IAM-06: sso-anmeldung-ueber-oidc
internal/oidc: JWKS-Parser (RSA-Schluessel, RFC 7517) + Verifier prueft ID-Tokens gegen den geparsten Schluesselsatz (Signatur, Ablauf ueber die jwt-Bibliothek, Aussteller) — Akzeptanzkriterium 3. VerifyWithNonce prueft zusaetzlich, dass der nonce-Claim exakt dem beim Redirect ausgestellten Nonce entspricht (Replay-Schutz). StateStore ist der CSRF-/Replay-Schutz (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3): Generate stellt state+nonce aus, Consume loest den state ATOMAR und EINMALIG ein (WHERE used_at IS NULL, analog IAM-03/IAM-09-Muster) — ein abgefangener und wiederverwendeter Redirect-Callback schlaegt fehl. CompleteOIDCLogin mappt Rollen aus OIDC-Rollen-Claims ueber DIESELBE Erlaubnis-Matrix wie IAM-05/LDAP (ldapsync.RoleMappingStore.HighestRoleFor, keine zweite parallele Implementierung — Akzeptanzkriterium 2) und stellt bei Erfolg ein normales IAM-02-Sitzungs-Token aus. Lokaler Login (IAM-02 LoginService) bleibt vollstaendig unangetastet und damit als Fallback nutzbar. WICHTIGER HINWEIS: kein registrierter externer OIDC-Provider (Google/Okta/ Azure AD) in dieser Umgebung verfuegbar fuer einen echten Authorization- Code-Redirect (analog IAM-05/AUD-05). ANDERS als dort ist die eigentliche Token-Validierung aber rein kryptographisch und ohne Netzwerkabhaengigkeit zur Testzeit vollstaendig echt geprueft: Tests erzeugen ein eigenes RSA-Schluesselpaar, signieren ID-Tokens selbst und verifizieren sie exakt wie bei einem echten Provider. Nur der Live-Redirect zu einem realen externen IdP bleibt ungeprueft. Pruefungen (ausgefuehrt auf root@192.168.1.131, go build/vet/test PASS): 1. Rollen-Erlaubnis-Matrix fuer OIDC-Claims automatisiert getestet (keine Privilege-Escalation) — TestCompleteOIDCLogin_UnmappedRoleGrantsNothing: Claims mit "tenant_admin"/"superadmin" als Rollen-Strings, die NIE gemappt wurden, vergeben keine Rolle. PASS. 2. Token-Signatur- und Ablaufpruefung gegen JWKS automatisiert getestet — TestVerify_RejectsExpiredToken, TestVerify_RejectsWrongSigningKey, TestVerify_RejectsWrongIssuer, TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip. PASS. 3. State/Nonce-Handling gegen CSRF und Replay geprueft — TestStateStore_ConsumeIsSingleUse (State-Replay abgewiesen), TestVerifyWithNonce_RejectsMismatch (Nonce-Mismatch abgewiesen). PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
sysops
co-authored by
Claude Sonnet 5
Claude Sonnet 5
parent
1a82da211d
commit
e4856dfc9d
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
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// Package oidc implementiert Core IAM-06: SSO-Anmeldung ueber OpenID
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// Connect gegen externe Identity-Provider.
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//
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// WICHTIGER HINWEIS: In dieser Umgebung ist kein registrierter externer
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// OIDC-Provider (Client-ID/Secret bei Google/Okta/Azure AD o.ae.) verfuegbar,
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// gegen den ein echter Authorization-Code-Redirect-Flow end-to-end
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// durchgefuehrt werden koennte (analog AUD-05/Archive, IAM-05/LDAP). ANDERS
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// als bei LDAP/Archive ist die eigentliche Token-VALIDIERUNG (JWKS-
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// Signaturpruefung, Ablauf, Claims, Nonce/State) aber ein rein
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// kryptographischer Vorgang ohne Netzwerkabhaengigkeit zur Testzeit — die
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// Tests unten erzeugen ein eigenes RSA-Schluesselpaar, signieren ein
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// ID-Token selbst und pruefen es exakt so, wie es ein echter Provider
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// liefern wuerde. Nur der Redirect zu einem echten externen Provider bleibt
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// ungeprueft.
