|
||||
// Role ist eine der drei Grundrollen. Superadmin lebt mandantenuebergreifend
|
||||
// (siehe internal/user.SuperadminStore aus IAM-01) und wird deshalb NICHT
|
||||
// ueber Store (tenant-gescoped) zugewiesen — die Existenz eines Superadmin-
|
||||
// Kontos IST die Rollenzuweisung.
|
||||
type Role string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
RoleSuperadmin Role = "superadmin"
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin Role = "tenant_admin"
|
||||
RoleUser Role = "user"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type Permission string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
PermSelfRead Permission = "self.read"
|
||||
PermSelfUpdate Permission = "self.update"
|
||||
PermManageUsers Permission = "tenant.manage_users"
|
||||
PermManageSettings Permission = "tenant.manage_settings"
|
||||
PermManageTenants Permission = "platform.manage_tenants"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// parent bildet die Rollenhierarchie ab (Akzeptanzkriterium 2): eine Rolle
|
||||
// erbt alle Rechte ihrer Elternrolle. tenant_admin erbt von user,
|
||||
// superadmin erbt von tenant_admin.
|
||||
var parent = map[Role]Role{
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin: RoleUser,
|
||||
RoleSuperadmin: RoleTenantAdmin,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// direct sind die einer Rolle direkt (ohne Vererbung) zugeordneten Rechte.
|
||||
var direct = map[Role][]Permission{
|
||||
RoleUser: {PermSelfRead, PermSelfUpdate},
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin: {PermManageUsers, PermManageSettings},
|
||||
RoleSuperadmin: {PermManageTenants},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// EffectivePermissions liefert die vollstaendige, ueber die Hierarchie
|
||||
// aufgeloeste Rechtemenge einer Rolle (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 / Pruefung 2).
|
||||
func EffectivePermissions(role Role) []Permission {
|
||||
seen := make(map[Permission]bool)
|
||||
var out []Permission
|
||||
|
||||
for r, ok := role, true; ok; r, ok = parent[r] {
|
||||
for _, p := range direct[r] {
|
||||
if !seen[p] {
|
||||
seen[p] = true
|
||||
out = append(out, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HasPermission prueft, ob eine Rolle (inklusive geerbter Rechte) ein
|
||||
// bestimmtes Recht besitzt.
|
||||
func HasPermission(role Role, perm Permission) bool {
|
||||
for _, p := range EffectivePermissions(role) {
|
||||
if p == perm {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
package rbac
|
||||
|
||||
import "testing"
|
||||
|
||||
func contains(perms []Permission, p Permission) bool {
|
||||
for _, x := range perms {
|
||||
if x == p {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2: Rollenhierarchie liefert die erwartete
|
||||
// effektive Rechtemenge.
|
||||
func TestEffectivePermissions_Inheritance(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
userPerms := EffectivePermissions(RoleUser)
|
||||
if !contains(userPerms, PermSelfRead) || !contains(userPerms, PermSelfUpdate) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("user sollte self.read/self.update haben, habe %v", userPerms)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if contains(userPerms, PermManageUsers) {
|
||||
t.Fatal("user sollte KEIN tenant.manage_users haben")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
adminPerms := EffectivePermissions(RoleTenantAdmin)
|
||||
if !contains(adminPerms, PermSelfRead) || !contains(adminPerms, PermManageUsers) || !contains(adminPerms, PermManageSettings) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("tenant_admin sollte geerbte user-rechte + eigene rechte haben, habe %v", adminPerms)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if contains(adminPerms, PermManageTenants) {
|
||||
t.Fatal("tenant_admin sollte KEIN platform.manage_tenants haben")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
superPerms := EffectivePermissions(RoleSuperadmin)
|
||||
for _, want := range []Permission{PermSelfRead, PermSelfUpdate, PermManageUsers, PermManageSettings, PermManageTenants} {
|
||||
if !contains(superPerms, want) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("superadmin sollte %q haben (volle vererbte kette), habe %v", want, superPerms)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHasPermission(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if !HasPermission(RoleTenantAdmin, PermSelfRead) {
|
||||
t.Fatal("tenant_admin sollte geerbtes self.read haben")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if HasPermission(RoleUser, PermManageTenants) {
|
||||
t.Fatal("user sollte platform.manage_tenants nicht haben")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
|
||||
package rbac
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope wird geliefert, wenn versucht wird,
|
||||
// eine mandantenuebergreifende Rolle (superadmin) ueber den tenant-
|
||||
// gescopten Store zu vergeben — die erlaubte Matrix laesst hier nur
|
||||
// user/tenant_admin zu (Akzeptanzkriterium 1 / Pruefung 1).
