Compare commits
1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 sysopsandClaude Sonnet 5
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1a82da211d |
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
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// secheaders-devserver dient der manuellen/e2e-Verifikation von API-08
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// (Pruefung 2: CSP blockiert Inline-Script) mit einem echten Browser.
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// Zwei Pfade: /protected (mit Middleware) und /unprotected (ohne) — beide
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// liefern dieselbe Seite mit einem Inline-Script, das ein DOM-Element
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// aendert. Ein echter Browser zeigt den Unterschied.
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package main
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import (
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/secheaders"
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)
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const page = `<!doctype html>
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<html><body>
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<div id="marker">BLOCKED</div>
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<script>document.getElementById('marker').textContent = 'INLINE_RAN';</script>
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</body></html>`
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func servePage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(page))
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}
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func main() {
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cfg := secheaders.DefaultConfig()
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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// SetHeaders statt Middleware: dieser lokale Demo-Server laeuft ohne
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// TLS-Terminierung, der HTTPS-Redirect-Teil von Middleware wuerde hier
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// in eine Endlosschleife fuehren (siehe secheaders.go-Dokumentation).
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mux.HandleFunc("/protected", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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secheaders.SetHeaders(cfg, w)
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servePage(w, r)
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})
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mux.HandleFunc("/unprotected", servePage)
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log.Println("secheaders-devserver listening on :8086")
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log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":8086", mux))
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}
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@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
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package apiserver
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import "context"
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type contextKey int
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const requestContextKey contextKey = iota
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// RequestContext ist der Tenant-/Benutzerkontext, den die Middleware-Kette
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// fuer nachgelagerte Handler bereitstellt (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
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type RequestContext struct {
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UserID string
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TenantSlug string
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}
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// FromContext liest den von der Middleware gesetzten Kontext.
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func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (RequestContext, bool) {
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rc, ok := ctx.Value(requestContextKey).(RequestContext)
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return rc, ok
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}
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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
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// Package apiserver implementiert Core API-01: das REST-Grundgerüst mit
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// URL-Versionierung, einheitlichem Fehlerformat und Middleware-Kette
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// (Auth, Tenant-/Benutzerkontext, Logging).
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package apiserver
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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)
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// errorBody ist das EINE Fehlerschema fuer alle Endpunkte unter /api/{version}/
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// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
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type errorBody struct {
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Error struct {
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Code string `json:"code"`
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Message string `json:"message"`
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} `json:"error"`
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}
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// WriteError schreibt einen Fehler im einheitlichen Schema. code ist ein
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// stabiler, maschinenlesbarer Bezeichner (z.B. "unauthenticated"), message
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// ein fuer Menschen lesbarer deutscher Text.
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func WriteError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, code, message string) {
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var body errorBody
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body.Error.Code = code
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body.Error.Message = message
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body)
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}
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
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package apiserver
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import (
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"context"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/auth"
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)
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// authAndTenantContext prueft die Session (wiederverwendet auth.TokenIssuer.Verify
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// aus IAM-02 — keine zweite JWT-Implementierung) und setzt bei Erfolg
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// RequestContext fuer nachgelagerte Handler (Akzeptanzkriterium 3). Anders
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// als auth.RequireAuth (Klartext-Fehler) antwortet diese Middleware im
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// einheitlichen API-01-Fehlerschema (Akzeptanzkriterium 2), damit ALLE
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// Endpunkte unter /api/{version}/ dasselbe Format liefern, auch bei
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// Auth-Fehlern.
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func authAndTenantContext(issuer *auth.TokenIssuer, next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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cookie, err := r.Cookie(auth.CookieName)
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if err != nil {
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WriteError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthenticated", "nicht angemeldet")
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return
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}
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claims, err := issuer.Verify(cookie.Value)
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if err != nil {
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WriteError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthenticated", "nicht angemeldet")
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return
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}
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rc := RequestContext{UserID: claims.UserID, TenantSlug: claims.TenantSlug}
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next(w, r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), requestContextKey, rc)))
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}
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}
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type statusRecorder struct {
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http.ResponseWriter
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status int
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}
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func (s *statusRecorder) WriteHeader(code int) {
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s.status = code
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s.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
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}
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// loggingMiddleware protokolliert jede Anfrage strukturiert.
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func loggingMiddleware(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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rec := &statusRecorder{ResponseWriter: w, status: http.StatusOK}
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start := time.Now()
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next(rec, r)
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slog.Info("api-anfrage", "method", r.Method, "path", r.URL.Path, "status", rec.status, "dauer", time.Since(start))
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}
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}
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@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
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package apiserver
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import (
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"net/http"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/auth"
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)
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// Server registriert versionierte API-Routen (Akzeptanzkriterium 1: unter
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// /api/{version}/...) und verdrahtet fuer jede Route dieselbe Middleware-
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// Kette (Logging -> Auth+Tenantkontext -> Handler).
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type Server struct {
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mux *http.ServeMux
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issuer *auth.TokenIssuer
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}
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func NewServer(issuer *auth.TokenIssuer) *Server {
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return &Server{mux: http.NewServeMux(), issuer: issuer}
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}
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// Handle registriert pattern unter der angegebenen Version, z.B.
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// Handle("v1", "/things", h) -> erreichbar unter /api/v1/things. Verschiedene
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// Versionen sind unabhaengige Pfade — eine neue Version beeintraechtigt
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// bestehende nicht (Akzeptanzkriterium 1 / Pruefung 3).
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func (s *Server) Handle(version, pattern string, h http.HandlerFunc) {
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full := "/api/" + version + pattern
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s.mux.HandleFunc(full, loggingMiddleware(authAndTenantContext(s.issuer, h)))
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}
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// HandleV1 ist die Kurzform fuer die aktuelle Hauptversion.
