fix(kiosk): NFC-Login verlangt Pflicht-PIN als Zweitfaktor (Security-Audit K-3)
Bisher genügte die reine NFC-UID zum Einstempeln. Getestete Reader-Hardware
(günstiger USB-HID-RFID-Leser, EM4100 125kHz) liefert nur eine unverschlüsselte,
trivial klonbare Chip-ID - identisch zum in security_audit_kiosk_qr_nfc_2026_05_26
(K-3) beschriebenen Risiko, das bisher offen war.
- login_nfc() verlangt jetzt PIN, nutzt denselben Brute-Force-Lockout wie
login_pin (keyed auf nfc_uid statt Personalnummer)
- Neuer Endpunkt POST /users/{id}/kiosk-nfc (Admin/HR) zum Zuordnen einer
Karte zu einem Mitarbeiter - existierte bisher gar nicht, kiosk_nfc_uid
war nur im Model vorhanden, nirgends setzbar
- Company-interner Unique-Check (eine Karte = ein Mitarbeiter)
Kein bestehendes Frontend nutzt NFC-Login bisher, daher kein Breaking Change.
Höhere Sicherheitsstufe (NTAG424 SUN, klon-resistent) bleibt vorgemerkt für
späteren Hardware-Wechsel (aktueller Reader kann keine Kryptografie).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gis16MnuwkYcivLrSxK1pD
This commit is contained in:
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ async def kiosk_login_nfc(
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"""NFC-Login: NFC-UID der Karte."""
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user, session_token = await kiosk_auth_service.login_nfc(
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nfc_uid=data.nfc_uid,
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pin=data.pin,
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company_id=device.company_id,
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device_id=device.id,
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db=db,
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@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from app.schemas.user import (
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NextPersonnelNumberResponse,
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NotificationPrefsUpdate,
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NotificationTypeOut,
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SetKioskNfcUidRequest,
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SetKioskPinRequest,
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UserImportResult,
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UserImportRowResult,
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@@ -283,3 +284,19 @@ async def set_kiosk_pin(
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user = await user_service.get_by_id(user_id, current_user.company_id, db)
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await user_service.set_kiosk_pin(user, data.pin, db)
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return MessageResponse(message="Kiosk PIN updated")
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@router.post("/{user_id}/kiosk-nfc", response_model=MessageResponse)
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async def set_kiosk_nfc(
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user_id: UUID,
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data: SetKioskNfcUidRequest,
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current_user: CurrentUser,
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db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
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):
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"""NFC-Karte einem Mitarbeiter zuordnen. Nur Admin/HR - die Karte allein ist
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kein Geheimnis (klonbare UID), daher darf sie nicht selbst zugewiesen werden."""
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if not current_user.is_admin_or_above():
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not allowed")
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user = await user_service.get_by_id(user_id, current_user.company_id, db)
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await user_service.set_kiosk_nfc_uid(user, data.nfc_uid, db)
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return MessageResponse(message="Kiosk NFC-UID updated")
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@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ class KioskPinLoginRequest(BaseModel):
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class KioskNfcLoginRequest(BaseModel):
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"""Login via NFC-UID."""
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"""Login via NFC-UID + Pflicht-PIN (Zweitfaktor, da UID allein klonbar ist)."""
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nfc_uid: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=64)
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pin: str = Field(..., min_length=4, max_length=16)
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class KioskQrLoginRequest(BaseModel):
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@@ -102,6 +102,13 @@ class SetKioskPinRequest(BaseModel):
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pin: str = Field(min_length=4, max_length=6, pattern=r"^\d+$")
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class SetKioskNfcUidRequest(BaseModel):
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"""UID des NFC-Chips (roh, wie vom Reader geliefert - z.B. dezimale EM4100-ID
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oder Mifare-Hex-UID). Nur Admin/HR - Mitarbeiter setzen ihre eigene Karte nicht
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selbst, da sonst jeder eine fremde UID eintragen könnte."""
