N0zoM1z0
84e4361c09
Keep explicitly selected Node Inspector targets observable when discovery cannot verify their file location. Resolve literal POSIX discovery paths without URI decoding, and retain lossy Windows or underscore paths as unresolved metadata. Validate scriptParsed file URLs independently. Preserve unknown target identity through runtime reconciliation, regenerate contracts, and verify real CLI/MCP behavior on Linux and Windows. Closes #530 Assisted-by: Kogasa (gensokyo-skills:kogasa-surprise-testing)
96 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
96 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
|
|
|
|
import {
|
|
browserOriginSchema,
|
|
sanitizeBrowserUrl,
|
|
} from "../domain/browserObservation.js";
|
|
import type {
|
|
JavaScriptRuntimeLocation,
|
|
JavaScriptRuntimeTargetLocation,
|
|
} from "../domain/javascriptRuntimeObservation.js";
|
|
import { authorizedElectronFile } from "./ElectronFileScope.js";
|
|
|
|
export type RuntimeLocationDecision =
|
|
| { readonly allowed: true; readonly location: JavaScriptRuntimeLocation }
|
|
| {
|
|
readonly allowed: false;
|
|
readonly reason: "unsupported_location";
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/** Resolve a protocol location exposed by the explicitly selected Inspector endpoint. */
|
|
export const authorizeRuntimeLocation = async (
|
|
value: string,
|
|
): Promise<RuntimeLocationDecision> => {
|
|
if (value.startsWith("node:") && value.length > 0)
|
|
return {
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
location: { kind: "builtin", specifier: value },
|
|
};
|
|
if (value.startsWith("file:")) {
|
|
const filePath = await authorizedElectronFile(value);
|
|
return filePath === undefined
|
|
? { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" }
|
|
: { allowed: true, location: { kind: "file", file_path: filePath } };
|
|
}
|
|
let url: URL;
|
|
try {
|
|
url = new URL(value);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
|
|
}
|
|
if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol))
|
|
return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
|
|
const parsedOrigin = browserOriginSchema.safeParse(url.origin);
|
|
if (!parsedOrigin.success)
|
|
return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
|
|
return {
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
location: {
|
|
kind: "url",
|
|
origin: parsedOrigin.data,
|
|
sanitized_url: sanitizeBrowserUrl(value).url,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/** Interpret Node's lossy discovery metadata separately from scriptParsed URLs. */
|
|
export const authorizeRuntimeTargetLocation = async (
|
|
value: string,
|
|
context: { readonly type: string; readonly product: string },
|
|
): Promise<
|
|
| {
|
|
readonly allowed: true;
|
|
readonly location: JavaScriptRuntimeTargetLocation;
|
|
}
|
|
| { readonly allowed: false; readonly reason: "unsupported_location" }
|
|
> => {
|
|
if (
|
|
context.type !== "node" ||
|
|
!/^node\.js\/v/iu.test(context.product) ||
|
|
!value.startsWith("file://")
|
|
)
|
|
return authorizeRuntimeLocation(value);
|
|
const reportedPath = value.slice("file://".length);
|
|
if (!reportedPath.startsWith("/") && !/^[a-z]:[/\\_]/iu.test(reportedPath))
|
|
return authorizeRuntimeLocation(value);
|
|
|
|
// Node concatenates the pathname, then replaces quotes and backslashes with
|
|
// underscores. A remaining underscore cannot prove which pathname was used.
|
|
if (process.platform !== "win32" && !/[_"\\]/u.test(reportedPath)) {
|
|
if (reportedPath.startsWith("/")) {
|
|
const decision = await authorizeRuntimeLocation(
|
|
pathToFileURL(reportedPath).href,
|
|
);
|
|
if (decision.allowed) return decision;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
location: {
|
|
kind: "unresolved",
|
|
reported_url: value,
|
|
reason: "unverifiable-file-location",
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
};
|