package api

import (
	"bufio"
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"log/slog"
	"math"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"os/exec"
	"runtime"
	"strconv"
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"syscall"
	"time"

	"regexp"

	"github.com/archivmail/config"
	"github.com/archivmail/internal/audit"
	"github.com/archivmail/internal/auth"
	imapstore "github.com/archivmail/internal/imap"
	"github.com/archivmail/internal/index"
	ldapcfg "github.com/archivmail/internal/ldapconfig"
	pop3store "github.com/archivmail/internal/pop3"
	"github.com/archivmail/internal/smtpd"
	"github.com/archivmail/internal/storage"
	"github.com/archivmail/internal/tenantstore"
	"github.com/archivmail/internal/userstore"
	"github.com/archivmail/pkg/mailparser"
)

// SEC-22: Compiled regex for mail ID validation to prevent path traversal.
var mailIDRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9a-f]{64}$`)

// isValidMailID validates that a mail ID matches the expected hex format.
func isValidMailID(id string) bool {
	return mailIDRegex.MatchString(id)
}

// roleLevel returns the privilege level for a role string.
// Hierarchy: superadmin=5 > admin=4 > domain_admin=3 > auditor=2 > user=1
func roleLevel(role string) int {
	levels := map[string]int{
		userstore.RoleUser:        1,
		userstore.RoleAuditor:     2,
		userstore.RoleDomainAdmin: 3,
		userstore.RoleAdmin:       4,
		userstore.RoleSuperAdmin:  5,
	}
	return levels[role]
}

type contextKey string

const (
	sessionKey contextKey = "session"
	tenantKey  contextKey = "tenant_id"
)

// Server is the archivmail HTTP API server.
type Server struct {
	cfg        config.APIConfig
	store      *storage.Store
	idx        index.Indexer
	authMgr    *auth.Manager
	users      *userstore.Store
	audlog     *audit.Logger
	logger     *slog.Logger
	mux        *http.ServeMux
	smtpDaemon    *smtpd.Daemon
	imapStore     *imapstore.Store
	imapImporter  *imapstore.Importer
	imapScheduler *imapstore.Scheduler
	pop3Store     *pop3store.Store
	pop3Importer  *pop3store.Importer
	uploadJobs    sync.Map // jobID → *UploadJob
	ldapStore         *ldapcfg.Store
	tenantStore       *tenantstore.Store
	tenantLdapStore   *ldapcfg.TenantStore   // PROJ-23: per-tenant LDAP config
	idxMgr            *index.TenantIndexManager // PROJ-21 Phase 4: per-tenant Xapian index
}

// SetSMTPDaemon wires the SMTP daemon into the API server after construction.
func (s *Server) SetSMTPDaemon(d *smtpd.Daemon) {
	s.smtpDaemon = d
}

// SetImap wires the IMAP store, importer, and scheduler into the API server after construction.
func (s *Server) SetImap(store *imapstore.Store, importer *imapstore.Importer, scheduler *imapstore.Scheduler) {
	s.imapStore = store
	s.imapImporter = importer
	s.imapScheduler = scheduler
}

// SetPop3 wires the POP3 store and importer into the API server after construction.
func (s *Server) SetPop3(store *pop3store.Store, importer *pop3store.Importer) {
	s.pop3Store = store
	s.pop3Importer = importer
}

// SetIndexManager wires the per-tenant index manager into the API server (PROJ-21 Phase 4).
func (s *Server) SetIndexManager(mgr *index.TenantIndexManager) {
	s.idxMgr = mgr
}

// New creates and wires up a new API server.
func New(
	cfg config.APIConfig,
	store *storage.Store,
	idx index.Indexer,
	authMgr *auth.Manager,
	users *userstore.Store,
	audlog *audit.Logger,
	logger *slog.Logger,
) *Server {
	s := &Server{
		cfg:     cfg,
		store:   store,
		idx:     idx,
		authMgr: authMgr,
		users:   users,
		audlog:  audlog,
		logger:  logger,
		mux:     http.NewServeMux(),
	}
	s.routes()
	return s
}

// auth wraps a handler with authentication + tenant context propagation.
func (s *Server) auth(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
	return s.authMiddleware(s.tenantMiddleware(h))
}

// authAdmin wraps a handler requiring at least admin role.
func (s *Server) authAdmin(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
	return s.authMiddleware(s.tenantMiddleware(s.requireRole(userstore.RoleDomainAdmin, h)))
}

func (s *Server) routes() {
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/health", s.handleHealth)
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/login", s.handleLogin)
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/auth/me", s.auth(s.handleMe))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/logout", s.auth(s.handleLogout))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/users", s.authAdmin(s.handleListUsers))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/users", s.authAdmin(s.handleCreateUser))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("PATCH /api/users/{id}", s.authAdmin(s.handleUpdateUser))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/users/{id}", s.authAdmin(s.handleDeleteUser))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/search", s.auth(s.handleSearch))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/audit", s.auth(s.requireRole(userstore.RoleAuditor, s.handleAuditLog)))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/smtp/status", s.authAdmin(s.handleSMTPStatus))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/storage/stats", s.authAdmin(s.handleStorageStats))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/mails/{id}", s.auth(s.requireMailAccess(s.handleGetMail)))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/mails/{id}/attachments/{index}", s.auth(s.requireMailAccess(s.handleGetAttachment)))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/mails/{id}/raw", s.auth(s.requireMailAccess(s.handleGetRaw)))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/services", s.authAdmin(s.handleListServices))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/services/{name}/action", s.authAdmin(s.handleServiceAction))

	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/system/stats", s.authAdmin(s.handleSystemStats))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/security/audit", s.authAdmin(s.handleSecurityAudit))
	// SEC-17: Security fix actions require superadmin, not just domain_admin.
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/security/fix", s.auth(s.requireRole(userstore.RoleSuperAdmin, s.handleSecurityFix)))

	// Export routes
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/export/pdf/{id}", s.auth(s.requireMailAccess(s.handleExportPDF)))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/export/zip", s.auth(s.requireMailAccess(s.handleExportZIP)))

	// Upload routes (admin only)
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/upload", s.authAdmin(s.handleUpload))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/upload/{jobID}/progress", s.authAdmin(s.handleUploadProgress))

	// Upload routes (all authenticated users)
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/upload", s.auth(s.handleUpload))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/upload/{jobID}/progress", s.auth(s.handleUploadProgress))

	// IMAP routes (accessible to all authenticated users)
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/imap", s.auth(s.handleListImap))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/imap", s.auth(s.handleCreateImap))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/imap/{id}", s.auth(s.handleDeleteImap))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("PATCH /api/imap/{id}", s.auth(s.handleUpdateImapInterval))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/imap/test", s.auth(s.handleTestImap))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/imap/{id}/import", s.auth(s.handleStartImport))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/imap/{id}/progress", s.auth(s.handleImapProgress))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/imap/{id}/sync", s.auth(s.handleSyncNow))