|
||||
ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope = errors.New("rbac: rolle ist in diesem geltungsbereich nicht zuweisbar")
|
||||
ErrNotFound = errors.New("rbac: keine rollenzuweisung gefunden")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// assignableRoles ist die erlaubte Matrix fuer Store (tenant-gescoped).
|
||||
var assignableRoles = map[Role]bool{
|
||||
RoleUser: true,
|
||||
RoleTenantAdmin: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Assignment struct {
|
||||
UserID string
|
||||
Role Role
|
||||
GrantedBy string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Store verwaltet Rollenzuweisungen innerhalb GENAU EINER Tenant-Datenbank —
|
||||
// analog zu internal/user.TenantUserStore (Modell C: der Pool bestimmt den
|
||||
// Tenant, keine tenant_id-Spalte noetig).
|
||||
type Store struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Store {
|
||||
return &Store{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assign vergibt eine Rolle an einen Benutzer. grantedBy identifiziert den
|
||||
// Akteur, der die Zuweisung vorgenommen hat (Akzeptanzkriterium 3). Jede
|
||||
// Zuweisung wird zusaetzlich in role_assignment_history festgehalten, auch
|
||||
// wenn sie eine vorherige Rolle ersetzt.
|
||||
func (s *Store) Assign(ctx context.Context, userID string, role Role, grantedBy string) (Assignment, error) {
|
||||
if !assignableRoles[role] {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope
|
||||
}
|
||||
if grantedBy == "" {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, errors.New("rbac: grantedBy darf nicht leer sein")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("transaktion starten: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback(ctx) }()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_assignments (user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET role = $2, granted_by = $3, granted_at = now()
|
||||
`, userID, string(role), grantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("rolle zuweisen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO role_assignment_history (user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
|
||||
`, userID, string(role), grantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("historie schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("transaktion committen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Assignment{UserID: userID, Role: role, GrantedBy: grantedBy}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Store) Get(ctx context.Context, userID string) (Assignment, error) {
|
||||
var a Assignment
|
||||
var role string
|
||||
a.UserID = userID
|
||||
if err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT role, granted_by FROM role_assignments WHERE user_id = $1
|
||||
`, userID).Scan(&role, &a.GrantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return Assignment{}, ErrNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("rollenzuweisung lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.Role = Role(role)
|
||||
return a, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// History liefert jede Rollenzuweisung eines Benutzers in chronologischer
|
||||
// Reihenfolge — die Grundlage fuer "wer hat wann welche Rolle vergeben"
|
||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||
func (s *Store) History(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Assignment, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT role, granted_by FROM role_assignment_history
|
||||
WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY granted_at
|
||||
`, userID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historie abfragen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
var out []Assignment
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var role string
|
||||
a := Assignment{UserID: userID}
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&role, &a.GrantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historieneintrag lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.Role = Role(role)
|
||||
out = append(out, a)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
|
||||
package rbac
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
|
||||
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupStoreTest(t *testing.T) (*Store, string, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||||
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignments (
|
||||
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id),
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user', 'tenant_admin')),
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignment_history (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
user_id UUID NOT NULL,
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
userStore := user.NewTenantUserStore(pool)
|
||||
u, err := userStore.Create(ctx, "rbac_test@example.com", "RBAC Test")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("testuser anlegen: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup := func() {
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM role_assignment_history WHERE user_id = $1`, u.ID)
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM role_assignments WHERE user_id = $1`, u.ID)
|
||||
_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1`, u.ID)
|
||||
pool.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NewStore(pool), u.ID, cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1: Grundrollen sind einem Benutzer je Tenant zuweisbar.