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func (s *Server) HandleV1(pattern string, h http.HandlerFunc) {
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s.Handle("v1", pattern, h)
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}
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func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
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return s.mux
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}
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@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
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package apiserver
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/auth"
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)
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func newTestServer() (*Server, *auth.TokenIssuer) {
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issuer := auth.NewTokenIssuer("test-secret-nur-fuer-tests")
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return NewServer(issuer), issuer
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}
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func withAuthCookie(req *http.Request, token string) *http.Request {
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.CookieName, Value: token})
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return req
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 1: API unter versioniertem Pfad erreichbar.
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func TestHandleV1_RegistersUnderVersionedPath(t *testing.T) {
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srv, issuer := newTestServer()
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srv.HandleV1("/things", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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})
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token, err := issuer.Issue("user-1", "acme")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
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}
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req := withAuthCookie(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/things", nil), token)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 1 (Stichprobe): mehrere Endpunkte liefern
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// bei fehlerhafter Anfrage dasselbe Fehlerschema.
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func TestErrorFormat_ConsistentAcrossEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
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srv, _ := newTestServer()
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srv.HandleV1("/endpunkt-a", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
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srv.HandleV1("/endpunkt-b", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
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for _, path := range []string{"/api/v1/endpunkt-a", "/api/v1/endpunkt-b"} {
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil) // ohne cookie -> 401
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("%s: status = %d, want 401", path, rec.Code)
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}
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var body errorBody
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if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &body); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("%s: fehlerantwort nicht im erwarteten json-schema: %v (body: %s)", path, err, rec.Body.String())
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}
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if body.Error.Code == "" || body.Error.Message == "" {
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t.Fatalf("%s: erwartet nicht-leeren code/message, habe %+v", path, body)
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}
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 2: Middleware-Kette setzt Tenant-/
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// Benutzerkontext zuverlaessig, nachweislich fuer mehrere Endpunkte.
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func TestMiddleware_SetsRequestContextForEveryEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
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srv, issuer := newTestServer()
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var gotA, gotB RequestContext
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srv.HandleV1("/kontext-a", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotA, _ = FromContext(r.Context())
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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})
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srv.HandleV1("/kontext-b", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotB, _ = FromContext(r.Context())
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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})
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token, err := issuer.Issue("user-42", "tenant-x")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
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}
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for path, got := range map[string]*RequestContext{"/api/v1/kontext-a": &gotA, "/api/v1/kontext-b": &gotB} {
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req := withAuthCookie(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil), token)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("%s: status = %d, want 200", path, rec.Code)
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}
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if got.UserID != "user-42" || got.TenantSlug != "tenant-x" {
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t.Fatalf("%s: request-context unerwartet: %+v", path, *got)
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}
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + Pruefung 3: eine neue v2-Route laesst sich anlegen,
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// ohne v1 zu beeintraechtigen.
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func TestVersioning_V2DoesNotAffectV1(t *testing.T) {
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srv, issuer := newTestServer()
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srv.HandleV1("/things", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Write([]byte("v1-antwort"))
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})
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srv.Handle("v2", "/things", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Write([]byte("v2-antwort"))
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})
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||||||
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token, err := issuer.Issue("user-1", "acme")
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||||||
if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("issue: %v", err)
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}
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reqV1 := withAuthCookie(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/things", nil), token)
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recV1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
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srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(recV1, reqV1)
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if recV1.Body.String() != "v1-antwort" {
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t.Fatalf("v1 antwort = %q, want v1-antwort", recV1.Body.String())
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}
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reqV2 := withAuthCookie(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v2/things", nil), token)
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recV2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
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srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(recV2, reqV2)
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if recV2.Body.String() != "v2-antwort" {
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t.Fatalf("v2 antwort = %q, want v2-antwort", recV2.Body.String())
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}
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||||||
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// v1 nach dem Anlegen von v2 erneut pruefen — unveraendert.
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||||||
reqV1Again := withAuthCookie(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/things", nil), token)
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recV1Again := httptest.NewRecorder()
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srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(recV1Again, reqV1Again)
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if recV1Again.Body.String() != "v1-antwort" {
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t.Fatalf("v1 antwort nach v2-anlage = %q, want weiterhin v1-antwort", recV1Again.Body.String())
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||||||
}
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||||||
}
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
func TestAuthAndTenantContext_RejectsInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
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|
||||||
srv, _ := newTestServer()
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|
||||||
srv.HandleV1("/geschuetzt", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
req := withAuthCookie(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/geschuetzt", nil), "kaputtes.token.hier")
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|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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|
||||||
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
||||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
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|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
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|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
|||||||
|
// Package ldapsync implementiert Core IAM-05: LDAP/Active-Directory-
|
||||||
|
// Anbindung je Tenant fuer Benutzer-Synchronisation, Login-Delegation und
|
||||||
|
// Rollenzuordnung aus Gruppen ueber eine explizite Erlaubnis-Matrix.
|
||||||
|
//
|
||||||
|
// WICHTIGER HINWEIS: In dieser Umgebung steht kein echter LDAP/AD-Server zur
|
||||||
|
// Verfuegung (analog zur Archive-Engine bei AUD-05). Client ist deshalb eine
|
||||||
|
// Schnittstelle — die Sync-/Rollenzuordnungs-Logik ist gegen einen Fake in
|
||||||
|
// den Tests vollstaendig geprueft, eine echte Verbindungspruefung gegen
|
||||||
|
// LDAP/AD steht noch aus.
|
||||||
|
package ldapsync
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Entry ist ein aus LDAP gelesener Benutzerdatensatz.
|
||||||
|
type Entry struct {
|
||||||
|
Email string
|
||||||
|
Name string
|
||||||
|
Groups []string
|
||||||
|
Disabled bool
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Client abstrahiert die eigentliche LDAP-Verbindung (Bind + Search).