	// POP3 routes (accessible to all authenticated users)
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/pop3", s.auth(s.handleListPop3))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/pop3", s.auth(s.handleCreatePop3))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/pop3/{id}", s.auth(s.handleDeletePop3))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/pop3/test", s.auth(s.handleTestPop3))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/pop3/{id}/import", s.auth(s.handleStartPop3Import))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/pop3/{id}/progress", s.auth(s.handlePop3Progress))

	// PROJ-24: TOTP 2FA routes
	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/auth/totp/setup", s.auth(s.handleTOTPSetupGet))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/totp/setup", s.auth(s.handleTOTPSetupPost))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/auth/totp", s.auth(s.handleTOTPDisable))
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/totp", s.handleTOTPLogin) // no auth middleware — uses pending token
	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/users/{id}/totp/reset", s.authAdmin(s.handleTOTPReset))
}

// ServeHTTP implements http.Handler.
func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	s.mux.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}

// --- handlers ---

func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
}

const (
	loginMaxFailures = 5
	loginWindow      = 15 * time.Minute
)

func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var req struct {
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Password string `json:"password"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}

	// Rate-limiting: block after too many recent failures
	failures, err := s.users.CountRecentFailures(req.Username, loginWindow)
	if err == nil && failures >= loginMaxFailures {
		s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
			EventType: audit.EventLogin,
			Username:  req.Username,
			IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
			Success:   false,
			Detail:    "rate limited",
		})
		writeError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "too many failed login attempts, try again later")
		return
	}

	token, user, totpRequired, err := s.authMgr.Login(req.Username, req.Password)
	if err != nil {
		_ = s.users.RecordLoginAttempt(req.Username, remoteIP(r))
		s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
			EventType: audit.EventLogin,
			Username:  req.Username,
			IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
			Success:   false,
			Detail:    classifyLoginError(err),
		})
		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid credentials")
		return
	}

	// PROJ-24: If TOTP is enabled, return a pending token instead of a full session.
	if totpRequired {
		s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
			EventType: audit.EventLogin,
			Username:  user.Username,
			IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
			Success:   true,
			Detail:    "totp_pending",
		})
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]interface{}{
			"totp_required": true,
			"session_token": token,
		})
		return
	}

	_ = s.users.UpdateLastLogin(user.ID)

	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
		EventType: audit.EventLogin,
		Username:  user.Username,
		IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
		Success:   true,
	})

	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
		Name:     sessionCookieName,
		Value:    token,
		Path:     "/",
		MaxAge:   8 * 3600,
		HttpOnly: true,
		SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
		// Secure: true — enable when TLS is terminated at this server
	})

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"user": map[string]interface{}{
			"id":       user.ID,
			"username": user.Username,
			"email":    user.Email,
			"role":     user.Role,
		},
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())

	user, err := s.users.GetByUsername(sess.Username)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "user lookup failed")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"username": user.Username,
		"email":    user.Email,
		"role":     user.Role,
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Read token from cookie first, then Bearer header
	token := ""
	if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil {
		token = c.Value
	}
	if token == "" {
		token = extractBearerToken(r)
	}
	if token != "" {
		_ = s.authMgr.Logout(token)
	}

	// Clear the session cookie
	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
		Name:     sessionCookieName,
		Value:    "",
		Path:     "/",
		MaxAge:   -1,
		HttpOnly: true,
		SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
	})

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
		EventType: audit.EventLogout,
		Username:  sess.Username,
		IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
		Success:   true,
	})

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
}

func (s *Server) handleListUsers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	tenantID := tenantFromCtx(r.Context())

	var (
		users []*userstore.User
		err   error
	)
	if tenantID != nil {
		users, err = s.users.ListByTenant(r.Context(), *tenantID)
	} else {
		users, err = s.users.List("")
	}
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list users")
		return
	}

	type userResp struct {
		ID       int64  `json:"id"`
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Email    string `json:"email"`
		Role     string `json:"role"`
		Active   bool   `json:"active"`
		TenantID *int64 `json:"tenant_id,omitempty"`
	}

	resp := make([]userResp, 0, len(users))
	for _, u := range users {
		resp = append(resp, userResp{
			ID:       u.ID,
			Username: u.Username,
			Email:    u.Email,
			Role:     u.Role,
			Active:   u.Active,
			TenantID: u.TenantID,
		})
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}

func (s *Server) handleCreateUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var req struct {
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Email    string `json:"email"`
		Password string `json:"password"`
		Role     string `json:"role"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}

	// SEC-01: Privilege escalation check — caller must not assign a role
	// at or above their own level.
	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if roleLevel(req.Role) >= roleLevel(sess.Role) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient privileges to assign this role")
		return
	}

	// SEC-02: Tenant isolation — non-superadmin users can only create users
	// within their own tenant.
	var tenantID *int64
	if sess.TenantID != nil {
		tenantID = sess.TenantID
	}

	user, err := s.users.Create(userstore.CreateUserRequest{
		Username: req.Username,
		Email:    req.Email,
		Password: req.Password,
		Role:     req.Role,
		TenantID: tenantID,
	})
	if err != nil {
		s.logger.Error("create user failed", "err", err)
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "user creation failed")
		return
	}

	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
		EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
		Username:  sess.Username,
		IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
		Detail:    "created user: " + user.Username,
		Success:   true,
	})

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, map[string]interface{}{
		"id":       user.ID,
		"username": user.Username,
		"email":    user.Email,
		"role":     user.Role,
		"active":   user.Active,
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleUpdateUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid user id")
		return
	}

	var req struct {
		Email    *string `json:"email"`
		Role     *string `json:"role"`
		Active   *bool   `json:"active"`
		Password *string `json:"password"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())

	// SEC-02: Tenant isolation — load target user and verify same tenant.
	target, err := s.users.GetByID(id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "user not found")
		return
	}
	if sess.TenantID != nil {
		if target.TenantID == nil || *target.TenantID != *sess.TenantID {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	// SEC-01: Privilege escalation check — caller must not assign a role
	// at or above their own level, and must not modify users at or above
	// their own level.
	if roleLevel(target.Role) >= roleLevel(sess.Role) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient privileges to modify this user")
		return
	}
	if req.Role != nil && roleLevel(*req.Role) >= roleLevel(sess.Role) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient privileges to assign this role")
		return
	}

	updated, err := s.users.Update(id, userstore.UpdateUserRequest{
		Email:    req.Email,
		Role:     req.Role,
		Active:   req.Active,
		Password: req.Password,
	})
	if err != nil {
		s.logger.Error("update user failed", "err", err)
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "user update failed")
		return
	}

	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
		EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
		Username:  sess.Username,
		IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
		Detail:    fmt.Sprintf("updated user %d", id),
		Success:   true,
	})

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"id":       updated.ID,
		"username": updated.Username,
		"email":    updated.Email,
		"role":     updated.Role,
		"active":   updated.Active,
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleDeleteUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid user id")
		return
	}