|
||||
func TestStore_AssignAndGet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, userID, cleanup := setupStoreTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
assigned, err := store.Assign(ctx, userID, RoleTenantAdmin, "admin@acme.example")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("assign: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if assigned.Role != RoleTenantAdmin {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet tenant_admin, habe %q", assigned.Role)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got, err := store.Get(ctx, userID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.Role != RoleTenantAdmin || got.GrantedBy != "admin@acme.example" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("zuweisung unerwartet: %+v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 1: Zuweisung ausserhalb der erlaubten
|
||||
// Matrix (superadmin im tenant-gescopten Store) wird abgewiesen.
|
||||
func TestStore_RejectsSuperadminOutsideAllowedMatrix(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, userID, cleanup := setupStoreTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := store.Assign(ctx, userID, RoleSuperadmin, "admin@acme.example")
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sicherstellen, dass der abgewiesene Versuch keine Zeile hinterlassen hat.
|
||||
if _, err := store.Get(ctx, userID); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrNotFound nach abgewiesener zuweisung, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestStore_RejectsUnknownRole(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, userID, cleanup := setupStoreTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Assign(ctx, userID, Role("erfunden"), "admin@acme.example"); !errors.Is(err, ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope fuer unbekannte rolle, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3: Rollenzuweisung vollstaendig auditierbar.
|
||||
func TestStore_HistoryTracksWhoAndWhen(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, userID, cleanup := setupStoreTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Assign(ctx, userID, RoleUser, "system"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("assign 1: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := store.Assign(ctx, userID, RoleTenantAdmin, "admin@acme.example"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("assign 2: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
history, err := store.History(ctx, userID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("history: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(history) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 2 historieneintraege, habe %d", len(history))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if history[0].Role != RoleUser || history[0].GrantedBy != "system" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("history[0] unerwartet: %+v", history[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if history[1].Role != RoleTenantAdmin || history[1].GrantedBy != "admin@acme.example" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("history[1] unerwartet: %+v", history[1])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
|
||||
package user
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Handler stellt die CRUD-API fuer Benutzerkonten bereit (IAM-01-Auftrag).
|
||||
// Auth/Sessions (IAM-02) und Rollen (RBAC-01) sind ausdruecklich nicht Teil
|
||||
// dieser Kachel und daher hier noch nicht angebunden.
|
||||
type Handler struct {
|
||||
users *TenantUserStore
|
||||
superadmins *SuperadminStore
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewHandler(users *TenantUserStore, superadmins *SuperadminStore) *Handler {
|
||||
return &Handler{users: users, superadmins: superadmins}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type createUserRequest struct {
|
||||
Email string `json:"email"`
|
||||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *Handler) CreateUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
var req createUserRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "ungueltige Anfrage", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u, err := h.users.Create(r.Context(), req.Email, req.Name)
|
||||
writeUserResult(w, u, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CreateSuperadmin legt ein mandantenuebergreifendes Superadmin-Konto an —
|
||||
// bewusst ein eigener Endpunkt statt eines Tenant-Parameters mit Null-Wert.
|
||||
func (h *Handler) CreateSuperadmin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
var req createUserRequest
|
||||
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
||||
http.Error(w, "ungueltige Anfrage", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u, err := h.superadmins.Create(r.Context(), req.Email, req.Name)
|
||||
writeUserResult(w, u, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func writeUserResult(w http.ResponseWriter, u User, err error) {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidEmail), errors.Is(err, ErrEmailTaken):
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
|
||||
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
http.Error(w, "benutzer konnte nicht verarbeitet werden", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
|
||||
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(u)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
|
||||
package user
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// setupTestDB legt eine frische, isolierte Testdatenbank an, wendet die
|
||||
// uebergebene Migration an und liefert einen verbundenen Pool. Wird ohne
|
||||
// TEST_ADMIN_DSN uebersprungen — siehe internal/tenant/provisioner_test.go
|
||||
// fuer dasselbe Muster.