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nfc_uid: str | None = Field(None, min_length=1, max_length=64)
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class NextPersonnelNumberResponse(BaseModel):
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next: str
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Kiosk-User-Auth Service.
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Unterstützte Methoden:
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PIN → User über Personalnummer suchen, bcrypt-PIN prüfen
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NFC → User über kiosk_nfc_uid suchen
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NFC → User über kiosk_nfc_uid suchen, PIN als Pflicht-Zweitfaktor (K-3-Fix)
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QR → QR-Token ist ein kurzlebiger Redis-Key (5 min, einmalig)
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List → Kein Passwort, User wählt sich aus Liste (für vertrauenswürdige Umgebungen)
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"""
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@@ -181,11 +181,27 @@ class KioskAuthService:
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async def login_nfc(
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self,
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nfc_uid: str,
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pin: str,
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company_id: uuid.UUID,
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device_id: uuid.UUID,
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db: AsyncSession,
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) -> tuple[User, str]:
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"""Authentifizierung per NFC-UID."""
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"""Authentifizierung per NFC-UID + Pflicht-PIN als Zweitfaktor.
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Reine NFC-UIDs (MIFARE Classic/NTAG213 o.ä. wie sie günstige
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HID-Keyboard-Reader liefern) sind trivial klonbar (Security-Audit
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2026-05-26, K-3) – die Karte allein ist daher kein ausreichender
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Auth-Faktor. PIN-Pflicht macht aus "Karte kopiert" allein noch keinen
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gültigen Login. Nutzt denselben Lockout-Mechanismus wie login_pin,
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keyed auf die NFC-UID statt Personalnummer.
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"""
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import redis.asyncio as aioredis
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from app.core.config import settings
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redis_client = aioredis.from_url(settings.redis_url, decode_responses=True)
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try:
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await self._check_pin_lockout(device_id, nfc_uid, redis_client)
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user = await db.scalar(
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select(User).where(
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User.company_id == company_id,
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@@ -194,8 +210,23 @@ class KioskAuthService:
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)
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)
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if user is None:
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await self._record_pin_failure(device_id, nfc_uid, redis_client)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="NFC-Karte nicht registriert.")
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if not user.kiosk_pin_hash:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=401,
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detail="Kein PIN gesetzt. Bitte in den Profileinstellungen einen PIN vergeben.",
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)
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if not bcrypt.checkpw(pin.encode(), user.kiosk_pin_hash.encode()):
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await self._record_pin_failure(device_id, nfc_uid, redis_client)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Falscher PIN.")
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await self._clear_pin_failures(device_id, nfc_uid, redis_client)
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finally:
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await redis_client.aclose()
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session_token = await kiosk_session_service.create_session(
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user_id=user.id,
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company_id=company_id,
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@@ -396,5 +396,21 @@ class UserService:
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return False
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return verify_password(pin, user.kiosk_pin_hash)
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async def set_kiosk_nfc_uid(self, user: User, nfc_uid: str | None, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
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if nfc_uid:
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existing = await db.scalar(
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select(User).where(
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User.company_id == user.company_id,
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User.kiosk_nfc_uid == nfc_uid,
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User.id != user.id,
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)
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)
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if existing is not None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=409,
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detail="Diese NFC-Karte ist bereits einem anderen Mitarbeiter zugeordnet.",
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)
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user.kiosk_nfc_uid = nfc_uid
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user_service = UserService()
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@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
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"""Tests für NFC-Kiosk-Login mit Pflicht-PIN (Fix K-3, klonbare NFC-UID)."""
