RBAC #369: Rolle aus dem Token durchreichen, Policy-Pruefung fail-closed
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workflow bearerauth setzt X-User-Role nur aus den Claims (Client-Header werden entfernt); taskapi und connectorsetupapi fragen mit dieser Rolle, Default user. Migration 0029: connect.setup.write nur fuer tenant_admin. ai-app, workflow-app, connect-app starten ohne POLICY_URL nicht mehr, ausser mit NEXARCH_<MODUL>_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ type config struct {
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coreServiceToken string
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policyURL string
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policyServiceToken string
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policyDisabled bool
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}
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// policyClient liefert nil, solange NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL fehlt
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// (Uebergang; Pruefung dann deaktiviert, wird beim Start geloggt).
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// policyClient liefert nil nur mit NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1.
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func (c config) policyClient() *policyclient.Client {
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if c.policyURL == "" {
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return nil
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@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ func loadConfig(getenv func(string) string) (config, error) {
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coreServiceToken: getenv("NEXARCH_AI_APP_CORE_SERVICE_TOKEN"),
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policyURL: getenv("NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL"),
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policyServiceToken: getenv("NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN"),
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policyDisabled: getenv("NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_DISABLED") == "1",
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}
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if cfg.policyURL != "" && cfg.policyServiceToken == "" {
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return config{}, errors.New("ai-app: NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN ist erforderlich, wenn NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL gesetzt ist")
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@@ -115,6 +116,9 @@ func loadConfig(getenv func(string) string) (config, error) {
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if cfg.serviceToken == "" {
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return config{}, errors.New("ai-app: NEXARCH_AI_APP_SERVICE_TOKEN ist erforderlich")
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}
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if cfg.policyURL == "" && !cfg.policyDisabled {
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return config{}, errors.New("ai-app: NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL ist erforderlich (oder NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1 als Uebergang)")
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}
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if cfg.addr == "" {
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cfg.addr = defaultListenAddr
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}
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@@ -148,7 +152,7 @@ func build(pool *pgxpool.Pool, cfg config, prov provider.Provider, workerID stri
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searchSvc := semanticsearch.New(prov, vectorindex.New(pool), cfg.model)
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policy := cfg.policyClient()
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if policy == nil {
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log.Print("ai-app: WARNUNG: NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL nicht gesetzt, Rechtepruefung ai.search.read (Issue #369) deaktiviert")
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log.Print("ai-app: WARNUNG: Rechtepruefung ai.search.read deaktiviert (NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1)")
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}
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semanticsearchapi.NewServer(searchSvc, cfg.serviceToken).WithPolicy(policy).RegisterRoutes(mux)
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@@ -71,8 +71,9 @@ func TestLoadConfig_PolicyURLRequiresServiceToken(t *testing.T) {
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func TestLoadConfig_Defaults(t *testing.T) {
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env := map[string]string{
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"NEXARCH_AI_APP_TENANT_DSN": "postgres://x",
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"NEXARCH_AI_APP_SERVICE_TOKEN": "tok",
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"NEXARCH_AI_APP_TENANT_DSN": "postgres://x",
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"NEXARCH_AI_APP_SERVICE_TOKEN": "tok",
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"NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_DISABLED": "1",
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}
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cfg, err := loadConfig(func(k string) string { return env[k] })
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if err != nil {
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@@ -209,3 +210,18 @@ func TestBuild_QueueWorkerProcessesJobWithQuota(t *testing.T) {
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t.Errorf("quota-zaehlerstand = %d, want 1 (GOV-04-Verbrauchszaehlung nicht verdrahtet)", value)
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}
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}
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func TestLoadConfig_PolicyRequiredUnlessDisabled(t *testing.T) {
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env := map[string]string{
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"NEXARCH_AI_APP_TENANT_DSN": "postgres://x",
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"NEXARCH_AI_APP_SERVICE_TOKEN": "tok",
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}
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get := func(k string) string { return env[k] }
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if _, err := loadConfig(get); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL") {
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t.Fatalf("erwartete fehler zur fehlenden NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL, bekam %v", err)
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}
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env["NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_DISABLED"] = "1"
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if _, err := loadConfig(get); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("mit POLICY_DISABLED=1 darf der Start nicht scheitern: %v", err)
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}
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}
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@@ -36,12 +36,15 @@ func (f fixedKEK) TenantKEK(ctx context.Context, tenantSlug string) ([]byte, err
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return f.kek, nil
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}
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// buildPolicyClient liefert nil, solange NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_URL fehlt
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// (Uebergang; Rechtepruefung dann deaktiviert, Warnung im Log).