	// Fetch user info before deletion for audit log and IMAP cleanup
	target, err := s.users.GetByID(id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "user not found")
		return
	}

	// SEC-02: Tenant isolation — domain_admin can only delete users in their own tenant.
	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if sess.TenantID != nil {
		if target.TenantID == nil || *target.TenantID != *sess.TenantID {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	// SEC-01: Cannot delete users at or above own privilege level.
	if roleLevel(target.Role) >= roleLevel(sess.Role) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient privileges to delete this user")
		return
	}

	if err := s.users.DeleteSafe(id); err != nil {
		if err.Error() == "userstore: cannot delete last admin" {
			writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "cannot delete the last active admin")
			return
		}
		s.logger.Error("delete user failed", "err", err)
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "user deletion failed")
		return
	}

	// Remove all IMAP accounts that belonged to this user
	imapDeleted := 0
	if s.imapStore != nil {
		if n, err := s.imapStore.DeleteByOwner(r.Context(), target.Username); err != nil {
			s.logger.Warn("delete user: could not remove IMAP accounts", "user", target.Username, "err", err)
		} else {
			imapDeleted = n
		}
	}

	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
		EventType: audit.EventUserMgmt,
		Username:  sess.Username,
		IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
		Detail: fmt.Sprintf(
			"deleted user %d (%s, role=%s); %d IMAP account(s) removed; emails retained per GoBD",
			id, target.Username, target.Role, imapDeleted,
		),
		Success: true,
	})

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
}

func (s *Server) handleSearch(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	q := r.URL.Query().Get("q")
	fromFilter := r.URL.Query().Get("from")
	toFilter := r.URL.Query().Get("to")
	dateFromStr := r.URL.Query().Get("date_from")
	dateToStr := r.URL.Query().Get("date_to")
	sortParam := r.URL.Query().Get("sort") // "relevance", "date_asc", "date_desc"
	hasAttachStr := r.URL.Query().Get("has_attachment") // "true" or "false"
	pageStr := r.URL.Query().Get("page")
	pageSizeStr := r.URL.Query().Get("page_size")

	page, _ := strconv.Atoi(pageStr)
	pageSize, _ := strconv.Atoi(pageSizeStr)
	if pageSize <= 0 {
		pageSize = 25
	}

	req := index.SearchRequest{
		Query:    q,
		Sort:     sortParam,
		PageSize: pageSize,
		Page:     page,
	}

	if hasAttachStr == "true" {
		v := true
		req.HasAttachment = &v
	} else if hasAttachStr == "false" {
		v := false
		req.HasAttachment = &v
	}

	// Domain search: @domain.de matches both From AND To fields.
	// A value starting with '@' triggers OR-search across XF and XT prefixes.
	if strings.HasPrefix(fromFilter, "@") || strings.HasPrefix(toFilter, "@") {
		domain := fromFilter
		if domain == "" {
			domain = toFilter
		}
		req.OwnEmail = domain
	} else {
		req.From = fromFilter
		req.To = toFilter
	}

	if dateFromStr != "" {
		if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, dateFromStr); err == nil {
			req.DateFrom = &t
		} else if t, err := time.Parse(time.DateOnly, dateFromStr); err == nil {
			req.DateFrom = &t
		}
	}
	if dateToStr != "" {
		if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, dateToStr); err == nil {
			req.DateTo = &t
		} else if t, err := time.Parse(time.DateOnly, dateToStr); err == nil {
			// end of day for date_to
			t = t.Add(24*time.Hour - time.Second)
			req.DateTo = &t
		}
	}

	// PROJ-21 Phase 4: Use per-tenant index when available; fall back to
	// global index + post-filter when the tenant index manager is not wired.
	tenantID := tenantFromCtx(r.Context())
	searchIdx := s.idx
	usedTenantIndex := false
	if s.idxMgr != nil && tenantID != nil {
		searchIdx = s.idxMgr.ForTenant(tenantID)
		usedTenantIndex = true
	}

	result, err := searchIdx.Search(req)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "search failed")
		return
	}

	// Fallback tenant isolation: post-filter when we used the global index
	// but the user belongs to a tenant. This is the legacy path; the per-tenant
	// index path above makes this unnecessary.
	if tenantID != nil && !usedTenantIndex && len(result.Hits) > 0 {
		allowedIDs, idErr := s.store.GetAllIDsByTenant(r.Context(), tenantID)
		if idErr == nil {
			allowed := make(map[string]struct{}, len(allowedIDs))
			for _, id := range allowedIDs {
				allowed[id] = struct{}{}
			}
			filtered := result.Hits[:0]
			for _, h := range result.Hits {
				if _, ok := allowed[h.ID]; ok {
					filtered = append(filtered, h)
				}
			}
			result.Hits = filtered
			result.Total = len(filtered)
		}
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
		EventType: audit.EventSearch,
		Username:  sess.Username,
		IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
		Query:     q,
		Success:   true,
	})

	// Enrich hits with metadata (from, subject, date, size, attachments).
	type enrichedHit struct {
		ID             string  `json:"id"`
		Score          float64 `json:"score"`
		From           string  `json:"from,omitempty"`
		To             string  `json:"to,omitempty"`
		Subject        string  `json:"subject,omitempty"`
		Date           string  `json:"date,omitempty"`
		Size           int64   `json:"size,omitempty"`
		HasAttachments bool    `json:"has_attachments"`
	}
	enriched := make([]enrichedHit, 0, len(result.Hits))
	for _, h := range result.Hits {
		eh := enrichedHit{ID: h.ID, Score: h.Score}
		if raw, err := s.store.Load(h.ID); err == nil {
			eh.Size = int64(len(raw))
			if pm, err := mailparser.Parse(raw); err == nil {
				eh.From = pm.From
				if len(pm.To) > 0 {
					eh.To = strings.Join(pm.To, ", ")
				}
				eh.Subject = pm.Subject
				if !pm.Date.IsZero() {
					eh.Date = pm.Date.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
				}
				eh.HasAttachments = len(pm.Attachments) > 0
			}
		}
		enriched = append(enriched, eh)
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"total": result.Total,
		"hits":  enriched,
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleSMTPStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	tenantID := tenantFromCtx(r.Context())

	// domain_admin: return only their tenant's email statistics (no global daemon info)
	if sess != nil && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleSuperAdmin) {
		stats, err := s.store.StatsByTenant(r.Context(), tenantID)
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to read stats")
			return
		}
		domains := []string{}
		if tenantID != nil && s.tenantStore != nil {
			if dd, derr := s.tenantStore.ListDomains(r.Context(), *tenantID); derr == nil {
				for _, d := range dd {
					domains = append(domains, d.Domain)
				}
			}
		}
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
			"enabled":     true,
			"tenant_only": true,
			"domains":     domains,
			"total_mails": stats["count"],
			"total_bytes": stats["total_size"],
		})
		return
	}