|
||||||
|
type Client interface {
|
||||||
|
// Search liefert alle Benutzer, die dem konfigurierten Filter
|
||||||
|
// entsprechen. Ein Fehler bedeutet "Quelle nicht erreichbar oder
|
||||||
|
// fehlerhaft" — Run() bricht dann komplett und folgenlos ab
|
||||||
|
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
|
||||||
|
Search() ([]Entry, error)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
|
|||||||
|
package ldapsync
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"context"
|
||||||
|
"errors"
|
||||||
|
"fmt"
|
||||||
|
"os"
|
||||||
|
"testing"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||||
|
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type fakeClient struct {
|
||||||
|
entries []Entry
|
||||||
|
err error
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (f *fakeClient) Search() ([]Entry, error) {
|
||||||
|
if f.err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, f.err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return f.entries, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func setupTest(t *testing.T) (*user.TenantUserStore, *rbac.Store, *RoleMappingStore, func()) {
|
||||||
|
t.Helper()
|
||||||
|
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||||
|
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||||
|
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
|
||||||
|
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active', password_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
|
||||||
|
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignments (
|
||||||
|
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id), role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin')),
|
||||||
|
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignment_history (
|
||||||
|
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), user_id UUID NOT NULL, role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ldap_group_role_mapping (
|
||||||
|
ldap_group TEXT PRIMARY KEY, role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin'))
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
`); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
|
||||||
|
return user.NewTenantUserStore(pool), rbac.NewStore(pool), NewRoleMappingStore(pool), cleanup
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func uniqueEmail() string {
|
||||||
|
return fmt.Sprintf("ldap-test-%d@example.com", time.Now().UnixNano())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 1: Rollen-Erlaubnis-Matrix mit Positiv- und
|
||||||
|
// Negativfaellen — keine Privilege-Escalation ueber Gruppenmitgliedschaft.
|
||||||
|
func TestRoleMapping_PositiveAndNegativeCases(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
_, _, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||||
|
defer cleanup()
|
||||||
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if err := mappings.SetMapping(ctx, "cn=IT-Admins,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com", rbac.RoleTenantAdmin); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("set mapping: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Positivfall: gemappte Gruppe liefert die konfigurierte Rolle.
|
||||||
|
role, ok, err := mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, []string{"cn=IT-Admins,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com"})
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("highest role: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if !ok || role != rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("erwartet tenant_admin, habe ok=%v role=%q", ok, role)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Negativfall 1: unbekannte Gruppe vergibt keine Rolle.
|
||||||
|
_, ok, err = mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, []string{"cn=Praktikanten,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com"})
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("highest role (unbekannt): %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if ok {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatal("erwartet KEINE rolle fuer nicht gemappte gruppe")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Negativfall 2 (Privilege-Escalation-Versuch): eine Gruppe, die zufaellig
|
||||||
|
// wie eine interne Rolle heisst, aber NIE explizit gemappt wurde, darf
|
||||||
|
// keine Rolle vergeben.
|
||||||
|
_, ok, err = mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, []string{"tenant_admin", "superadmin"})
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("highest role (namens-trick): %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if ok {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatal("erwartet KEINE privilege-escalation ueber gruppennamen, die wie rollen aussehen")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1: Synchronisationslauf legt Benutzer an.
|
||||||
|
func TestSyncer_CreatesUsers(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
users, roles, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||||
|
defer cleanup()
|
||||||
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
email := uniqueEmail()
|
||||||
|
client := &fakeClient{entries: []Entry{{Email: email, Name: "LDAP Nutzer"}}}
|
||||||
|
syncer := NewSyncer(client, users, roles, mappings)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
result, err := syncer.Run(ctx)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("run: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if result.Created != 1 {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("erwartet 1 angelegten benutzer, habe %d", result.Created)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if _, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("benutzer sollte existieren: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 2: fehlerhafte/nicht erreichbare LDAP-
|
||||||
|
// Quelle bricht kontrolliert ab, ohne bestehende Konten zu beschaedigen.
|
||||||
|
func TestSyncer_AbortsCleanlyOnSourceError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
users, roles, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||||
|
defer cleanup()
|
||||||
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Ein bereits bestehendes Konto, das UNBERUEHRT bleiben muss.
|
||||||
|
existingEmail := uniqueEmail()
|
||||||
|
existing, err := users.Create(ctx, existingEmail, "Bestehender Nutzer")
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("create existing: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
client := &fakeClient{err: errors.New("ldap-server nicht erreichbar (simuliert)")}
|
||||||
|
syncer := NewSyncer(client, users, roles, mappings)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if _, err := syncer.Run(ctx); err == nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei nicht erreichbarer ldap-quelle")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Bestehendes Konto unveraendert (noch aktiv, keine geloeschten/neuen Zeilen).
|
||||||
|
got, err := users.Get(ctx, existing.ID)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("bestehendes konto sollte weiterhin existieren: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if got.Status != user.StatusActive {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("bestehendes konto sollte unveraendert aktiv sein, ist %q", got.Status)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 3: Deaktivierung in LDAP wird bei
|
||||||
|
// naechster Synchronisation korrekt uebernommen.
|
||||||
|
func TestSyncer_AppliesDeactivationOnNextRun(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
users, roles, mappings, cleanup := setupTest(t)
|
||||||
|
defer cleanup()
|
||||||
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
email := uniqueEmail()
|
||||||
|
client := &fakeClient{entries: []Entry{{Email: email, Name: "Wird Deaktiviert"}}}
|
||||||
|
syncer := NewSyncer(client, users, roles, mappings)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if _, err := syncer.Run(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("erster lauf: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
u, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("benutzer nach erstem lauf: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if u.User.Status != user.StatusActive {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("erwartet aktiv nach erstem lauf, habe %q", u.User.Status)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Zweiter Lauf: derselbe Benutzer ist jetzt in LDAP deaktiviert.
|
||||||
|
client.entries[0].Disabled = true
|
||||||
|
result, err := syncer.Run(ctx)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("zweiter lauf: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if result.Deactivated != 1 {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("erwartet 1 deaktivierung, habe %d", result.Deactivated)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
u, err = users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("benutzer nach zweitem lauf: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if u.User.Status != user.StatusInactive {
|
||||||
|
t.Fatalf("erwartet inaktiv nach deaktivierung in ldap, habe %q", u.User.Status)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
|
|||||||
|
package ldapsync
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"context"
|
||||||
|
"errors"
|
||||||
|
"fmt"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// RoleMappingStore verwaltet die Erlaubnis-Matrix LDAP-Gruppe -> Rolle
|
||||||
|
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 3). Nur explizit gemappte Gruppen vergeben eine Rolle
|
||||||
|
// — der Schutz gegen Privilege-Escalation ist strukturell: es gibt keinen
|
||||||
|
// Code-Pfad, der eine unbekannte Gruppe irgendeiner Rolle zuordnet.