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// buildPolicyClient liefert nil nur mit NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1;
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// ohne URL und ohne diesen Schalter startet der Dienst nicht.
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func buildPolicyClient() *policyclient.Client {
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policyURL := os.Getenv("NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_URL")
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if policyURL == "" {
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log.Print("connect-app: WARNUNG: NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_URL nicht gesetzt, Rechtepruefung connect.status.read/connect.setup.* (Issue #369) deaktiviert")
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if os.Getenv("NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_DISABLED") != "1" {
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log.Fatal("connect-app: NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_URL fehlt (oder NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1 als Uebergang setzen)")
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}
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log.Print("connect-app: WARNUNG: Rechtepruefung connect.status.read/connect.setup.* deaktiviert (NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1)")
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return nil
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}
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token := os.Getenv("NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN")
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@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ func NewServer(credentials *credential.Store, mappings *fieldmapping.Store) *Ser
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}
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// WithPolicy aktiviert die Rechtepruefung gegen Core (POST /authorize).
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// Rolle ist mangels Rollenkonzept in Connect fest "user" (Uebergang, wie
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// statusapi).
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func (s *Server) WithPolicy(client *policyclient.Client) *Server {
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s.policy = client
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return s
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@@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ func (s *Server) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
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func (s *Server) requirePermission(permission string, next handler) handler {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, tenantSlug, userID string) {
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if s.policy != nil {
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allowed, err := s.policy.Allowed(r.Context(), tenantSlug, "user", permission)
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allowed, err := s.policy.Allowed(r.Context(), tenantSlug, roleOf(r), permission)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "berechtigungsdienst nicht erreichbar")
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return
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@@ -253,3 +251,10 @@ func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
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func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
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writeJSON(w, status, map[string]string{"error": msg})
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}
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func roleOf(r *http.Request) string {
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if role := r.Header.Get("X-User-Role"); role != "" {
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return role
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}
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return "user"
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}
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@@ -121,3 +121,19 @@ func TestCatalog_PolicyNotAskedWithoutIdentity(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatalf("policy darf ohne identitaet nicht befragt werden: %+v", seen)
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}
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}
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func TestPolicyAsked_WithRoleFromHeader_DefaultUser(t *testing.T) {
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var seen []map[string]string
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policyAPI := newFakePolicyAPI(t, false, &seen)
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defer policyAPI.Close()
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mux := policyMux(policyAPI.URL)
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mux.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), authedRequest("GET", "/connectors/catalog", nil))
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admin := authedRequest("GET", "/connectors/catalog", nil)
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admin.Header.Set("X-User-Role", "tenant_admin")
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mux.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), admin)
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if len(seen) != 2 || seen[0]["role"] != "user" || seen[1]["role"] != "tenant_admin" {
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t.Fatalf("falsche rollen in policy-anfragen: %+v", seen)
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}
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}
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
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## Rechtepruefung in ai-app, workflow-app, connect-app (Issue #369)
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- Migration `migrations/0029_task_setup_policy_rules.up.sql` (Core-DB, vor dem Binary-Rollout) legt `workflow.task.read/write` und `connect.setup.read/write` fuer `user` und `tenant_admin` an; `ai.search.read` stammt aus 0018.
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- Je Dienst zwei Variablen in der Env-Datei: `NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_URL`/`NEXARCH_AI_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN`, `NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_URL`/`NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN`, `NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_URL`/`NEXARCH_CONNECT_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN` (URL der policy-api, z. B. `http://127.0.0.1:8093`; Token wie `NEXARCH_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN` der policy-api, analog `NEXARCH_DMS_APP_POLICY_*`).
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- Ohne `*_POLICY_URL` startet der Dienst mit Warnung im Log und ohne Pruefung (Uebergang). Mit URL: Core nicht erreichbar → 503, kein Recht → 403. Rolle ist in allen drei Diensten vorerst fest `user`, weil weder bearerauth noch die Connect-/AI-Aufrufer eine Rolle durchreichen.
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- Ohne `*_POLICY_URL` startet der Dienst nicht (fail-closed). Uebergang: `NEXARCH_{AI,WORKFLOW,CONNECT}_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1` (Warnung im Log, keine Pruefung). Mit URL: Core nicht erreichbar → 503, kein Recht → 403. Rolle: workflow-app und connect-app reichen die Rolle aus dem Token als `X-User-Role` durch (nur aus dem Token, Client-Header werden entfernt); ohne Rolle gilt `user`. `connect.setup.write` hat nur `tenant_admin`. ai-app wird von Modulen mit Service-Token gerufen und fragt mit Rolle `user`.
