Files
archivmail/internal/api/totp_handlers.go
T
sysops 2de340573b fix(security): behebe F-01/F-02/W-03/W-04 aus Security-Audit + PROJ-24 TOTP 2FA
F-01: err.Error() wird nicht mehr an HTTP-Clients gesendet.
      Stattdessen generische Fehlermeldungen + Server-Log.
      Betrifft: handleCreateUser, handleUpdateUser, handleDeleteUser,
                handleSyncNow, handleSecurityConfig, handleUpload.

F-02: Login-Audit-Log enthält keinen rohen err.Error() mehr.
      Neue classifyLoginError() Funktion: invalid_password / ldap_error /
      account_disabled / unknown — schützt vor LDAP-Info-Leak via Audit-API.

W-03: remoteIP() trimmt jetzt Leerzeichen aus X-Forwarded-For.
      Vollständige Lösung erfordert Proxy-Konfiguration (W-03 bleibt WARN).

W-04: Attachment-Dateiname wird durch sanitizeFilename() bereinigt.
      Nur [a-zA-Z0-9._- ] erlaubt — verhindert Header-Injection.

PROJ-24: TOTP 2FA vollständig implementiert:
      - internal/auth/totp.go: GenerateSecret, ValidateTOTP, QRCodeSVG
      - internal/api/totp_handlers.go: Setup, Login-Step2, Admin-Reset
      - internal/userstore: SetTOTPSecret, EnableTOTP, DisableTOTP, ResetTOTP
      - Login-Flow: totp_pending JWT → /api/auth/totp → vollwertiger JWT
      - AES-256-GCM verschlüsseltes Secret in users.totp_secret

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 00:54:00 +01:00

263 lines
7.6 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"github.com/archivmail/internal/audit"
"github.com/archivmail/internal/auth"
)
// ── PROJ-24: TOTP 2FA Handlers ───────────────────────────────────────────
// handleTOTPSetupGet generates a new TOTP secret and QR code for the current user.
// GET /api/auth/totp/setup
func (s *Server) handleTOTPSetupGet(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
if sess.UserID == 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
return
}
secret, otpauthURL, qrPNG, err := auth.GenerateSecret(sess.Username, "archivmail")
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp setup: generate secret failed", "err", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to generate TOTP secret")
return
}
// Encrypt the secret with AES-256-GCM before storing
encryptedSecret, err := s.authMgr.EncryptAES([]byte(secret))
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp setup: encrypt secret failed", "err", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to encrypt TOTP secret")
return
}
// Store encrypted secret in DB (not yet activated)
if err := s.users.SetTOTPSecret(r.Context(), sess.UserID, encryptedSecret); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp setup: store secret failed", "err", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to store TOTP secret")
return
}
resp := map[string]interface{}{
"secret": secret,
"otpauth_url": otpauthURL,
}
if len(qrPNG) > 0 {
resp["qr_code"] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(qrPNG)
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// handleTOTPSetupPost confirms TOTP setup by verifying a code, then activates TOTP.
// POST /api/auth/totp/setup { "code": "123456" }
func (s *Server) handleTOTPSetupPost(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
if sess.UserID == 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
return
}
var req struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil || req.Code == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing or invalid code")
return
}
// Load encrypted secret from DB
encSecret, _, err := s.users.GetTOTPSecret(r.Context(), sess.UserID)
if err != nil || len(encSecret) == 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "no TOTP secret found, run setup first")
return
}
// Decrypt
plainSecret, err := s.authMgr.DecryptAESForHandler(encSecret)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp setup confirm: decrypt failed", "err", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to decrypt TOTP secret")
return
}
// Validate code
if !auth.ValidateTOTP(string(plainSecret), req.Code) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid TOTP code")
return
}
// Activate TOTP
if err := s.users.EnableTOTP(r.Context(), sess.UserID); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp setup confirm: enable failed", "err", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to enable TOTP")
return
}
s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
Username: sess.Username,
IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
Detail: "totp_enabled",
Success: true,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
}
// handleTOTPDisable deactivates TOTP for the current user (requires a valid code).
// DELETE /api/auth/totp { "code": "123456" }
func (s *Server) handleTOTPDisable(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
if sess.UserID == 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
return
}
var req struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil || req.Code == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing or invalid code")
return
}
// Load and decrypt secret
encSecret, enabled, err := s.users.GetTOTPSecret(r.Context(), sess.UserID)
if err != nil || !enabled || len(encSecret) == 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "TOTP is not enabled")
return
}
plainSecret, err := s.authMgr.DecryptAESForHandler(encSecret)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp disable: decrypt failed", "err", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to decrypt TOTP secret")
return
}
if !auth.ValidateTOTP(string(plainSecret), req.Code) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid TOTP code")
return
}
if err := s.users.DisableTOTP(r.Context(), sess.UserID); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp disable: failed", "err", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to disable TOTP")
return
}
s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
Username: sess.Username,
IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
Detail: "totp_disabled",
Success: true,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
}
// handleTOTPLogin completes a TOTP-pending login by validating the code.
// POST /api/auth/totp { "session_token": "...", "code": "123456" }
func (s *Server) handleTOTPLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req struct {
SessionToken string `json:"session_token"`
Code string `json:"code"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil || req.SessionToken == "" || req.Code == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing session_token or code")
return
}
token, user, err := s.authMgr.ValidateTOTPLogin(req.SessionToken, req.Code)
if err != nil {
s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
EventType: audit.EventLogin,
IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
Success: false,
Detail: "totp_login_failed: " + err.Error(),
})
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid TOTP code or expired session")
return
}
_ = s.users.UpdateLastLogin(user.ID)
s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
EventType: audit.EventLogin,
Username: user.Username,
IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
Success: true,
Detail: "totp_login_completed",
})
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookieName,
Value: token,
Path: "/",
MaxAge: 8 * 3600,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
"user": map[string]interface{}{
"id": user.ID,
"username": user.Username,
"email": user.Email,
"role": user.Role,
},
})
}
// handleTOTPReset allows an admin to reset TOTP for a user.
// POST /api/admin/users/{id}/totp/reset
func (s *Server) handleTOTPReset(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid user id")
return
}
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
// Fetch target user
target, err := s.users.GetByID(id)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "user not found")
return
}
// SEC-02: Tenant isolation — domain_admin can only reset TOTP for users in their own tenant.
if sess.TenantID != nil {
if target.TenantID == nil || *target.TenantID != *sess.TenantID {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
return
}
}
// Reset TOTP
if err := s.users.ResetTOTP(r.Context(), id, sess.Username); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("totp reset: failed", "err", err, "target_user", id, "admin", sess.Username)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to reset TOTP")
return
}
s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
Username: sess.Username,
IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("totp_reset_by_admin: TOTP reset by %s for user %s (id=%d)", sess.Username, target.Username, id),
Success: true,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
}