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package oidc
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import (
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"crypto/rsa"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/binary"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"math/big"
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)
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type jwk struct {
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Kid string `json:"kid"`
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Kty string `json:"kty"`
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N string `json:"n"`
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E string `json:"e"`
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}
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type jwkSet struct {
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Keys []jwk `json:"keys"`
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}
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var ErrUnsupportedKeyType = errors.New("oidc: nicht unterstuetzter jwk-schluesseltyp")
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// ParseJWKS dekodiert eine JWKS-Antwort (RFC 7517) in kid -> RSA-Public-Key.
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// Nur RSA-Schluessel (kty=RSA, Standard bei allen gaengigen OIDC-Providern
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// fuer ID-Tokens) werden unterstuetzt.
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func ParseJWKS(data []byte) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
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var set jwkSet
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &set); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("jwks parsen: %w", err)
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}
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out := make(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, len(set.Keys))
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for _, k := range set.Keys {
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if k.Kty != "RSA" {
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continue
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}
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pub, err := decodeRSAKey(k)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("schluessel %q dekodieren: %w", k.Kid, err)
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}
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out[k.Kid] = pub
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func decodeRSAKey(k jwk) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
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nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.N)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("modulus dekodieren: %w", err)
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}
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eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(k.E)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("exponent dekodieren: %w", err)
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}
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eBuf := make([]byte, 8)
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copy(eBuf[8-len(eBytes):], eBytes)
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e := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(eBuf))
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return &rsa.PublicKey{N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes), E: e}, nil
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
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package oidc
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/auth"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/ldapsync"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
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)
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// CompleteOIDCLogin verifiziert das ID-Token (Signatur, Ablauf, Aussteller,
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// Nonce — Akzeptanzkriterium 3), loest den State einmalig ein
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// (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3), legt bei Bedarf einen lokalen Benutzer an
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// und mapped Rollen aus den OIDC-Claims ueber DIESELBE Erlaubnis-Matrix wie
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// IAM-05/LDAP (ldapsync.RoleMappingStore — kein zweiter, paralleler
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// Mapping-Mechanismus, Akzeptanzkriterium 2). Bei Erfolg wird ein normales
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// IAM-02-Sitzungs-Token ausgestellt.
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func CompleteOIDCLogin(
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ctx context.Context,
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verifier *Verifier,
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states *StateStore,
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users *user.TenantUserStore,
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roles *rbac.Store,
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roleMapping *ldapsync.RoleMappingStore,
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issuer *auth.TokenIssuer,
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tenantSlug, state, idToken string,
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) (token string, err error) {
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nonce, err := states.Consume(ctx, state)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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claims, err := verifier.VerifyWithNonce(idToken, nonce)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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if claims.Email == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: id-token ohne e-mail-claim", ErrInvalidToken)
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}
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u, err := findOrCreateUser(ctx, users, claims.Email)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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if role, ok, err := roleMapping.HighestRoleFor(ctx, claims.Roles); err != nil {
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return "", err
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} else if ok {
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if _, err := roles.Assign(ctx, u.ID, role, "oidc-sso"); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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}
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return issuer.Issue(u.ID, tenantSlug)
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}
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func findOrCreateUser(ctx context.Context, users *user.TenantUserStore, email string) (user.User, error) {
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creds, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
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if err == nil {
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return creds.User, nil
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}
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if !errors.Is(err, user.ErrNotFound) {
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return user.User{}, err
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}
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return users.Create(ctx, email, email)
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
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package oidc
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/auth"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/ldapsync"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/rbac"
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"gitea.perlbach24.de/scripte/nexarch/internal/user"
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)
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func setupLoginTest(t *testing.T) (*pgxpool.Pool, func()) {
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t.Helper()
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adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
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if adminDSN == "" {
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t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
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}
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ctx := context.Background()
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pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, name TEXT NOT NULL,
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status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active', password_hash TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignments (
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user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id), role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin')),
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granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_assignment_history (
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), user_id UUID NOT NULL, role TEXT NOT NULL,
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granted_by TEXT NOT NULL, granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ldap_group_role_mapping (
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ldap_group TEXT PRIMARY KEY, role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('user','tenant_admin'))
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oidc_states (
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state TEXT PRIMARY KEY, nonce TEXT NOT NULL, expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
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used_at TIMESTAMPTZ, created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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`); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
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}
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cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
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return pool, cleanup
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 1 + 3: End-to-End-Login gegen ein (selbst signiertes,
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// aber protokollkorrektes) ID-Token — Signatur, Nonce, State, Rollen-Mapping,
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// Sitzungs-Token-Ausstellung.