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- `taskapi` (`GET /tasks`, `PATCH /tasks/{id}/status`) ist seit #369 in `workflow-app` verdrahtet und liegt damit hinter bearerauth.
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## 204: Workflow-Demo und Bearer (Stand 2026-10-28)
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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-- Issue #369: workflow/internal/taskapi und connect/internal/connectorsetupapi
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-- hatten keine Rechte-Schluessel; Muster wie 0018_module_policy_rules.
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-- Beide Rollen, weil die Aufrufer (bearerauth/X-User-Id) noch keine Rolle
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-- liefern und die Module mit fester Rolle 'user' pruefen (siehe statusapi).
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-- connect.setup.write (Zugangsdaten, Mapping) nur fuer tenant_admin; die Rolle
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-- kommt aus dem Token (X-User-Role), ohne Rolle gilt 'user'.
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WITH grants(role, permission) AS (
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VALUES
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('user', 'workflow.task.read'),
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@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ WITH grants(role, permission) AS (
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('tenant_admin', 'workflow.task.write'),
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('user', 'connect.setup.read'),
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('user', 'connect.setup.write'),
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('tenant_admin', 'connect.setup.read'),
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('tenant_admin', 'connect.setup.write')
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),
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@@ -160,12 +160,15 @@ func buildMux(pool *pgxpool.Pool, taskStore *task.Store, serviceToken, tenantSlu
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return mux, nil
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}
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// buildPolicyClient liefert nil, solange NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_URL fehlt
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// (Uebergang; Rechtepruefung dann deaktiviert, Warnung im Log).
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// buildPolicyClient liefert nil nur mit NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1;
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// ohne URL und ohne diesen Schalter startet der Dienst nicht.
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func buildPolicyClient() *policyclient.Client {
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policyURL := os.Getenv("NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_URL")
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if policyURL == "" {
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log.Print("workflow-app: WARNUNG: NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_URL nicht gesetzt, Rechtepruefung workflow.task.read/write (Issue #369) deaktiviert")
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if os.Getenv("NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_DISABLED") != "1" {
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log.Fatal("workflow-app: NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_URL fehlt (oder NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1 als Uebergang setzen)")
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}
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log.Print("workflow-app: WARNUNG: Rechtepruefung workflow.task.read/write deaktiviert (NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1)")
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return nil
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}
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return policyclient.New(policyURL, requireEnv("NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN"))
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@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ Optional:
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- `NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_ESCALATION_INTERVAL` (Go-Duration, Default `5m`)
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- `NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_URL` / `NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_SERVICE_TOKEN`
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(Issue #369: Rechtepruefung `workflow.task.read`/`workflow.task.write` fuer
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`taskapi` gegen Core `POST /authorize`; ohne URL startet der Dienst mit
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Warnung ohne Pruefung, URL ohne Token ist ein Startfehler)
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`taskapi` gegen Core `POST /authorize`; ohne URL bricht der Dienst
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mit Startfehler ab, ausser `NEXARCH_WORKFLOW_APP_POLICY_DISABLED=1`; URL ohne Token ist ein Startfehler; Rolle aus dem Token als `X-User-Role`)
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Keine Zugangsdaten im Code — ausschließlich über Umgebungsvariablen (AC2).
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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// Package bearerauth setzt die Identitaet der Workflow-APIs aus einem
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// verifizierten Core-Modul-Token. Die Handler lesen weiter X-User-Id und
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// X-Tenant-Slug; die Middleware ueberschreibt beide aus den Claims, sodass ein
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// Client sie nicht frei setzen kann.
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// Client sie nicht frei setzen kann. X-User-Role kommt nur aus dem Token.
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package bearerauth
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import (
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
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const (
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headerUser = "X-User-Id"
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headerTenant = "X-Tenant-Slug"
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headerRole = "X-User-Role"
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)
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// Middleware verlangt fuer Anfragen mit Authorization: Bearer ein gueltiges
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@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ const (
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// allowHeaderAuth ist gesetzt (Uebergang, bis alle Clients Bearer senden).