	// superadmin: global daemon status
	if s.smtpDaemon == nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"enabled": false, "running": false})
		return
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, s.smtpDaemon.Status())
}

func (s *Server) handleStorageStats(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	tenantID := tenantFromCtx(r.Context())
	stats, err := s.store.StatsByTenant(r.Context(), tenantID)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to read storage stats")
		return
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"total_mails": stats["count"],
		"total_bytes": stats["total_size"],
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleAuditLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	pageStr := r.URL.Query().Get("page")
	pageSizeStr := r.URL.Query().Get("page_size")
	username := r.URL.Query().Get("username")
	eventType := r.URL.Query().Get("event_type")

	page, _ := strconv.Atoi(pageStr)
	pageSize, _ := strconv.Atoi(pageSizeStr)
	if pageSize <= 0 {
		pageSize = 50
	}

	entries, total, err := s.audlog.Query(audit.QueryFilter{
		Username:  username,
		EventType: eventType,
		PageSize:  pageSize,
		Page:      page,
	})
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "audit query failed")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"total":   total,
		"entries": entries,
	})
}

// --- middleware ---

const sessionCookieName = "archivmail_session"

func (s *Server) authMiddleware(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		// Prefer httpOnly cookie; fall back to Bearer token for CLI/API clients.
		token := ""
		if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil {
			token = c.Value
		}
		if token == "" {
			token = extractBearerToken(r)
		}
		if token == "" {
			writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "missing authorization")
			return
		}

		sess, err := s.authMgr.ValidateToken(token)
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid or expired token")
			return
		}

		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), sessionKey, sess)
		next(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
	}
}

func (s *Server) requireRole(role string, next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
		if sess == nil || !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, role) {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient permissions")
			return
		}
		next(w, r)
	}
}

// --- helpers ---

func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, v interface{}) {
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(code)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}

func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, msg string) {
	writeJSON(w, code, map[string]string{"error": msg})
}

func extractBearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
	h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
	if strings.HasPrefix(h, "Bearer ") {
		return strings.TrimPrefix(h, "Bearer ")
	}
	return ""
}

func sessionFromCtx(ctx context.Context) *auth.Session {
	v := ctx.Value(sessionKey)
	if v == nil {
		return &auth.Session{}
	}
	if s, ok := v.(*auth.Session); ok {
		return s
	}
	return &auth.Session{}
}

// tenantMiddleware extracts the tenant_id from the session and stores it in
// the request context, making it available to all downstream handlers.
func (s *Server) tenantMiddleware(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		session := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
		if session != nil && session.TenantID != nil {
			ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), tenantKey, session.TenantID)
			next(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
			return
		}
		next(w, r)
	}
}

// tenantFromCtx extracts the tenant_id from context. Returns nil for global (superadmin) context.
func tenantFromCtx(ctx context.Context) *int64 {
	v, _ := ctx.Value(tenantKey).(*int64)
	return v
}

// sanitizeFilename strips characters that could be used for HTTP header injection
// (quotes, newlines, control chars) from attachment filenames coming from parsed
// e-mails. Only alphanumerics, spaces, dots, hyphens, and underscores are kept.
func sanitizeFilename(name string) string {
	var b strings.Builder
	for _, r := range name {
		if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') ||
			r == '.' || r == '-' || r == '_' || r == ' ' {
			b.WriteRune(r)
		}
	}
	return b.String()
}

// classifyLoginError maps internal login errors to safe audit-log categories.
// Raw error messages must not be stored in audit logs since auditor-role
// users can read them via GET /api/audit and internal details (LDAP hostnames,
// port numbers, etc.) would be exposed.
func classifyLoginError(err error) string {
	if err == nil {
		return ""
	}
	msg := err.Error()
	switch {
	case strings.Contains(msg, "not found"), strings.Contains(msg, "invalid password"),
		strings.Contains(msg, "invalid credentials"):
		return "invalid_password"
	case strings.Contains(msg, "ldap"), strings.Contains(msg, "LDAP"):
		return "ldap_error"
	case strings.Contains(msg, "disabled"), strings.Contains(msg, "inactive"):
		return "account_disabled"
	default:
		return "unknown"
	}
}

func remoteIP(r *http.Request) string {
	if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
		return strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(fwd, ",")[0])
	}
	return r.RemoteAddr
}

// ── Mail access middleware ────────────────────────────────────────────────

// requireMailAccess checks that the caller may read mail content.
// superadmin and domain_admin have read access (tenant-scoped via handleGetMail).
// Auditor and user have access to their own mails.
// The old "admin" role (now domain_admin) previously had no mail access — that
// restriction is removed; domain_admin now needs to be able to read archived mails.
func (s *Server) requireMailAccess(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
		if sess == nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
			return
		}
		next(w, r)
	}
}

// ── Mail handlers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

func (s *Server) handleGetMail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	id := r.PathValue("id")
	// SEC-22: Validate mail ID format to prevent path traversal.
	if !isValidMailID(id) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid mail id")
		return
	}

	raw, err := s.store.Load(id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "mail not found")
		return
	}

	pm, err := mailparser.Parse(raw)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to parse mail")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())

	// Tenant isolation: domain_admin sees only own tenant's mail
	if sess.TenantID != nil {
		mailTenant, _ := s.store.GetTenantForMail(r.Context(), id)
		if mailTenant == nil || *mailTenant != *sess.TenantID {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	// user role: only own mailbox
	if sess.Role == userstore.RoleUser {
		u, err := s.users.GetByUsername(sess.Username)
		if err != nil || !mailBelongsToUser(pm, u.Email) {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	type attachMeta struct {
		Index       int    `json:"index"`
		Filename    string `json:"filename"`
		ContentType string `json:"content_type"`
		Size        int    `json:"size"`
	}
	attachments := make([]attachMeta, len(pm.Attachments))
	for i, a := range pm.Attachments {
		attachments[i] = attachMeta{
			Index:       i,
			Filename:    a.Filename,
			ContentType: a.ContentType,
			Size:        a.Size,
		}
	}

	var dateStr string
	if !pm.Date.IsZero() {
		dateStr = pm.Date.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
	}

	// Verify status
	vs, _ := s.store.GetVerifyStatus(r.Context(), id)
	var verifyOK interface{} = nil
	var verifiedAt interface{} = nil
	if vs.VerifyOK != nil {
		verifyOK = *vs.VerifyOK
	}
	if vs.VerifiedAt != nil {
		verifiedAt = vs.VerifiedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"id":          id,
		"from":        pm.From,
		"to":          strings.Join(pm.To, ", "),
		"cc":          strings.Join(pm.CC, ", "),
		"subject":     pm.Subject,
		"date":        dateStr,
		"size":        len(raw),
		"body_html":   pm.HTMLBody,
		"body_plain":  pm.TextBody,
		"raw_headers": extractRawHeaders(raw),
		"attachments": attachments,
		"verify_ok":   verifyOK,
		"verified_at": verifiedAt,
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleGetAttachment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	id := r.PathValue("id")
	// SEC-22: Validate mail ID format to prevent path traversal.
	if !isValidMailID(id) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid mail id")
		return
	}
	indexStr := r.PathValue("index")
	idx, err := strconv.Atoi(indexStr)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid attachment index")
		return
	}

	raw, err := s.store.Load(id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "mail not found")
		return
	}

	pm, err := mailparser.Parse(raw)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to parse mail")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())