|
||||
func setupTestDB(t *testing.T, dbName, schemaSQL string) *pgxpool.Pool {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
adminPool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("admin pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, _ = adminPool.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf(`DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS %q`, dbName))
|
||||
if _, err := adminPool.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf(`CREATE DATABASE %q`, dbName)); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("testdatenbank anlegen: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
dsn := strings.Replace(adminDSN, "/postgres?", "/"+dbName+"?", 1)
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, dsn)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("connect testdatenbank: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, schemaSQL); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema anwenden: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
||||
pool.Close()
|
||||
_, _ = adminPool.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf(`DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS %q`, dbName))
|
||||
adminPool.Close()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
return pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const usersSchema = `
|
||||
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto;
|
||||
CREATE TABLE users (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||||
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);`
|
||||
|
||||
const superadminsSchema = `
|
||||
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto;
|
||||
CREATE TABLE superadmins (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||||
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);`
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + 3, Pruefung 1 (inkl. Negativfall doppelte E-Mail).
|
||||
func TestTenantUserStore_CRUD(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
pool := setupTestDB(t, "test_iam01_users", usersSchema)
|
||||
store := NewTenantUserStore(pool)
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
created, err := store.Create(ctx, "alice@example.com", "Alice")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if created.Status != StatusActive {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet status active, hat %q", created.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got, err := store.Get(ctx, created.ID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.Email != "alice@example.com" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("get email = %q", got.Email)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
updated, err := store.Update(ctx, created.ID, "", "Alice A.")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("update: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if updated.Name != "Alice A." || updated.Email != "alice@example.com" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("update ergebnis unerwartet: %+v", updated)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
list, err := store.List(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("list: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(list) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 1 benutzer, habe %d", len(list))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
deactivated, err := store.Deactivate(ctx, created.ID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("deactivate: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if deactivated.Status != StatusInactive {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet status inactive, hat %q", deactivated.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Negativfall: doppelte E-Mail-Adresse.
|
||||
if _, err := store.Create(ctx, "second@example.com", "Bob"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("create second: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := store.Create(ctx, "second@example.com", "Bob Zwei"); !errors.Is(err, ErrEmailTaken) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrEmailTaken, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Negativfall: fehlender Benutzer.
|
||||
if _, err := store.Get(ctx, created.ID+"-nicht-vorhanden"); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet fehler bei unbekannter/ungueltiger id")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2: Superadmin-Anlage ohne Tenant-Kontext.
|
||||
// SuperadminStore.Create hat keinen Tenant-Parameter — es gibt syntaktisch
|
||||
// keine Moeglichkeit, hier versehentlich einen Tenant-Sonderfall zu vergessen.
|
||||
func TestSuperadminStore_CreateWithoutTenantContext(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
pool := setupTestDB(t, "test_iam01_superadmins", superadminsSchema)
|
||||
store := NewSuperadminStore(pool)
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
created, err := store.Create(ctx, "root@nexarch.internal", "Root")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("create superadmin: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if created.Status != StatusActive {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet status active, hat %q", created.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got, err := store.Get(ctx, created.ID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.Email != "root@nexarch.internal" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("get email = %q", got.Email)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Create(ctx, "root@nexarch.internal", "Root Zwei"); !errors.Is(err, ErrEmailTaken) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrEmailTaken (globale eindeutigkeit), habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
deactivated, err := store.Deactivate(ctx, created.ID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("deactivate: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if deactivated.Status != StatusInactive {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet status inactive, hat %q", deactivated.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
||||
package user
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// SuperadminStore verwaltet mandantenuebergreifende Superadmin-Konten in der
|
||||
// Control-Plane-Registry (siehe internal/tenant.Registry). Superadmin-ohne-
|
||||
// Tenant ist dadurch ein eigener Typ statt eines Sonderfalls von User/
|
||||
// TenantUserStore — es gibt keinen Tenant-Parameter, den man weglassen
|
||||
// koennte (IAM-01, "ohne Sonderbehandlung im Code").