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func Middleware(v *moduleauth.Verifier, allowHeaderAuth bool, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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r.Header.Del(headerRole)
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token, ok := bearer(r)
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if !ok {
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if !allowHeaderAuth {
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@@ -47,6 +49,9 @@ func Middleware(v *moduleauth.Verifier, allowHeaderAuth bool, next http.Handler)
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}
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r.Header.Set(headerUser, claims.Subject)
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r.Header.Set(headerTenant, claims.Tenant)
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if claims.Role != "" {
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r.Header.Set(headerRole, claims.Role)
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
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func echo() http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(r.Header.Get("X-User-Id") + "|" + r.Header.Get("X-Tenant-Slug")))
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(r.Header.Get("X-User-Id") + "|" + r.Header.Get("X-Tenant-Slug") + "|" + r.Header.Get("X-User-Role")))
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})
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}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func TestBearerOverridesClientSuppliedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
"Authorization": "Bearer " + iss.Token("u1", "acme", "user", "", ""),
|
||||
"X-User-Id": "fremd", "X-Tenant-Slug": "fremd",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if rec.Code != 200 || rec.Body.String() != "u1|acme" {
|
||||
if rec.Code != 200 || rec.Body.String() != "u1|acme|user" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("code=%d body=%q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -51,10 +51,25 @@ func TestInvalidBearerIs401(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestWithoutBearerHeadersStrippedUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
v, _ := moduleauth.NewTestVerifierAndIssuer()
|
||||
hdr := map[string]string{"X-User-Id": "u9", "X-Tenant-Slug": "t9"}
|
||||
if rec := do(Middleware(v, false, echo()), hdr); rec.Body.String() != "|" {
|
||||
if rec := do(Middleware(v, false, echo()), hdr); rec.Body.String() != "||" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Header muessen entfernt werden, bekam %q", rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if rec := do(Middleware(v, true, echo()), hdr); rec.Body.String() != "u9|t9" {
|
||||
if rec := do(Middleware(v, true, echo()), hdr); rec.Body.String() != "u9|t9|" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Uebergangsmodus muss Header durchlassen, bekam %q", rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRoleOnlyFromToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
v, iss := moduleauth.NewTestVerifierAndIssuer()
|
||||
h := Middleware(v, true, echo())
|
||||
rec := do(h, map[string]string{
|
||||
"Authorization": "Bearer " + iss.Token("u1", "acme", "tenant_admin", "", ""),
|
||||
"X-User-Role": "tenant_admin_fremd",
|
||||
})
|
||||
if rec.Body.String() != "u1|acme|tenant_admin" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Rolle muss aus dem Token kommen, bekam %q", rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if rec := do(h, map[string]string{"X-User-Role": "tenant_admin"}); rec.Body.String() != "||" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Rolle ohne Token muss entfernt werden, bekam %q", rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ func NewServer(store *task.Store, ownTenantSlug string) *Server {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WithPolicy aktiviert die Rechtepruefung gegen Core (POST /authorize).
|
||||
// Rolle ist fest "user": bearerauth reicht nur Subject und Tenant aus den
|
||||
// Claims durch, keine Rolle (Uebergang, wie connect/internal/statusapi).
|
||||
func (s *Server) WithPolicy(client *policyclient.Client) *Server {
|
||||
s.policy = client
|
||||
return s
|
||||
@@ -64,7 +62,7 @@ func (s *Server) requireAuth(permission string, next http.HandlerFunc) http.Hand
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.policy != nil {
|
||||
allowed, err := s.policy.Allowed(r.Context(), tenantSlug, "user", permission)
|
||||
allowed, err := s.policy.Allowed(r.Context(), tenantSlug, roleOf(r), permission)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "berechtigungsdienst nicht erreichbar")
|
||||
return
|
||||
@@ -120,3 +118,10 @@ func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
|
||||
func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, status, map[string]string{"error": msg})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func roleOf(r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
if role := r.Header.Get("X-User-Role"); role != "" {
|
||||
return role
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "user"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -119,3 +119,19 @@ func TestHandleList_PolicyAllows_Passes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet 200 mit berechtigung, bekam %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPolicyAsked_WithRoleFromHeader_DefaultUser(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var seen []map[string]string
|
||||
policyAPI := newFakePolicyAPI(t, false, &seen)
|
||||
defer policyAPI.Close()
|
||||
mux := policyMux(t, policyAPI.URL)
|
||||
|
||||
mux.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), authed(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/tasks", nil)))
|
||||
admin := authed(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/tasks", nil))
|
||||
admin.Header.Set("X-User-Role", "tenant_admin")
|
||||
mux.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), admin)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(seen) != 2 || seen[0]["role"] != "user" || seen[1]["role"] != "tenant_admin" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("falsche rollen in policy-anfragen: %+v", seen)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user