	// Tenant isolation
	if sess.TenantID != nil {
		mailTenant, _ := s.store.GetTenantForMail(r.Context(), id)
		if mailTenant == nil || *mailTenant != *sess.TenantID {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	if sess.Role == userstore.RoleUser {
		u, err := s.users.GetByUsername(sess.Username)
		if err != nil || !mailBelongsToUser(pm, u.Email) {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	if idx < 0 || idx >= len(pm.Attachments) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "attachment not found")
		return
	}

	a := pm.Attachments[idx]
	filename := sanitizeFilename(a.Filename)
	if filename == "" {
		filename = fmt.Sprintf("attachment-%d", idx)
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", a.ContentType)
	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`attachment; filename="%s"`, filename))
	w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(a.Data)))
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write(a.Data)
}

func (s *Server) handleGetRaw(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	id := r.PathValue("id")
	// SEC-22: Validate mail ID format to prevent path traversal.
	if !isValidMailID(id) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid mail id")
		return
	}

	raw, err := s.store.Load(id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "mail not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())

	// Tenant isolation
	if sess.TenantID != nil {
		mailTenant, _ := s.store.GetTenantForMail(r.Context(), id)
		if mailTenant == nil || *mailTenant != *sess.TenantID {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	// SEC-28: Access check for user role — parse failure must NOT grant access.
	if sess.Role == userstore.RoleUser {
		pm, err := mailparser.Parse(raw)
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to parse mail")
			return
		}
		u, err := s.users.GetByUsername(sess.Username)
		if err != nil || !mailBelongsToUser(pm, u.Email) {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
			return
		}
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "message/rfc822")
	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`attachment; filename="%s.eml"`, id[:16]))
	w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(raw)))
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write(raw)
}

// ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// mailBelongsToUser checks if the user's email appears in To or CC.
func mailBelongsToUser(pm *mailparser.ParsedMail, userEmail string) bool {
	email := strings.ToLower(userEmail)
	for _, to := range pm.To {
		if strings.ToLower(to) == email {
			return true
		}
	}
	for _, cc := range pm.CC {
		if strings.ToLower(cc) == email {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// extractRawHeaders returns the header section of a raw RFC 2822 email.
func extractRawHeaders(raw []byte) string {
	for i := 0; i < len(raw)-3; i++ {
		if raw[i] == '\r' && raw[i+1] == '\n' && raw[i+2] == '\r' && raw[i+3] == '\n' {
			return string(raw[:i])
		}
		if raw[i] == '\n' && raw[i+1] == '\n' {
			return string(raw[:i])
		}
	}
	return string(raw)
}

// --- Service management ---

// allowedServices is the whitelist of systemd service names the admin may control.
var allowedServices = []string{
	"archivmail",
	"archivmail-web",
	"postgresql@17-main",
	"postfix",
	"nginx",
}

type ServiceStatus struct {
	Name            string `json:"name"`
	DisplayName     string `json:"display_name"`
	Active          string `json:"active"`            // active, inactive, failed, unknown
	Sub             string `json:"sub"`               // running, dead, exited, ...
	Enabled         string `json:"enabled"`           // enabled, disabled, static, unknown
	Description     string `json:"description"`
	ExternalBlocked *bool  `json:"external_blocked,omitempty"` // only set for archivmail
}

func isAllowedService(name string) bool {
	for _, s := range allowedServices {
		if s == name {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

func systemctlShow(name string) ServiceStatus {
	svc := ServiceStatus{Name: name, DisplayName: name}
	out, err := exec.Command("systemctl", "show", name+".service",
		"--property=ActiveState,SubState,UnitFileState,Description",
		"--no-pager").Output()
	if err != nil {
		svc.Active = "unknown"
		svc.Sub = ""
		svc.Enabled = "unknown"
	} else {
		for _, line := range strings.Split(string(out), "\n") {
			k, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, "=")
			if !ok {
				continue
			}
			switch k {
			case "ActiveState":
				svc.Active = v
			case "SubState":
				svc.Sub = v
			case "UnitFileState":
				svc.Enabled = v
			case "Description":
				svc.Description = v
			}
		}
	}
	if name == "archivmail" {
		blocked := nftAPIBlocked()
		svc.ExternalBlocked = &blocked
	}
	return svc
}

// nftAPIBlocked reports whether external access to port 8080 is currently blocked.
func nftAPIBlocked() bool {
	out, err := exec.Command("sudo", "/usr/local/sbin/archivmail-nft", "status").Output()
	if err != nil {
		return false
	}
	return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)) == "blocked"
}

func (s *Server) handleListServices(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	result := make([]ServiceStatus, 0, len(allowedServices))
	for _, name := range allowedServices {
		result = append(result, systemctlShow(name))
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, result)
}

func (s *Server) handleServiceAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Only superadmin may start/stop/restart services
	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if sess == nil || !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleSuperAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "superadmin required")
		return
	}

	name := r.PathValue("name")
	if !isAllowedService(name) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unknown service")
		return
	}

	var body struct {
		Action string `json:"action"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request")
		return
	}

	allowedActions := map[string]bool{
		"start": true, "stop": true, "restart": true,
		"enable": true, "disable": true,
	}
	nftActions := map[string]string{
		"block_external": "block",
		"allow_external": "unblock",
	}

	if nftArg, isNft := nftActions[body.Action]; isNft {
		if name != "archivmail" {
			writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "external access control only available for archivmail")
			return
		}
		out, err := exec.Command("sudo", "/usr/local/sbin/archivmail-nft", nftArg).CombinedOutput()
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
			return
		}
		sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
		s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
			EventType: "service." + body.Action,
			Username:  sess.Username,
			IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
			Detail:    name,
			Success:   true,
		})
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, systemctlShow(name))
		return
	}

	if !allowedActions[body.Action] {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unknown action")
		return
	}

	out, err := exec.Command("sudo", "/usr/bin/systemctl", body.Action, name+".service").CombinedOutput()
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
		return
	}

	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
		EventType: "service." + body.Action,
		Username:  sess.Username,
		IPAddress: remoteIP(r),
		Detail:    name,
		Success:   true,
	})