|
||||
type SuperadminStore struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewSuperadminStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *SuperadminStore {
|
||||
return &SuperadminStore{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *SuperadminStore) Create(ctx context.Context, email, name string) (User, error) {
|
||||
if err := ValidateEmail(email); err != nil {
|
||||
return User{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var u User
|
||||
u.Email, u.Name, u.Status = email, name, StatusActive
|
||||
|
||||
row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO superadmins (email, name, status)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
|
||||
RETURNING id, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
`, u.Email, u.Name, u.Status)
|
||||
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&u.ID, &u.CreatedAt, &u.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
return User{}, mapWriteErr(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *SuperadminStore) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (User, error) {
|
||||
return scanUser(s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, email, name, status, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
FROM superadmins WHERE id = $1
|
||||
`, id))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *SuperadminStore) List(ctx context.Context) ([]User, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, email, name, status, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
FROM superadmins ORDER BY created_at
|
||||
`)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("superadmins auflisten: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
var out []User
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var u User
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.Name, &u.Status, &u.CreatedAt, &u.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("superadmin lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, u)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *SuperadminStore) Deactivate(ctx context.Context, id string) (User, error) {
|
||||
return scanUser(s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
UPDATE superadmins SET status = $2, updated_at = now()
|
||||
WHERE id = $1
|
||||
RETURNING id, email, name, status, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
`, id, StatusInactive))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
|
||||
package user
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TenantUserStore verwaltet Benutzer innerhalb GENAU EINER Tenant-Datenbank.
|
||||
// Welcher Mandant gemeint ist, ergibt sich ausschliesslich aus dem
|
||||
// uebergebenen Pool — es gibt keine tenant_id-Spalte (siehe migrations/tenant/0001_users.up.sql).
|
||||
type TenantUserStore struct {
|
||||
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewTenantUserStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *TenantUserStore {
|
||||
return &TenantUserStore{pool: pool}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *TenantUserStore) Create(ctx context.Context, email, name string) (User, error) {
|
||||
if err := ValidateEmail(email); err != nil {
|
||||
return User{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var u User
|
||||
u.Email, u.Name, u.Status = email, name, StatusActive
|
||||
|
||||
row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
INSERT INTO users (email, name, status)
|
||||
VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
|
||||
RETURNING id, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
`, u.Email, u.Name, u.Status)
|
||||
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&u.ID, &u.CreatedAt, &u.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
return User{}, mapWriteErr(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *TenantUserStore) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (User, error) {
|
||||
return scanUser(s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, email, name, status, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
FROM users WHERE id = $1
|
||||
`, id))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *TenantUserStore) List(ctx context.Context) ([]User, error) {
|
||||
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
|
||||
SELECT id, email, name, status, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
FROM users ORDER BY created_at
|
||||
`)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("benutzer auflisten: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer rows.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
var out []User
|
||||
for rows.Next() {
|
||||
var u User
|
||||
if err := rows.Scan(&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.Name, &u.Status, &u.CreatedAt, &u.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("benutzer lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, u)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Update aendert Name und E-Mail. Eine leere email/name laesst das jeweilige
|
||||
// Feld unveraendert.
|
||||
func (s *TenantUserStore) Update(ctx context.Context, id, email, name string) (User, error) {
|
||||
if email != "" {
|
||||
if err := ValidateEmail(email); err != nil {
|
||||
return User{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
UPDATE users
|
||||
SET email = COALESCE(NULLIF($2, ''), email),
|
||||
name = COALESCE(NULLIF($3, ''), name),
|
||||
updated_at = now()
|
||||
WHERE id = $1
|
||||
RETURNING id, email, name, status, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
`, id, email, name)
|
||||
|
||||
u, err := scanUser(row)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return User{}, mapWriteErr(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Deactivate setzt den Benutzer auf inaktiv statt ihn zu loeschen.
|
||||
func (s *TenantUserStore) Deactivate(ctx context.Context, id string) (User, error) {
|
||||
return scanUser(s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||
UPDATE users SET status = $2, updated_at = now()
|
||||
WHERE id = $1
|
||||
RETURNING id, email, name, status, created_at, updated_at
|
||||
`, id, StatusInactive))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func scanUser(row pgx.Row) (User, error) {
|
||||
var u User
|
||||
if err := row.Scan(&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.Name, &u.Status, &u.CreatedAt, &u.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return User{}, ErrNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return User{}, fmt.Errorf("benutzer lesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mapWriteErr uebersetzt den Unique-Constraint-Verstoss der E-Mail-Spalte in
|
||||
// einen sprechenden Fehler statt der rohen Postgres-Fehlermeldung.
