0fbb1924bb
W-02: Cookie Secure-Flag ist nun über config.yml steuerbar.
api.secure_cookies: true/false — default false (kein Breaking Change).
Alle 3 SetCookie-Aufrufe (Login, Logout, TOTP) nutzen s.cfg.SecureCookies.
W-03: remoteIP() ist jetzt eine Methode und prüft api.trusted_proxies.
X-Forwarded-For wird nur ausgewertet wenn der direkte Peer in der
trusted_proxies-Liste steht (IP oder CIDR). Sonst wird r.RemoteAddr
verwendet — kein Spoofing mehr möglich.
Neue Hilfsfunktion: isTrustedProxy(ip, proxies).
config.go: APIConfig um SecureCookies bool + TrustedProxies []string erweitert.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
153 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
153 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/archivmail/internal/audit"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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)
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// ── PROJ-25: Profile Handlers (Password & Email Change) ─────────────────
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// handleChangePassword allows a local user to change their own password.
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// PATCH /api/auth/password
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func (s *Server) handleChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
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if sess.UserID == 0 {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
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return
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}
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var req struct {
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CurrentPassword string `json:"current_password"`
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NewPassword string `json:"new_password"`
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}
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
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return
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}
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// Load user
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user, err := s.users.GetByUsername(sess.Username)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("change_password: user not found", "err", err, "username", sess.Username)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "user not found")
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return
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}
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// LDAP users cannot change password here
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if user.Source == "ldap" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "password is managed by LDAP")
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return
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}
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// Verify current password
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currentHash, err := s.users.GetPasswordHash(r.Context(), user.ID)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("change_password: get hash failed", "err", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(currentHash), []byte(req.CurrentPassword)); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "current password is incorrect")
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return
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}
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// Validate new password length
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if len(req.NewPassword) < 8 {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "new password must be at least 8 characters")
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return
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}
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// Hash new password
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newHash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(req.NewPassword), 12)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("change_password: bcrypt failed", "err", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
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return
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}
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// Persist
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if err := s.users.UpdatePassword(r.Context(), user.ID, string(newHash)); err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("change_password: update failed", "err", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update password")
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return
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}
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s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
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EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
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Username: sess.Username,
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IPAddress: s.remoteIP(r),
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Success: true,
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Detail: "change_password",
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})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
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}
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// handleChangeEmail allows a local user to change their own email address.
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// PATCH /api/auth/email
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func (s *Server) handleChangeEmail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
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if sess.UserID == 0 {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
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return
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}
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var req struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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}
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
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return
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}
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// Load user
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user, err := s.users.GetByUsername(sess.Username)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("change_email: user not found", "err", err, "username", sess.Username)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "user not found")
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return
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}
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// LDAP users cannot change email here
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if user.Source == "ldap" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "email is managed by LDAP")
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return
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}
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// Basic email validation
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if !strings.Contains(req.Email, "@") || !strings.Contains(req.Email, ".") {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid email address")
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return
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}
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// Persist
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if err := s.users.UpdateEmail(r.Context(), user.ID, req.Email); err != nil {
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// Check for unique constraint violation (duplicate email)
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var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
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if errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == "23505" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "email already in use")
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return
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}
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s.logger.Error("change_email: update failed", "err", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update email")
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return
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}
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s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
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EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
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Username: sess.Username,
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IPAddress: s.remoteIP(r),
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Success: true,
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Detail: "change_email",
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})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"ok": true, "email": req.Email})
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}
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