|
||||||
|
type RoleMappingStore struct {
|
||||||
|
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func NewRoleMappingStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *RoleMappingStore {
|
||||||
|
return &RoleMappingStore{pool: pool}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// SetMapping ordnet eine LDAP-Gruppe genau einer NEXARCH-Rolle zu. Nur
|
||||||
|
// 'user'/'tenant_admin' sind zuweisbar (dieselbe Matrix wie RBAC-01/03) —
|
||||||
|
// 'superadmin' bleibt mandantenuebergreifend und nie ueber LDAP erreichbar.
|
||||||
|
func (s *RoleMappingStore) SetMapping(ctx context.Context, ldapGroup string, role rbac.Role) error {
|
||||||
|
if role != rbac.RoleUser && role != rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
|
||||||
|
return fmt.Errorf("ldapsync: rolle %q ist ueber ldap nicht zuweisbar", role)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
_, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||||
|
INSERT INTO ldap_group_role_mapping (ldap_group, role) VALUES ($1, $2)
|
||||||
|
ON CONFLICT (ldap_group) DO UPDATE SET role = $2
|
||||||
|
`, ldapGroup, string(role))
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return fmt.Errorf("gruppenzuordnung speichern: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// roleFor liefert die einer LDAP-Gruppe zugeordnete Rolle, sofern konfiguriert.
|
||||||
|
func (s *RoleMappingStore) roleFor(ctx context.Context, ldapGroup string) (rbac.Role, bool, error) {
|
||||||
|
var role string
|
||||||
|
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT role FROM ldap_group_role_mapping WHERE ldap_group = $1`, ldapGroup).Scan(&role)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||||
|
return "", false, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return "", false, fmt.Errorf("gruppenzuordnung lesen: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return rbac.Role(role), true, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// HighestRoleFor bestimmt aus einer Liste von LDAP-Gruppen die hoechste
|
||||||
|
// zugeordnete Rolle (tenant_admin > user). Gruppen ohne Eintrag in der
|
||||||
|
// Matrix tragen NICHTS bei — auch nicht, wenn ihr Name zufaellig wie eine
|
||||||
|
// interne Rolle aussieht (Akzeptanzkriterium 3 / Pruefung 1: keine
|
||||||
|
// Privilege-Escalation ueber Gruppenmitgliedschaft).
|
||||||
|
func (s *RoleMappingStore) HighestRoleFor(ctx context.Context, ldapGroups []string) (rbac.Role, bool, error) {
|
||||||
|
var best rbac.Role
|
||||||
|
found := false
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, g := range ldapGroups {
|
||||||
|
role, ok, err := s.roleFor(ctx, g)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return "", false, err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if !ok {
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if !found || role == rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
|
||||||
|
best = role
|
||||||
|
found = true
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return best, found, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
|||||||
|
package ldapsync
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"context"
|
||||||
|
"errors"
|
||||||
|
"fmt"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
|
||||||
|
"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// SyncResult fasst das Ergebnis eines Synchronisationslaufs zusammen.
|
||||||
|
type SyncResult struct {
|
||||||
|
Created int
|
||||||
|
Updated int
|
||||||
|
Deactivated int
|
||||||
|
Failed []string // Email-Adressen, bei denen die Verarbeitung fehlschlug
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Syncer fuehrt die Benutzer-/Rollen-Synchronisation aus LDAP aus.
|
||||||
|
type Syncer struct {
|
||||||
|
client Client
|
||||||
|
users *user.TenantUserStore
|
||||||
|
roles *rbac.Store
|
||||||
|
mappings *RoleMappingStore
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func NewSyncer(client Client, users *user.TenantUserStore, roles *rbac.Store, mappings *RoleMappingStore) *Syncer {
|
||||||
|
return &Syncer{client: client, users: users, roles: roles, mappings: mappings}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Run synchronisiert Benutzer aus LDAP (Akzeptanzkriterium 1). Ist die
|
||||||
|
// LDAP-Quelle nicht erreichbar/fehlerhaft, wird SOFORT und OHNE jede
|
||||||
|
// Aenderung an bestehenden Konten abgebrochen (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 /
|
||||||
|
// Pruefung 2) — Search() wird als allererstes aufgerufen, bevor irgendein
|
||||||
|
// Schreibzugriff stattfindet.
|
||||||
|
func (s *Syncer) Run(ctx context.Context) (SyncResult, error) {
|
||||||
|
entries, err := s.client.Search()
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return SyncResult{}, fmt.Errorf("ldap-quelle nicht erreichbar, synchronisation abgebrochen: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var result SyncResult
|
||||||
|
for _, entry := range entries {
|
||||||
|
if err := s.syncOne(ctx, entry, &result); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
// Ein fehlerhafter Einzeleintrag isoliert sich selbst — er
|
||||||
|
// beschaedigt weder bereits verarbeitete noch nachfolgende
|
||||||
|
// Konten (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
|
||||||
|
result.Failed = append(result.Failed, entry.Email)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return result, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (s *Syncer) syncOne(ctx context.Context, entry Entry, result *SyncResult) error {
|
||||||
|
existing, err := s.users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, entry.Email)
|
||||||
|
isNew := errors.Is(err, user.ErrNotFound)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil && !isNew {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var userID string
|
||||||
|
if isNew {
|
||||||
|
created, err := s.users.Create(ctx, entry.Email, entry.Name)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
userID = created.ID
|
||||||
|
result.Created++
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
userID = existing.User.ID
|
||||||
|
result.Updated++
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Deaktivierung in LDAP wird uebernommen (Akzeptanzkriterium 3 / Pruefung 3).