|
||||
func mapWriteErr(err error) error {
|
||||
var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
|
||||
if errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == "23505" {
|
||||
return ErrEmailTaken
|
||||
}
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return ErrNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("benutzer schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
// Package user implementiert Core IAM-01: das Benutzer-Datenmodell und die
|
||||
// CRUD-Operationen. Tenant-Zugehoerigkeit ist ueber die Zieldatenbank
|
||||
// gegeben (Modell C, siehe internal/tenant) — Superadmin-Konten leben
|
||||
// dagegen mandantenuebergreifend in der Registry und sind ueber
|
||||
// SuperadminStore als eigener, First-Class-Typ modelliert, nicht als
|
||||
// tenant_id-NULL-Sonderfall in User.
|
||||
package user
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"regexp"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type Status string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
StatusActive Status = "active"
|
||||
StatusInactive Status = "inactive"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type User struct {
|
||||
ID string
|
||||
Email string
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Status Status
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var emailPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$`)
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrInvalidEmail = errors.New("user: ungueltige E-Mail-Adresse")
|
||||
var ErrEmailTaken = errors.New("user: E-Mail-Adresse bereits vergeben")
|
||||
var ErrNotFound = errors.New("user: nicht gefunden")
|
||||
|
||||
func ValidateEmail(email string) error {
|
||||
if !emailPattern.MatchString(email) {
|
||||
return ErrInvalidEmail
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
package user
|
||||
|
||||
import "testing"
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidateEmail(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
email string
|
||||
wantErr bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"a@b.de", false},
|
||||
{"a.b+c@sub.example.com", false},
|
||||
{"", true},
|
||||
{"keine-email", true},
|
||||
{"a@b", true},
|
||||
{"@b.de", true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, c := range cases {
|
||||
err := ValidateEmail(c.email)
|
||||
if (err != nil) != c.wantErr {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ValidateEmail(%q) error = %v, wantErr %v", c.email, err, c.wantErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS superadmins;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
-- Superadmin-Konten arbeiten mandantenuebergreifend und leben deshalb in der
|
||||
-- Control-Plane-Registry (siehe TEN-01), nicht in einer Tenant-Datenbank.
|
||||
-- Das bildet "Superadmin ohne Tenant" strukturell als First-Class-Zustand ab,
|
||||
-- statt ihn als Sonderfall in der Tenant-users-Tabelle zu behandeln
|
||||
-- (IAM-01, siehe core-kanban/tickets/IAM-01.md — bekannte Fehler vermeiden).
|
||||
-- E-Mail-Eindeutigkeit ist hier global, da die Registry-DB einmalig existiert.
|
||||
CREATE TABLE superadmins (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||||
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS policy_rule_changes;
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS policy_rules;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
-- Zentrale, deklarative Policy-Regeln (RBAC-02, siehe core-kanban/tickets/RBAC-02.md).
|
||||
-- policy_rules haelt den AKTUELLEN, gewaehrten Regelsatz (Existenz = erlaubt,
|
||||
-- Default-Deny fuer alles ohne Zeile). policy_rule_changes ist die
|
||||
-- versionierte Aenderungshistorie (Akzeptanzkriterium 3: Regelwechsel ohne
|
||||
-- Codeaenderung nachvollziehbar).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE policy_rules (
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
permission TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY (role, permission)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE TABLE policy_rule_changes (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
permission TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action IN ('grant', 'revoke')),
|
||||
actor TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
version INT NOT NULL,
|
||||
changed_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX policy_rule_changes_idx ON policy_rule_changes (role, permission, version);
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS audit_events;
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-- Zentrales Audit-Log-Modell (AUD-01, siehe core-kanban/tickets/AUD-01.md).