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, systemctlShow(name))
}

// ── IMAP handlers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

func (s *Server) handleListImap(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.imapStore == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "IMAP not configured")
		return
	}
	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	// SEC-03: Use HasRole to correctly check admin privileges (domain_admin, admin, superadmin).
	isAdmin := auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin)
	accounts, err := s.imapStore.List(r.Context(), sess.Username, isAdmin)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list IMAP accounts")
		return
	}
	if accounts == nil {
		accounts = []imapstore.Account{}
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accounts)
}

func (s *Server) handleCreateImap(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.imapStore == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "IMAP not configured")
		return
	}
	var req struct {
		Name            string   `json:"name"`
		Host            string   `json:"host"`
		Port            int      `json:"port"`
		TLS             string   `json:"tls"`
		Username        string   `json:"username"`
		Password        string   `json:"password"`
		ExcludedFolders []string `json:"excluded_folders"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}
	if req.Name == "" || req.Host == "" || req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "name, host, username and password are required")
		return
	}
	if req.Port <= 0 {
		req.Port = 993
	}
	if req.TLS == "" {
		req.TLS = "ssl"
	}
	if req.ExcludedFolders == nil {
		req.ExcludedFolders = []string{}
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	acc := imapstore.Account{
		Owner:           sess.Username,
		Name:            req.Name,
		Host:            req.Host,
		Port:            req.Port,
		TLS:             req.TLS,
		Username:        req.Username,
		ExcludedFolders: req.ExcludedFolders,
	}

	created, err := s.imapStore.Create(r.Context(), acc, req.Password)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create IMAP account")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, created)
}

func (s *Server) handleDeleteImap(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.imapStore == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "IMAP not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.imapStore.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	if err := s.imapStore.Delete(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete account")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
}

func (s *Server) handleTestImap(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var req struct {
		Host     string `json:"host"`
		Port     int    `json:"port"`
		TLS      string `json:"tls"`
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Password string `json:"password"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}
	if req.Host == "" || req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "host, username and password are required")
		return
	}
	if req.Port <= 0 {
		req.Port = 993
	}
	if req.TLS == "" {
		req.TLS = "ssl"
	}

	c, err := imapstore.Connect(req.Host, req.Port, req.TLS)
	if err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
			"ok":    false,
			"error": fmt.Sprintf("Verbindung fehlgeschlagen: %v", err),
		})
		return
	}
	defer c.Close()

	if err := c.Login(req.Username, req.Password).Wait(); err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
			"ok":    false,
			"error": fmt.Sprintf("Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen: %v", err),
		})
		return
	}

	folders, err := imapstore.ListFolders(c)
	if err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
			"ok":    false,
			"error": fmt.Sprintf("Ordner konnten nicht gelesen werden: %v", err),
		})
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"ok":      true,
		"folders": folders,
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleStartImport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.imapStore == nil || s.imapImporter == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "IMAP not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.imapStore.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	if acc.Status == "running" {
		writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "import already running")
		return
	}

	go s.imapImporter.Run(context.Background(), id)

	// Return current account state (status will switch to "running" shortly)
	acc.Status = "running"
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, acc)
}

func (s *Server) handleImapProgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.imapStore == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "IMAP not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.imapStore.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, acc)
}

// handleSyncNow triggers an immediate incremental sync for a single IMAP account.
func (s *Server) handleSyncNow(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.imapStore == nil || s.imapScheduler == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "IMAP not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.imapStore.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	if err := s.imapScheduler.TriggerSync(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
		s.logger.Error("trigger sync failed", "err", err)
		writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "sync already running or failed to start")
		return
	}

	// Return the account with the updated sync_running flag reflected immediately.
	acc.SyncRunning = true
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, acc)
}

// handleUpdateImapInterval updates the automatic sync interval for an IMAP account.
func (s *Server) handleUpdateImapInterval(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.imapStore == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "IMAP not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.imapStore.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	var req struct {
		SyncIntervalMin int `json:"sync_interval_min"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}

	// 0 = disabled; otherwise must be between 5 and 1440 minutes.
	if req.SyncIntervalMin != 0 && (req.SyncIntervalMin < 5 || req.SyncIntervalMin > 1440) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "sync_interval_min must be 0 (disabled) or between 5 and 1440")
		return
	}

	if err := s.imapStore.UpdateSyncInterval(r.Context(), id, req.SyncIntervalMin); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update sync interval")
		return
	}

	acc.SyncIntervalMin = req.SyncIntervalMin
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, acc)
}

// ── System stats handler ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

type diskStat struct {
	Mount      string  `json:"mount"`
	TotalBytes uint64  `json:"total_bytes"`
	UsedBytes  uint64  `json:"used_bytes"`
	FreeBytes  uint64  `json:"free_bytes"`
	UsedPct    float64 `json:"used_pct"`
	FSType     string  `json:"fstype"`
}

type mailInfo struct {
	ID      string `json:"id"`
	Date    string `json:"date"`
	From    string `json:"from"`
	Subject string `json:"subject"`
}

var excludedFSTypes = map[string]bool{
	"tmpfs": true, "proc": true, "sysfs": true, "devtmpfs": true,
	"cgroup": true, "cgroup2": true, "overlay": true, "squashfs": true,
	"debugfs": true, "tracefs": true, "securityfs": true, "pstore": true,
	"efivarfs": true, "bpf": true, "hugetlbfs": true, "mqueue": true,
	"ramfs": true, "devpts": true, "fusectl": true, "configfs": true,
	"autofs": true, "nsfs": true, "rpc_pipefs": true,
	"fuse.lxcfs": true, "fuse": true,
}

func (s *Server) handleSystemStats(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// CPU: /proc/loadavg
	cpuResp := map[string]interface{}{"load1": 0.0, "load5": 0.0, "load15": 0.0, "num_cpu": runtime.NumCPU()}
	if data, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/loadavg"); err == nil {
		parts := strings.Fields(string(data))
		if len(parts) >= 3 {
			l1, _ := strconv.ParseFloat(parts[0], 64)
			l5, _ := strconv.ParseFloat(parts[1], 64)
			l15, _ := strconv.ParseFloat(parts[2], 64)
			cpuResp = map[string]interface{}{"load1": l1, "load5": l5, "load15": l15, "num_cpu": runtime.NumCPU()}
		}
	}

	// RAM: /proc/meminfo
	ramResp := map[string]interface{}{"total_bytes": uint64(0), "used_bytes": uint64(0), "free_bytes": uint64(0), "used_pct": 0.0}
	if data, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/meminfo"); err == nil {
		kv := parseMeminfo(string(data))
		total := kv["MemTotal"] * 1024
		available := kv["MemAvailable"] * 1024
		used := total - available
		var usedPct float64
		if total > 0 {
			usedPct = math.Round(float64(used)/float64(total)*1000) / 10
		}
		ramResp = map[string]interface{}{
			"total_bytes": total,
			"used_bytes":  used,
			"free_bytes":  available,
			"used_pct":    usedPct,
		}
	}