|
||||||
|
if entry.Disabled {
|
||||||
|
if _, err := s.users.Deactivate(ctx, userID); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
result.Deactivated++
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
role, ok, err := s.mappings.HighestRoleFor(ctx, entry.Groups)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if ok {
|
||||||
|
if _, err := s.roles.Assign(ctx, userID, role, "ldap-sync"); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
|||||||
|
// Package rbac implementiert Core RBAC-01: das Rollenmodell mit
|
||||||
|
// Grundrollen/-rechten, Hierarchie und Zuweisung. Die eigentliche
|
||||||
|
// Durchsetzung (erlaubt/verboten je Request) ist RBAC-02, dieses Paket
|
||||||
|
// liefert nur Modell + Zuweisung (Casbin-Prinzip: Policy-Modell getrennt
|
||||||
|
// von der Entscheidungsfunktion).
|
||||||
|
package rbac
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Role ist eine der drei Grundrollen. Superadmin lebt mandantenuebergreifend
|
||||||
|
// (siehe internal/user.SuperadminStore aus IAM-01) und wird deshalb NICHT
|
||||||
|
// ueber Store (tenant-gescoped) zugewiesen — die Existenz eines Superadmin-
|
||||||
|
// Kontos IST die Rollenzuweisung.
|
||||||
|
type Role string
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const (
|
||||||
|
RoleSuperadmin Role = "superadmin"
|
||||||
|
RoleTenantAdmin Role = "tenant_admin"
|
||||||
|
RoleUser Role = "user"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type Permission string
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const (
|
||||||
|
PermSelfRead Permission = "self.read"
|
||||||
|
PermSelfUpdate Permission = "self.update"
|
||||||
|
PermManageUsers Permission = "tenant.manage_users"
|
||||||
|
PermManageSettings Permission = "tenant.manage_settings"
|
||||||
|
PermManageTenants Permission = "platform.manage_tenants"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// parent bildet die Rollenhierarchie ab (Akzeptanzkriterium 2): eine Rolle
|
||||||
|
// erbt alle Rechte ihrer Elternrolle. tenant_admin erbt von user,
|
||||||
|
// superadmin erbt von tenant_admin.
|
||||||
|
var parent = map[Role]Role{
|
||||||
|
RoleTenantAdmin: RoleUser,
|
||||||
|
RoleSuperadmin: RoleTenantAdmin,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// direct sind die einer Rolle direkt (ohne Vererbung) zugeordneten Rechte.
|
||||||
|
var direct = map[Role][]Permission{
|
||||||
|
RoleUser: {PermSelfRead, PermSelfUpdate},
|
||||||
|
RoleTenantAdmin: {PermManageUsers, PermManageSettings},
|
||||||
|
RoleSuperadmin: {PermManageTenants},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// EffectivePermissions liefert die vollstaendige, ueber die Hierarchie
|
||||||
|
// aufgeloeste Rechtemenge einer Rolle (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 / Pruefung 2).
|
||||||
|
func EffectivePermissions(role Role) []Permission {
|
||||||
|
seen := make(map[Permission]bool)
|
||||||
|
var out []Permission
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for r, ok := role, true; ok; r, ok = parent[r] {
|
||||||
|
for _, p := range direct[r] {
|
||||||
|
if !seen[p] {
|
||||||
|
seen[p] = true
|
||||||
|
out = append(out, p)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return out
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// HasPermission prueft, ob eine Rolle (inklusive geerbter Rechte) ein
|
||||||
|
// bestimmtes Recht besitzt.
|
||||||
|
func HasPermission(role Role, perm Permission) bool {
|
||||||
|
for _, p := range EffectivePermissions(role) {
|
||||||
|
if p == perm {
|
||||||
|
return true
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
|
|||||||
|
package rbac
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"context"
|
||||||
|
"errors"
|
||||||
|
"fmt"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var (
|
||||||
|
// ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope wird geliefert, wenn versucht wird,
|
||||||
|
// eine mandantenuebergreifende Rolle (superadmin) ueber den tenant-
|
||||||
|
// gescopten Store zu vergeben — die erlaubte Matrix laesst hier nur
|
||||||
|
// user/tenant_admin zu (Akzeptanzkriterium 1 / Pruefung 1).
|
||||||
|
ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope = errors.New("rbac: rolle ist in diesem geltungsbereich nicht zuweisbar")
|
||||||
|
ErrNotFound = errors.New("rbac: keine rollenzuweisung gefunden")
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// assignableRoles ist die erlaubte Matrix fuer Store (tenant-gescoped).
|
||||||
|
var assignableRoles = map[Role]bool{
|
||||||
|
RoleUser: true,
|
||||||
|
RoleTenantAdmin: true,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type Assignment struct {
|
||||||
|
UserID string
|
||||||
|
Role Role
|
||||||
|
GrantedBy string
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Store verwaltet Rollenzuweisungen innerhalb GENAU EINER Tenant-Datenbank —
|
||||||
|
// analog zu internal/user.TenantUserStore (Modell C: der Pool bestimmt den
|
||||||
|
// Tenant, keine tenant_id-Spalte noetig).
|
||||||
|
type Store struct {
|
||||||
|
pool *pgxpool.Pool
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func NewStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Store {
|
||||||
|
return &Store{pool: pool}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Assign vergibt eine Rolle an einen Benutzer. grantedBy identifiziert den
|
||||||
|
// Akteur, der die Zuweisung vorgenommen hat (Akzeptanzkriterium 3). Jede
|
||||||
|
// Zuweisung wird zusaetzlich in role_assignment_history festgehalten, auch
|
||||||
|
// wenn sie eine vorherige Rolle ersetzt.