|
||||
-- Getrennt vom allgemeinen Anwendungs-Log (Akzeptanzkriterium 2): eigene
|
||||
-- Tabelle, eigenes Paket (internal/audit), kein Log-Framework.
|
||||
-- tenant_slug ist NOT NULL + darf nicht leer sein (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 /
|
||||
-- Pruefung 2) — mandantenuebergreifende Ereignisse nutzen den reservierten
|
||||
-- Wert 'system', niemals NULL oder leeren String.
|
||||
CREATE TABLE audit_events (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
occurred_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
tenant_slug TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (tenant_slug <> ''),
|
||||
actor TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor <> ''),
|
||||
action TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action <> ''),
|
||||
target TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
metadata JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX audit_events_tenant_slug_idx ON audit_events (tenant_slug, occurred_at);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS feature_flags;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
-- Feature-Flags zentral je Mandant/Zielgruppe (LIC-02, siehe core-kanban/tickets/LIC-02.md).
|
||||
-- Lebt in der Registry-DB, nicht pro Tenant-Datenbank — Flags sind eine
|
||||
-- Core-weite Konfiguration, keine Mandanten-Geschaeftsdaten.
|
||||
CREATE TABLE feature_flags (
|
||||
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
|
||||
rollout_percentage INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (rollout_percentage BETWEEN 0 AND 100),
|
||||
target_tenant_slugs TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS policy_module_scopes;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
-- Modul-Scoping fuer Policy-Regeln (RBAC-04, siehe core-kanban/tickets/RBAC-04.md).
|
||||
-- Existiert fuer eine (role, permission)-Regel ein Eintrag hier, gilt sie
|
||||
-- NUR, wenn zusaetzlich das verknuepfte Feature-Flag (LIC-02) fuer den
|
||||
-- Tenant aktiv ist — Rechte folgen der Lizenz, nicht umgekehrt.
|
||||
CREATE TABLE policy_module_scopes (
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
permission TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
module TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
flag_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY (role, permission)
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS users;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
||||
-- Benutzer-Datenmodell (IAM-01, siehe core-kanban/tickets/IAM-01.md).
|
||||
-- Diese Migration laeuft in der DB EINES Mandanten (Modell C, siehe TEN-01) —
|
||||
-- die Tenant-Zugehoerigkeit ist implizit durch die Datenbankverbindung
|
||||
-- gegeben, es gibt daher bewusst KEINE tenant_id-Spalte.
|
||||
-- E-Mail-Eindeutigkeit ist hier tenant-scoped: der UNIQUE-Constraint gilt
|
||||
-- nur innerhalb dieser einen Tenant-Datenbank.
|
||||
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE TABLE users (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||||
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_assignment_history;
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_assignments;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
-- Rollenzuweisung pro Benutzer (RBAC-01, siehe core-kanban/tickets/RBAC-01.md).
|
||||
-- Nur 'user' und 'tenant_admin' sind hier zuweisbar — 'superadmin' lebt
|
||||
-- mandantenuebergreifend in der Registry (IAM-01 SuperadminStore) und hat
|
||||
-- daher bewusst KEINE Zeile in dieser tenant-lokalen Tabelle (Akzeptanz-
|
||||
-- kriterium 1: nur Zuweisungen innerhalb der erlaubten Matrix).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE role_assignments (
|
||||
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id),
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user', 'tenant_admin')),
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-- Vollstaendige Historie jeder Rollenaenderung (Akzeptanzkriterium 3: wer
|
||||
-- hat wann welche Rolle vergeben).
|
||||
CREATE TABLE role_assignment_history (
|
||||
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||
user_id UUID NOT NULL,
|
||||
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX role_assignment_history_user_idx ON role_assignment_history (user_id, granted_at);
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ ROLE="nexarch_test"
|
||||
export PGPASSWORD="$PASS"
|
||||
|
||||
psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenants CASCADE;"
|
||||
psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS audit_events CASCADE;"
|
||||
|
||||
dbs=$(psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -tAc "SELECT datname FROM pg_database WHERE datname LIKE 'tenant\_%' ESCAPE '\'")
|
||||
for db in $dbs; do
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user