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func TestCompleteOIDCLogin_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
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pool, cleanup := setupLoginTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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key := generateTestKey(t)
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verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
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states := NewStateStore(pool)
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users := user.NewTenantUserStore(pool)
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roles := rbac.NewStore(pool)
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roleMapping := ldapsync.NewRoleMappingStore(pool)
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issuer := auth.NewTokenIssuer("test-secret-nur-fuer-tests")
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if err := roleMapping.SetMapping(ctx, "sso-admins", rbac.RoleTenantAdmin); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("set mapping: %v", err)
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}
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state, nonce, err := states.Generate(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("generate state: %v", err)
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}
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email := fmt.Sprintf("oidc-test-%d@example.com", time.Now().UnixNano())
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claims := Claims{
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Subject: "idp-subject-123",
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Email: email,
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Nonce: nonce,
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Roles: []string{"sso-admins"},
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
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},
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}
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idToken := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
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token, err := CompleteOIDCLogin(ctx, verifier, states, users, roles, roleMapping, issuer, "acme", state, idToken)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("complete oidc login: %v", err)
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}
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if token == "" {
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t.Fatal("erwartet nicht-leeres sitzungs-token")
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}
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assignment, err := roles.Get(ctx, mustGetUserID(t, ctx, users, email))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("rollenzuweisung lesen: %v", err)
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}
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if assignment.Role != rbac.RoleTenantAdmin {
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t.Fatalf("erwartet tenant_admin aus sso-admins-mapping, habe %q", assignment.Role)
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}
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// Replay desselben state schlaegt fehl.
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if _, err := CompleteOIDCLogin(ctx, verifier, states, users, roles, roleMapping, issuer, "acme", state, idToken); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei wiederverwendetem state (replay)")
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}
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}
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// Akzeptanzkriterium 2 + Pruefung 1: keine Privilege-Escalation ueber
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// manipulierte/unbekannte Rollen-Claims.
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func TestCompleteOIDCLogin_UnmappedRoleGrantsNothing(t *testing.T) {
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pool, cleanup := setupLoginTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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ctx := context.Background()
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key := generateTestKey(t)
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verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
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states := NewStateStore(pool)
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users := user.NewTenantUserStore(pool)
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roles := rbac.NewStore(pool)
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roleMapping := ldapsync.NewRoleMappingStore(pool)
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issuer := auth.NewTokenIssuer("test-secret-nur-fuer-tests")
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state, nonce, err := states.Generate(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("generate state: %v", err)
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}
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email := fmt.Sprintf("oidc-test-%d@example.com", time.Now().UnixNano())
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claims := Claims{
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Email: email,
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Nonce: nonce,
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// Versuch, sich ueber einen manipulierten Rollen-Claim
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// hochzustufen — diese Gruppen wurden NIE gemappt.
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Roles: []string{"tenant_admin", "superadmin"},
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
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},
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}
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idToken := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
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if _, err := CompleteOIDCLogin(ctx, verifier, states, users, roles, roleMapping, issuer, "acme", state, idToken); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("complete oidc login: %v", err)
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}
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userID := mustGetUserID(t, ctx, users, email)
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if _, err := roles.Get(ctx, userID); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("erwartet KEINE rollenzuweisung fuer nicht gemappte claims (privilege-escalation-versuch)")
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}
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}
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func mustGetUserID(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, users *user.TenantUserStore, email string) string {
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t.Helper()
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creds, err := users.GetByEmailForAuth(ctx, email)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("get user by email: %v", err)
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}
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return creds.User.ID
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
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package oidc
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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var ErrStateInvalid = errors.New("oidc: state ungueltig, bereits verwendet oder abgelaufen")
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// DefaultStateTTL begrenzt, wie lange ein ausgestellter State/Nonce fuer den
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// Redirect-Umweg zum Identity-Provider gueltig bleibt.
