security: M-2 HttpOnly-Cookie + M-4 TrustedHost-Warning + M-5 TOTP-Lockout + M-7 zentraler get_client_ip()
M-2: Refresh-Token als HttpOnly SameSite=Strict Cookie
- auth.py: _set_refresh_cookie/_delete_refresh_cookie Helpers
- Alle Auth-Endpoints (login, totp/login, refresh, logout) nutzen Cookie
- schemas/auth.py: refresh_token in Request/Response optional
- AuthContext.tsx: kein refresh_token in localStorage
- api/client.ts: credentials:include, kein Token-Body beim Refresh
M-4: TrustedHostMiddleware Warning in Production
- main.py: Startup-Warning wenn is_production + kein ALLOWED_HOSTS
M-5: TOTP-Fehlversuche Redis-Lockout
- auth.py: _check/_record/_clear_totp_lockout; 5 Versuche → 15 min Sperre
M-7: Zentraler get_client_ip()-Helper
- core/dependencies.py: get_client_ip() mit X-Real-IP → X-Forwarded-For → client.host
- hours_payouts.py, absences.py, busylight.py: request.client.host ersetzt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
patrick
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