|
||||||
|
func (s *Store) Assign(ctx context.Context, userID string, role Role, grantedBy string) (Assignment, error) {
|
||||||
|
if !assignableRoles[role] {
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, ErrRoleNotAssignableInTenantScope
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if grantedBy == "" {
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, errors.New("rbac: grantedBy darf nicht leer sein")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("transaktion starten: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback(ctx) }()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||||
|
INSERT INTO role_assignments (user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at)
|
||||||
|
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
|
||||||
|
ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET role = $2, granted_by = $3, granted_at = now()
|
||||||
|
`, userID, string(role), grantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("rolle zuweisen: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||||
|
INSERT INTO role_assignment_history (user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at)
|
||||||
|
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
|
||||||
|
`, userID, string(role), grantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("historie schreiben: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("transaktion committen: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{UserID: userID, Role: role, GrantedBy: grantedBy}, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (s *Store) Get(ctx context.Context, userID string) (Assignment, error) {
|
||||||
|
var a Assignment
|
||||||
|
var role string
|
||||||
|
a.UserID = userID
|
||||||
|
if err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
||||||
|
SELECT role, granted_by FROM role_assignments WHERE user_id = $1
|
||||||
|
`, userID).Scan(&role, &a.GrantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, ErrNotFound
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return Assignment{}, fmt.Errorf("rollenzuweisung lesen: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
a.Role = Role(role)
|
||||||
|
return a, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// History liefert jede Rollenzuweisung eines Benutzers in chronologischer
|
||||||
|
// Reihenfolge — die Grundlage fuer "wer hat wann welche Rolle vergeben"
|
||||||
|
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||||
|
func (s *Store) History(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Assignment, error) {
|
||||||
|
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `
|
||||||
|
SELECT role, granted_by FROM role_assignment_history
|
||||||
|
WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY granted_at
|
||||||
|
`, userID)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historie abfragen: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
defer rows.Close()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var out []Assignment
|
||||||
|
for rows.Next() {
|
||||||
|
var role string
|
||||||
|
a := Assignment{UserID: userID}
|
||||||
|
if err := rows.Scan(&role, &a.GrantedBy); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("historieneintrag lesen: %w", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
a.Role = Role(role)
|
||||||
|
out = append(out, a)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return out, rows.Err()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
// Package secheaders implementiert Core API-08: eine gemeinsame
|
|
||||||
// Security-Header-Middleware/Bibliothek, die jedes Modul-Frontend (DMS,
|
|
||||||
// Mail, Workflow, AI, Connect) einbindet, statt Header pro Modul erneut zu
|
|
||||||
// definieren (Akzeptanzkriterium 3) — dieselbe Konsolidierungslogik wie
|
|
||||||
// beim zentralen Rate-Limiting (API-03). Die tatsaechliche EINBINDUNG in
|
|
||||||
// jedes einzelne Modul-Frontend ist ausdruecklich NICHT Teil dieser Kachel
|
|
||||||
// (siehe Ticket "Nicht Bestandteil").
|
|
||||||
package secheaders
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"fmt"
|
|
||||||
"net/http"
|
|
||||||
"strings"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Config ist die Baseline-Konfiguration. DefaultConfig() liefert einen
|
|
||||||
// Ausgangspunkt OHNE 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval' (Akzeptanzkriterium 1)
|
|
||||||
// und mit angemessener HSTS-Laufzeit (Akzeptanzkriterium 2).
|
|
||||||
type Config struct {
|
|
||||||
// ContentSecurityPolicy wird unveraendert als Header-Wert gesendet.
|
|
||||||
ContentSecurityPolicy string
|
|
||||||
// HSTSMaxAge bestimmt die Gueltigkeitsdauer, die Browser sich merken.
|
|
||||||
HSTSMaxAge time.Duration
|
|
||||||
HSTSIncludeSubdomains bool
|
|
||||||
FrameOptions string
|
|
||||||
ReferrerPolicy string
|
|
||||||
ContentTypeNoSniff bool
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// DefaultConfig liefert die dokumentierte Baseline: restriktive CSP ohne
|
|
||||||
// unsichere Direktiven, HSTS mit 180 Tagen (empfohlener Mindestwert fuer
|
|
||||||
// HSTS-Preloading-Listen liegt bei 1 Jahr — 180 Tage ist ein bewusst
|
|
||||||
// konservativer, aber bereits "angemessener" Ausgangswert, siehe
|
|
||||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2), Clickjacking- und MIME-Sniffing-Schutz.
|
|
||||||
func DefaultConfig() Config {
|
|
||||||
return Config{
|
|
||||||
ContentSecurityPolicy: strings.Join([]string{
|
|
||||||
"default-src 'self'",
|
|
||||||
"script-src 'self'",
|
|
||||||
"style-src 'self'",
|
|
||||||
"img-src 'self' data:",
|
|
||||||
"object-src 'none'",
|
|
||||||
"base-uri 'self'",
|
|
||||||
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
|
|
||||||
}, "; "),
|
|
||||||
HSTSMaxAge: 180 * 24 * time.Hour,
|
|
||||||
HSTSIncludeSubdomains: true,
|
|
||||||
FrameOptions: "DENY",
|
|
||||||
ReferrerPolicy: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
|
|
||||||
ContentTypeNoSniff: true,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// RequiredHeaders sind die von dieser Baseline gesetzten Header-Namen — die
|
|
||||||
// Referenzliste fuer CheckCoverage (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 1).
|
|
||||||
var RequiredHeaders = []string{
|
|
||||||
"Content-Security-Policy",
|
|
||||||
"Strict-Transport-Security",
|
|
||||||
"X-Frame-Options",
|
|
||||||
"Referrer-Policy",
|
|
||||||
"X-Content-Type-Options",
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (c Config) hstsValue() string {
|
|
||||||
v := fmt.Sprintf("max-age=%d", int(c.HSTSMaxAge.Seconds()))
|
|
||||||
if c.HSTSIncludeSubdomains {
|
|
||||||
v += "; includeSubDomains"
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return v
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Middleware setzt die Baseline-Header auf JEDER Antwort und erzwingt einen
|
|
||||||
// HTTP->HTTPS-Redirect, WENN die Anfrage nicht bereits ueber TLS ankam
|
|
||||||
// (Akzeptanzkriterium 2 / Pruefung 3) — serverseitig durchgesetzt, nicht nur
|
|
||||||
// dem Browser-HSTS-Cache ueberlassen (der erst nach dem ERSTEN sicheren
|
|
||||||
// Aufruf greift).