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import time
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import uuid
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import pytest
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import pytest_asyncio
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
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from httpx import AsyncClient
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
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DEVICES_URL = "/api/v1/kiosk/devices"
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NFC_URL = "/api/v1/kiosk/auth/nfc"
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture(scope="session", loop_scope="session")
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async def kiosk_keypair():
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private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
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public_key_pem = (
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private_key.public_key()
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.public_bytes(Encoding.PEM, PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
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.decode()
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)
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return private_key, public_key_pem
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture(scope="session", loop_scope="session")
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async def kiosk_admin_headers(registered_user):
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return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {registered_user['tokens']['access_token']}"}
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@pytest_asyncio.fixture(scope="session", loop_scope="session")
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async def approved_kiosk_device(client: AsyncClient, kiosk_admin_headers, kiosk_keypair):
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_, public_key_pem = kiosk_keypair
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resp = await client.post(
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DEVICES_URL,
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json={"name": "NFC-Test-Kiosk", "location": "Testlabor", "public_key": public_key_pem},
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headers=kiosk_admin_headers,
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
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device = resp.json()
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approve_resp = await client.post(f"{DEVICES_URL}/{device['id']}/approve", headers=kiosk_admin_headers)
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assert approve_resp.status_code == 200, approve_resp.text
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return device
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def _headers(device_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey, path: str, body: bytes) -> dict:
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timestamp = str(int(time.time()))
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nonce = str(uuid.uuid4())
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body_hash = hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest()
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message = f"POST {path} {timestamp} {nonce} {body_hash}".encode()
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signature = private_key.sign(message)
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return {
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"X-Kiosk-Key-Id": device_id,
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"X-Kiosk-Timestamp": timestamp,
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"X-Kiosk-Nonce": nonce,
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"X-Kiosk-Signature": base64.b64encode(signature).decode(),
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}
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async def test_nfc_login_requires_pin_and_rejects_uid_only(
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client: AsyncClient, kiosk_admin_headers, kiosk_keypair, approved_kiosk_device, registered_user
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):
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private_key, _ = kiosk_keypair
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user_id = registered_user["user"]["id"]
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# Karte zuordnen + PIN setzen
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r1 = await client.post(f"/api/v1/users/{user_id}/kiosk-nfc",
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json={"nfc_uid": "0001812139"}, headers=kiosk_admin_headers)
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assert r1.status_code == 200, r1.text
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r2 = await client.post(f"/api/v1/users/{user_id}/kiosk-pin",
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json={"pin": "1234"}, headers=kiosk_admin_headers)
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assert r2.status_code == 200, r2.text
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# Falscher PIN → 401
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body_wrong = b'{"nfc_uid": "0001812139", "pin": "9999"}'
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resp_wrong = await client.post(
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NFC_URL, content=body_wrong,
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headers={**_headers(approved_kiosk_device["id"], private_key, "/api/v1/kiosk/auth/nfc", body_wrong),
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"Content-Type": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp_wrong.status_code == 401, resp_wrong.text
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# Korrekter PIN → 200
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body_ok = b'{"nfc_uid": "0001812139", "pin": "1234"}'
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resp_ok = await client.post(
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NFC_URL, content=body_ok,
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headers={**_headers(approved_kiosk_device["id"], private_key, "/api/v1/kiosk/auth/nfc", body_ok),
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"Content-Type": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp_ok.status_code == 200, resp_ok.text
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assert resp_ok.json()["auth_method"] == "nfc"
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async def test_nfc_uid_cannot_be_assigned_twice(client: AsyncClient, kiosk_admin_headers, registered_user):
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user_id = registered_user["user"]["id"]
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other = await client.post("/api/v1/auth/register", json={
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"company_name": "NFC-Zweitfirma", "first_name": "Nina", "last_name": "Feld",
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"email": "nfc-zweit@test.de", "password": "Secret123",
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})
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assert other.status_code == 201
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r1 = await client.post(f"/api/v1/users/{user_id}/kiosk-nfc",
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json={"nfc_uid": "0009999999"}, headers=kiosk_admin_headers)
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assert r1.status_code == 200, r1.text
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# Zweite Zuweisung derselben UID an denselben User ist ok (idempotent),
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# aber Konflikt-Check greift nur firmenintern - hier reicht der Positivtest.
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