	// Disks: /proc/mounts + syscall.Statfs
	var disks []diskStat
	seenMounts := map[string]bool{}  // deduplicate by mountpoint
	seenDevices := map[string]bool{} // deduplicate by device (catches ZFS bind-mounts)
	if data, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/mounts"); err == nil {
		scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(string(data)))
		for scanner.Scan() {
			fields := strings.Fields(scanner.Text())
			if len(fields) < 3 {
				continue
			}
			device := fields[0]
			mount := fields[1]
			fstype := fields[2]
			if excludedFSTypes[fstype] || seenMounts[mount] || seenDevices[device] {
				continue
			}
			seenMounts[mount] = true
			var stat syscall.Statfs_t
			if err := syscall.Statfs(mount, &stat); err != nil {
				continue
			}
			total := stat.Blocks * uint64(stat.Bsize)
			free := stat.Bavail * uint64(stat.Bsize)
			used := total - free
			if total == 0 {
				continue // skip pseudo-mounts with no storage (e.g. lxcfs overlays)
			}
			seenDevices[device] = true
			var usedPct float64
			if total > 0 {
				usedPct = math.Round(float64(used)/float64(total)*1000) / 10
			}
			disks = append(disks, diskStat{
				Mount:      mount,
				TotalBytes: total,
				UsedBytes:  used,
				FreeBytes:  free,
				UsedPct:    usedPct,
				FSType:     fstype,
			})
		}
	}
	if disks == nil {
		disks = []diskStat{}
	}

	// Archive: first & last mail
	archiveResp := map[string]interface{}{"first_mail": nil, "last_mail": nil}
	first, last, err := s.store.FirstAndLastMail()
	if err == nil {
		if first != nil {
			archiveResp["first_mail"] = mailRefToInfo(s.store, first)
		}
		if last != nil {
			archiveResp["last_mail"] = mailRefToInfo(s.store, last)
		}
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"cpu":     cpuResp,
		"ram":     ramResp,
		"disks":   disks,
		"archive": archiveResp,
	})
}

func parseMeminfo(content string) map[string]uint64 {
	result := make(map[string]uint64)
	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(content))
	for scanner.Scan() {
		k, v, ok := strings.Cut(scanner.Text(), ":")
		if !ok {
			continue
		}
		fields := strings.Fields(strings.TrimSpace(v))
		if len(fields) == 0 {
			continue
		}
		val, err := strconv.ParseUint(fields[0], 10, 64)
		if err == nil {
			result[k] = val
		}
	}
	return result
}

func mailRefToInfo(store *storage.Store, ref *storage.MailRef) *mailInfo {
	dateStr := ref.ModTime.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
	raw, err := store.Load(ref.ID)
	if err != nil {
		return &mailInfo{ID: ref.ID, Date: dateStr}
	}
	pm, err := mailparser.Parse(raw)
	if err != nil {
		return &mailInfo{ID: ref.ID, Date: dateStr}
	}
	if !pm.Date.IsZero() {
		dateStr = pm.Date.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
	}
	return &mailInfo{
		ID:      ref.ID,
		Date:    dateStr,
		From:    pm.From,
		Subject: pm.Subject,
	}
}

// ── Security Audit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

type securityCheck struct {
	Name    string `json:"name"`
	Status  string `json:"status"` // "ok" | "warning" | "error"
	Message string `json:"message"`
}

func (s *Server) handleSecurityAudit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var checks []securityCheck

	// 1. Firewall (nftables) aktiv?
	nftOut, err := exec.CommandContext(r.Context(), "nft", "list", "ruleset").Output()
	nftStr := string(nftOut)
	firewallActive := err == nil

	if !firewallActive {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{
			Name:    "Firewall (nftables)",
			Status:  "error",
			Message: "nft konnte nicht ausgeführt werden — Firewall möglicherweise inaktiv",
		})
	} else if strings.Contains(nftStr, "policy drop") {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{
			Name:    "Firewall (nftables)",
			Status:  "ok",
			Message: "Aktiv — Input-Chain policy: drop (Whitelist-Modus)",
		})
	} else {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{
			Name:    "Firewall (nftables)",
			Status:  "warning",
			Message: "nftables aktiv, aber Input-Chain policy ist nicht 'drop'",
		})
	}

	// 2. Port 3000 (Next.js) extern erreichbar?
	if !firewallActive {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Port 3000 (Next.js)", Status: "error", Message: "Keine Firewall aktiv — Port möglicherweise extern erreichbar"})
	} else if strings.Contains(nftStr, "dport 3000") {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Port 3000 (Next.js)", Status: "warning", Message: "Port 3000 explizit in Firewall-Regeln — prüfen ob gewollt"})
	} else {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Port 3000 (Next.js)", Status: "ok", Message: "Blockiert (nicht in Whitelist)"})
	}

	// 3. Port 8080 (Go Backend) extern erreichbar?
	if !firewallActive {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Port 8080 (Go Backend)", Status: "error", Message: "Keine Firewall aktiv — Port möglicherweise extern erreichbar"})
	} else if strings.Contains(nftStr, "dport 8080") {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Port 8080 (Go Backend)", Status: "warning", Message: "Port 8080 explizit in Firewall-Regeln — prüfen ob gewollt"})
	} else {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Port 8080 (Go Backend)", Status: "ok", Message: "Blockiert (nicht in Whitelist)"})
	}

	// 4. HTTPS aktiv?
	if firewallActive && strings.Contains(nftStr, "dport 443") {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "HTTPS (TLS)", Status: "ok", Message: "Port 443 in Firewall freigegeben"})
	} else {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "HTTPS (TLS)", Status: "warning", Message: "Kein HTTPS — Verbindungen unverschlüsselt (certbot empfohlen)"})
	}

	// 5. SSH PermitRootLogin + PasswordAuthentication
	sshConf, err := os.ReadFile("/etc/ssh/sshd_config")
	if err == nil {
		lines := strings.Split(string(sshConf), "\n")
		rootLogin := ""
		passAuth := ""
		for _, l := range lines {
			tl := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(l))
			if strings.HasPrefix(tl, "permitrootlogin") && !strings.HasPrefix(tl, "#") {
				rootLogin = tl
			}
			if strings.HasPrefix(tl, "passwordauthentication") && !strings.HasPrefix(tl, "#") {
				passAuth = tl
			}
		}
		if strings.Contains(rootLogin, "no") || strings.Contains(rootLogin, "prohibit-password") {
			checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "SSH Root-Login", Status: "ok", Message: rootLogin})
		} else if rootLogin == "" {
			checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "SSH Root-Login", Status: "warning", Message: "Nicht explizit gesetzt (Standard: prohibit-password)"})
		} else {
			checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "SSH Root-Login", Status: "warning", Message: rootLogin + " — Passwort-Login für root möglich"})
		}
		if strings.Contains(passAuth, "no") {
			checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "SSH Passwort-Auth", Status: "ok", Message: "Nur Key-basierte Authentifizierung"})
		} else if passAuth == "" {
			checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "SSH Passwort-Auth", Status: "warning", Message: "Nicht explizit deaktiviert — SSH-Keys empfohlen"})
		} else {
			checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "SSH Passwort-Auth", Status: "warning", Message: passAuth + " — Brute-Force-Risiko"})
		}
	} else {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "SSH Konfiguration", Status: "warning", Message: "/etc/ssh/sshd_config nicht lesbar"})
	}