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const DefaultStateTTL = 10 * time.Minute
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type StateStore struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewStateStore(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *StateStore {
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return &StateStore{pool: pool}
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}
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// Generate stellt state+nonce fuer einen neuen Login-Redirect aus. state
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// wird als OAuth2-"state"-Parameter mitgeschickt (CSRF-Schutz), nonce
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// erscheint spaeter im ID-Token und muss exakt uebereinstimmen (Replay-Schutz).
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func (s *StateStore) Generate(ctx context.Context) (state, nonce string, err error) {
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state, err = randomValue()
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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nonce, err = randomValue()
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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_, err = s.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO oidc_states (state, nonce, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
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`, state, nonce, time.Now().Add(DefaultStateTTL))
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("state speichern: %w", err)
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}
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return state, nonce, nil
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}
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// Consume loest einen State EINMALIG ein (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3:
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// Replay-Schutz) — atomar ueber WHERE used_at IS NULL, analog IAM-03/IAM-09.
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// Ein zweiter Callback mit demselben state (z.B. durch einen Angreifer, der
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// die Redirect-URL abgefangen hat) schlaegt fehl.
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func (s *StateStore) Consume(ctx context.Context, state string) (nonce string, err error) {
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err = s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
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UPDATE oidc_states SET used_at = now()
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WHERE state = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > now()
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RETURNING nonce
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`, state).Scan(&nonce)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return "", ErrStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("state einloesen: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nonce, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func randomValue() (string, error) {
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func setupStateTest(t *testing.T) (*StateStore, func()) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
adminDSN := os.Getenv("TEST_ADMIN_DSN")
|
||||
if adminDSN == "" {
|
||||
t.Skip("TEST_ADMIN_DSN nicht gesetzt, Integrationstest uebersprungen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
pool, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, adminDSN)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oidc_states (
|
||||
state TEXT PRIMARY KEY, nonce TEXT NOT NULL, expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
|
||||
used_at TIMESTAMPTZ, created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
)`); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("schema: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup := func() { pool.Close() }
|
||||
return NewStateStore(pool), cleanup
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3: State/Nonce-Handling gegen CSRF und Replay.
|
||||
func TestStateStore_ConsumeIsSingleUse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, cleanup := setupStateTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
state, nonce, err := store.Generate(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("generate: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gotNonce, err := store.Consume(ctx, state)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("consume (erste einloesung): %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if gotNonce != nonce {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("nonce = %q, want %q", gotNonce, nonce)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Consume(ctx, state); !errors.Is(err, ErrStateInvalid) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrStateInvalid bei erneutem einloesen (replay), habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestStateStore_RejectsUnknownState(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
store, cleanup := setupStateTest(t)
|
||||
defer cleanup()
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := store.Consume(ctx, "niemals-ausgestellter-state"); !errors.Is(err, ErrStateInvalid) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet ErrStateInvalid, habe %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrInvalidToken = errors.New("oidc: id-token ungueltig, abgelaufen oder falscher aussteller")
|
||||
|
||||
// Claims sind die fuer NEXARCH relevanten OIDC-ID-Token-Claims.
|
||||
type Claims struct {
|
||||
Subject string `json:"sub"`
|
||||
Email string `json:"email"`
|
||||
Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
|
||||
Roles []string `json:"roles"` // providerabhaengiger Claim-Name, hier vereinfacht fest "roles"
|
||||
jwt.RegisteredClaims
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verifier prueft ID-Tokens gegen den JWKS-Schluesselsatz eines konfigurierten
|
||||
// Providers (Akzeptanzkriterium 3: fehlerhafte/abgelaufene Tokens werden
|
||||
// abgewiesen).
|
||||
type Verifier struct {
|
||||
keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
|
||||
issuer string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewVerifier(keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, issuer string) *Verifier {
|
||||
return &Verifier{keys: keys, issuer: issuer}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify prueft Signatur (gegen JWKS), Ablauf (jwt-Bibliothek lehnt
|
||||
// abgelaufene Tokens automatisch ab) und Aussteller.