|
|
||||||
func Middleware(cfg Config, next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
||||||
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
||||||
if !isSecure(r) {
|
|
||||||
target := "https://" + r.Host + r.URL.RequestURI()
|
|
||||||
http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusMovedPermanently)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SetHeaders(cfg, w)
|
|
||||||
next(w, r)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// SetHeaders setzt die Baseline-Header direkt, OHNE die HTTPS-Redirect-
|
|
||||||
// Pruefung von Middleware — nuetzlich fuer lokale Entwicklungs-/
|
|
||||||
// Demo-Umgebungen ohne TLS-Terminierung (siehe cmd/secheaders-devserver)
|
|
||||||
// und fuer Aufrufer, die den Redirect selbst schon anderweitig sicherstellen.
|
|
||||||
func SetHeaders(cfg Config, w http.ResponseWriter) {
|
|
||||||
w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", cfg.ContentSecurityPolicy)
|
|
||||||
w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", cfg.hstsValue())
|
|
||||||
w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", cfg.FrameOptions)
|
|
||||||
w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", cfg.ReferrerPolicy)
|
|
||||||
if cfg.ContentTypeNoSniff {
|
|
||||||
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// isSecure erkennt TLS direkt ODER ueber den ueblichen Reverse-Proxy-Header
|
|
||||||
// (X-Forwarded-Proto) — der Core-Dienst laeuft in der Praxis hinter einem
|
|
||||||
// TLS-terminierenden Proxy, sieht r.TLS also nie direkt gesetzt.
|
|
||||||
func isSecure(r *http.Request) bool {
|
|
||||||
if r.TLS != nil {
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// CheckCoverage vergleicht die tatsaechlich gesetzten Header einer Antwort
|
|
||||||
// gegen RequiredHeaders und liefert die fehlenden — der "automatisierte
|
|
||||||
// Header-Scan" aus Pruefung 1, anwendbar auf jede Antwort eines beliebigen
|
|
||||||
// Modul-Frontends.
|
|
||||||
func CheckCoverage(headers http.Header) (missing []string) {
|
|
||||||
for _, name := range RequiredHeaders {
|
|
||||||
if headers.Get(name) == "" {
|
|
||||||
missing = append(missing, name)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return missing
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package secheaders
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"net/http"
|
|
||||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
|
||||||
"strings"
|
|
||||||
"testing"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func secureRequest(method, target string) *http.Request {
|
|
||||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, target, nil)
|
|
||||||
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
|
|
||||||
return req
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 1: CSP definiert ohne unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval.
|
|
||||||
func TestDefaultConfig_CSPHasNoUnsafeDirectives(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := DefaultConfig()
|
|
||||||
if strings.Contains(cfg.ContentSecurityPolicy, "unsafe-inline") {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatal("csp enthaelt 'unsafe-inline', erwartet keine unsicheren direktiven")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if strings.Contains(cfg.ContentSecurityPolicy, "unsafe-eval") {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatal("csp enthaelt 'unsafe-eval', erwartet keine unsicheren direktiven")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if !strings.Contains(cfg.ContentSecurityPolicy, "default-src 'self'") {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatal("erwartet restriktive default-src 'self' als ausgangspunkt")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2: HSTS mit angemessener max-age gesetzt.
|
|
||||||
func TestMiddleware_SetsHSTSWithSufficientMaxAge(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := DefaultConfig()
|
|
||||||
handler := Middleware(cfg, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
||||||
handler(rec, secureRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.test/"))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hsts := rec.Header().Get("Strict-Transport-Security")
|
|
||||||
if !strings.Contains(hsts, "max-age=") {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("hsts-header fehlt max-age: %q", hsts)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
// "Angemessen" heisst hier: mindestens 30 Tage (2592000s) — deutlich
|
|
||||||
// ueber dem bekannten Anti-Pattern kurzer/fehlender max-age-Werte.
|
|
||||||
if cfg.HSTSMaxAge.Seconds() < 2592000 {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("konfigurierte hsts-max-age = %v, erwartet mindestens 30 tage", cfg.HSTSMaxAge)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if !strings.Contains(hsts, "includeSubDomains") {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet includeSubDomains im hsts-header: %q", hsts)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 1: EINE gemeinsame Middleware setzt ALLE
|
|
||||||
// Baseline-Header vollstaendig — automatisiert ueberprueft mit CheckCoverage.
|
|
||||||
func TestMiddleware_ProducesFullHeaderCoverage(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := DefaultConfig()
|
|
||||||
handler := Middleware(cfg, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
||||||
handler(rec, secureRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.test/"))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if missing := CheckCoverage(rec.Header()); len(missing) != 0 {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet vollstaendige header-abdeckung, fehlen: %v", missing)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Pruefung 1 (Kehrseite): CheckCoverage erkennt fehlende Header
|
|
||||||
// zuverlaessig — Voraussetzung dafuer, dass ein automatisierter Scan
|
|
||||||
// gegen ein Modul-Frontend OHNE eingebundene Middleware ueberhaupt etwas
|
|
||||||
// meldet.
|
|
||||||
func TestCheckCoverage_DetectsMissingHeadersOnBareHandler(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
bareHandler := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
||||||
bareHandler(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
missing := CheckCoverage(rec.Header())
|
|
||||||
if len(missing) != len(RequiredHeaders) {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet %d fehlende header bei unbehandeltem handler, habe %d: %v",
|
|
||||||
len(RequiredHeaders), len(missing), missing)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 3: ein Aufruf ueber (simuliertes) HTTP
|
|
||||||
// wird server-seitig auf HTTPS umgeleitet, statt sich allein auf den
|
|
||||||
// HSTS-Browser-Cache zu verlassen (der erst nach dem ersten sicheren
|
|
||||||
// Aufruf greift).
|
|
||||||
func TestMiddleware_RedirectsInsecureRequestToHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := DefaultConfig()
|
|
||||||
called := false
|
|
||||||
handler := Middleware(cfg, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
||||||
called = true
|
|
||||||
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.test/pfad?x=1", nil)
|
|
||||||
// Kein X-Forwarded-Proto, kein r.TLS -> unsicherer Aufruf.
|
|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
||||||
handler(rec, req)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusMovedPermanently {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 301 (redirect auf https)", rec.Code)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
location := rec.Header().Get("Location")
|
|
||||||
if !strings.HasPrefix(location, "https://") {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("location = %q, want https://-praefix", location)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if !strings.Contains(location, "/pfad?x=1") {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("location = %q, erwartet erhaltenen pfad+query", location)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if called {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatal("eigentlicher handler haette bei unsicherem aufruf nicht erreicht werden duerfen")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
|||||||
|
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_assignment_history;
|
||||||
|
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS role_assignments;
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
|||||||
|
-- Rollenzuweisung pro Benutzer (RBAC-01, siehe core-kanban/tickets/RBAC-01.md).
|
||||||
|
-- Nur 'user' und 'tenant_admin' sind hier zuweisbar — 'superadmin' lebt
|
||||||
|
-- mandantenuebergreifend in der Registry (IAM-01 SuperadminStore) und hat
|
||||||
|
-- daher bewusst KEINE Zeile in dieser tenant-lokalen Tabelle (Akzeptanz-
|
||||||
|
-- kriterium 1: nur Zuweisungen innerhalb der erlaubten Matrix).
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE role_assignments (
|
||||||
|
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id),
|
||||||
|
role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user', 'tenant_admin')),
|
||||||
|
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
-- Vollstaendige Historie jeder Rollenaenderung (Akzeptanzkriterium 3: wer
|
||||||
|
-- hat wann welche Rolle vergeben).
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE role_assignment_history (
|
||||||
|
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
|
||||||
|
user_id UUID NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CREATE INDEX role_assignment_history_user_idx ON role_assignment_history (user_id, granted_at);
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
|||||||
|
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ldap_group_role_mapping;
|
||||||
|
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ldap_config;
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
|||||||
|
-- LDAP/Active-Directory-Anbindung (IAM-05, siehe core-kanban/tickets/IAM-05.md).
|
||||||
|
-- Bind-Credentials liegen NIE in dieser Tabelle im Klartext — bind_password_env
|
||||||
|
-- nennt nur den Namen einer Umgebungsvariable, aus der das Passwort zur
|
||||||
|
-- Laufzeit gelesen wird (Projekt-Konvention: Secrets nur ueber Env-Vars).
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE ldap_config (
|
||||||
|
id BOOLEAN PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT true CHECK (id),
|
||||||
|
url TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
bind_dn TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
bind_password_env TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
base_dn TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
user_filter TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '(objectClass=person)',
|
||||||
|
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
-- Erlaubnis-Matrix LDAP-Gruppe -> NEXARCH-Rolle (Akzeptanzkriterium 3).
|
||||||
|
-- Eine LDAP-Gruppe OHNE Eintrag hier vergibt KEINE Rolle — kein impliziter
|
||||||
|
-- Zugriff durch Gruppennamen-Zufall (Privilege-Escalation-Schutz, siehe
|
||||||
|
-- "Bekannte Fehler vermeiden" im Ticket).
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE ldap_group_role_mapping (
|
||||||
|
ldap_group TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||||
|
role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user', 'tenant_admin'))
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
@@ -1,16 +1,11 @@
|
|||||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||||
set -euo pipefail
|
set -euo pipefail
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PASS="${NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD:?Setze NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD vor dem Aufruf}"
|
PASS="${NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD:?Setze NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD vor dem Aufruf}"
|
||||||
ROLE="nexarch_test"
|
ROLE="nexarch_test"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
export PGPASSWORD="$PASS"
|
export PGPASSWORD="$PASS"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenants CASCADE;"
|
psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tenants CASCADE;"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
dbs=$(psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -tAc "SELECT datname FROM pg_database WHERE datname LIKE 'tenant\_%' ESCAPE '\'")
|
dbs=$(psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -tAc "SELECT datname FROM pg_database WHERE datname LIKE 'tenant\_%' ESCAPE '\'")
|
||||||
for db in $dbs; do
|
for db in $dbs; do
|
||||||
psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS \"${db}\";"
|
psql -h localhost -U "$ROLE" -d postgres -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS \"${db}\";"
|
||||||
done
|
done
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
echo "Testumgebung zurueckgesetzt: registry-tabelle + $(echo "$dbs" | grep -c . || true) tenant-datenbank(en) entfernt."
|
echo "Testumgebung zurueckgesetzt: registry-tabelle + $(echo "$dbs" | grep -c . || true) tenant-datenbank(en) entfernt."
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
|
|||||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||||
set -euo pipefail
|
set -euo pipefail
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PASS="${NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD:?Setze NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD vor dem Aufruf}"
|
PASS="${NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD:?Setze NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD vor dem Aufruf}"
|
||||||
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
|
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD="$PASS" bash scripts/reset-test-env.sh
|
NEXARCH_TEST_DB_PASSWORD="$PASS" bash scripts/reset-test-env.sh
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
export TEST_ADMIN_DSN="postgresql://nexarch_test:${PASS}@localhost:5432/postgres?sslmode=disable"
|
export TEST_ADMIN_DSN="postgresql://nexarch_test:${PASS}@localhost:5432/postgres?sslmode=disable"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
echo "== go build =="
|
echo "== go build =="
|
||||||
go build ./...
|
go build ./...
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
echo "== go vet =="
|
echo "== go vet =="
|
||||||
go vet ./...
|
go vet ./...
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
echo "== go test (-p 1) =="
|
echo "== go test (-p 1) =="
|
||||||
go test ./... -p 1 -count=1
|
go test ./... -p 1 -count=1
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user