|
||||
func (v *Verifier) Verify(idToken string) (*Claims, error) {
|
||||
claims := &Claims{}
|
||||
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(idToken, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
|
||||
if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodRSA); !ok {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
kid, _ := t.Header["kid"].(string)
|
||||
key, ok := v.keys[kid]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
return key, nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil || !token.Valid {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
if claims.Issuer != v.issuer {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unerwarteter aussteller %q", ErrInvalidToken, claims.Issuer)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return claims, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerifyWithNonce prueft zusaetzlich, dass der nonce-Claim im Token exakt
|
||||
// dem bei der Anfrage ausgestellten Nonce entspricht — verhindert Replay
|
||||
// eines fremden, gueltigen ID-Tokens (Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3).
|
||||
func (v *Verifier) VerifyWithNonce(idToken, expectedNonce string) (*Claims, error) {
|
||||
claims, err := v.Verify(idToken)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if claims.Nonce == "" || claims.Nonce != expectedNonce {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: nonce stimmt nicht ueberein", ErrInvalidToken)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return claims, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
|
||||
package oidc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/rsa"
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func generateTestKey(t *testing.T) *rsa.PrivateKey {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("generate rsa key: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return key
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func signTestToken(t *testing.T, key *rsa.PrivateKey, kid string, claims Claims) string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
|
||||
token.Header["kid"] = kid
|
||||
s, err := token.SignedString(key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("sign token: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVerify_AcceptsValidToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
Email: "person@example.com",
|
||||
Nonce: "erwarteter-nonce",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
got, err := verifier.Verify(tok)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.Email != "person@example.com" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("email = %q", got.Email)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium 3 + Pruefung 2: Token-Signatur- und Ablaufpruefung.
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)), // abgelaufen
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei abgelaufenem token")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsWrongSigningKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
realKey := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
attackerKey := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
// Verifier kennt NUR den echten oeffentlichen Schluessel.
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &realKey.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Mit dem Angreifer-Schluessel signiert, aber unter demselben kid wie der echte.
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, attackerKey, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei fremd signiertem token")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVerify_RejectsWrongIssuer(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://ganz-anderer-idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei unerwartetem aussteller")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Akzeptanzkriterium/Pruefung 3: Nonce-Handling gegen Replay.
|
||||
func TestVerifyWithNonce_RejectsMismatch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{"kid-1": &key.PublicKey}, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
claims := Claims{
|
||||
Subject: "user-123",
|
||||
Nonce: "nonce-a",
|
||||
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com",
|
||||
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.VerifyWithNonce(tok, "nonce-b"); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet fehler bei nonce-mismatch (moeglicher replay eines fremden tokens)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.VerifyWithNonce(tok, "nonce-a"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet erfolg bei passendem nonce: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseJWKS_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
key := generateTestKey(t)
|
||||
|
||||
nBytes := key.PublicKey.N.Bytes()
|
||||
eBuf := make([]byte, 8)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(eBuf, uint64(key.PublicKey.E))
|
||||
// Fuehrende Nullbytes des Exponenten abschneiden (ueblich bei JWK-Kodierung).
|
||||
eStart := 0
|
||||
for eStart < len(eBuf)-1 && eBuf[eStart] == 0 {
|
||||
eStart++
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
set := jwkSet{Keys: []jwk{{
|
||||
Kid: "kid-1",
|
||||
Kty: "RSA",
|
||||
N: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(nBytes),
|
||||
E: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(eBuf[eStart:]),
|
||||
}}}
|
||||
data, err := json.Marshal(set)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
parsed, err := ParseJWKS(data)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("parse jwks: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
got, ok := parsed["kid-1"]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatal("erwartet kid-1 im ergebnis")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.E != key.PublicKey.E || got.N.Cmp(key.PublicKey.N) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("erwartet identischen oeffentlichen schluessel nach roundtrip")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Der wiederhergestellte Schluessel muss ein damit signiertes Token auch tatsaechlich verifizieren.
|
||||
verifier := NewVerifier(parsed, "https://idp.example.com")
|
||||
claims := Claims{Subject: "x", RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
|
||||
Issuer: "https://idp.example.com", ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
|
||||
}}
|
||||
tok := signTestToken(t, key, "kid-1", claims)
|
||||
if _, err := verifier.Verify(tok); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("verify mit aus jwks wiederhergestelltem schluessel: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user