	// 6. Fail2ban
	f2bOut, err := exec.CommandContext(r.Context(), "systemctl", "is-active", "fail2ban").Output()
	if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(string(f2bOut)) == "active" {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Fail2ban", Status: "ok", Message: "Aktiv"})
	} else {
		checks = append(checks, securityCheck{Name: "Fail2ban", Status: "warning", Message: "Nicht aktiv — kein Brute-Force-Schutz (apt install fail2ban)"})
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"checks": checks,
		"run_at": time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
	})
}

// ── Security Fix ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// allowedFixActions is a strict whitelist — only these actions may be executed.
var allowedFixActions = map[string]bool{
	"install_fail2ban":      true,
	"enable_firewall":       true,
	"fix_ssh_password_auth": true,
	"fix_ssh_root_login":    true,
}

func (s *Server) handleSecurityFix(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var body struct {
		Action string `json:"action"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}
	if !allowedFixActions[body.Action] {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unknown action: "+body.Action)
		return
	}

	ctx := r.Context()
	var msg string
	var fixErr error

	switch body.Action {

	case "install_fail2ban":
		// Install fail2ban if not present
		if _, err := exec.LookPath("fail2ban-client"); err != nil {
			out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "apt-get", "install", "-y", "fail2ban").CombinedOutput()
			if err != nil {
				writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "apt-get install fail2ban: "+string(out))
				return
			}
		}
		// Write a minimal jail.local if not already present
		jailPath := "/etc/fail2ban/jail.local"
		if _, err := os.Stat(jailPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
			jailConf := "[sshd]\nenabled = true\nmaxretry = 5\nbantime = 3600\nfindtime = 600\n"
			if err := os.WriteFile(jailPath, []byte(jailConf), 0644); err != nil {
				s.logger.Error("could not write jail.local", "err", err)
				writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "security config update failed")
				return
			}
		}
		// Enable and start
		exec.CommandContext(ctx, "systemctl", "enable", "fail2ban").Run()
		out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "systemctl", "restart", "fail2ban").CombinedOutput()
		if err != nil {
			fixErr = fmt.Errorf("systemctl restart fail2ban: %s", string(out))
		} else {
			msg = "Fail2ban installiert, SSH-Jail aktiviert und Dienst gestartet."
		}

	case "enable_firewall":
		// Reload rules from /etc/nftables.conf and enable service
		out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "nft", "-f", "/etc/nftables.conf").CombinedOutput()
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "nft -f /etc/nftables.conf: "+string(out))
			return
		}
		exec.CommandContext(ctx, "systemctl", "enable", "nftables").Run()
		msg = "nftables-Regeln neu geladen und Dienst aktiviert."

	case "fix_ssh_password_auth":
		fixErr = sshConfigSet("PasswordAuthentication", "no")
		if fixErr == nil {
			out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "systemctl", "restart", "ssh").CombinedOutput()
			if err != nil {
				fixErr = fmt.Errorf("systemctl restart ssh: %s", string(out))
			} else {
				msg = "PasswordAuthentication auf 'no' gesetzt, SSH neu gestartet."
			}
		}

	case "fix_ssh_root_login":
		fixErr = sshConfigSet("PermitRootLogin", "prohibit-password")
		if fixErr == nil {
			out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "systemctl", "restart", "ssh").CombinedOutput()
			if err != nil {
				fixErr = fmt.Errorf("systemctl restart ssh: %s", string(out))
			} else {
				msg = "PermitRootLogin auf 'prohibit-password' gesetzt, SSH neu gestartet."
			}
		}
	}

	if fixErr != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fixErr.Error())
		return
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"message": msg})
}

// ── POP3 handlers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

func (s *Server) handleListPop3(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.pop3Store == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "POP3 not configured")
		return
	}
	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	// SEC-03: Use HasRole to correctly check admin privileges (domain_admin, admin, superadmin).
	isAdmin := auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin)
	accounts, err := s.pop3Store.List(r.Context(), sess.Username, isAdmin)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list POP3 accounts")
		return
	}
	if accounts == nil {
		accounts = []pop3store.Account{}
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accounts)
}

func (s *Server) handleCreatePop3(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.pop3Store == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "POP3 not configured")
		return
	}
	var req struct {
		Name          string `json:"name"`
		Host          string `json:"host"`
		Port          int    `json:"port"`
		TLS           string `json:"tls"`
		TLSSkipVerify bool   `json:"tls_skip_verify"`
		Username      string `json:"username"`
		Password      string `json:"password"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}
	if req.Name == "" || req.Host == "" || req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "name, host, username and password are required")
		return
	}
	if req.Port <= 0 {
		req.Port = 110
	}
	if req.TLS == "" {
		req.TLS = "none"
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	acc := pop3store.Account{
		Owner:         sess.Username,
		Name:          req.Name,
		Host:          req.Host,
		Port:          req.Port,
		TLS:           req.TLS,
		TLSSkipVerify: req.TLSSkipVerify,
		Username:      req.Username,
	}

	created, err := s.pop3Store.Create(r.Context(), acc, req.Password)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create POP3 account")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, created)
}

func (s *Server) handleDeletePop3(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.pop3Store == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "POP3 not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.pop3Store.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	if err := s.pop3Store.Delete(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete account")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"ok": true})
}

func (s *Server) handleTestPop3(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	var req struct {
		Host          string `json:"host"`
		Port          int    `json:"port"`
		TLS           string `json:"tls"`
		TLSSkipVerify bool   `json:"tls_skip_verify"`
		Username      string `json:"username"`
		Password      string `json:"password"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
		return
	}
	if req.Host == "" || req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "host, username and password are required")
		return
	}
	if req.Port <= 0 {
		req.Port = 110
	}
	if req.TLS == "" {
		req.TLS = "none"
	}

	c, err := pop3store.Dial(req.Host, req.Port, req.TLS, req.TLSSkipVerify)
	if err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
			"ok":      false,
			"message": fmt.Sprintf("Verbindung fehlgeschlagen: %v", err),
		})
		return
	}
	defer c.Close()

	if err := c.Login(req.Username, req.Password); err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
			"ok":      false,
			"message": fmt.Sprintf("Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen: %v", err),
		})
		return
	}

	count, totalSize, err := c.Stat()
	if err != nil {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
			"ok":      false,
			"message": fmt.Sprintf("STAT fehlgeschlagen: %v", err),
		})
		return
	}

	_ = c.Quit()
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
		"ok":               true,
		"message":          fmt.Sprintf("Verbindung erfolgreich: %d E-Mails", count),
		"message_count":    count,
		"total_size_bytes": totalSize,
	})
}

func (s *Server) handleStartPop3Import(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.pop3Store == nil || s.pop3Importer == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "POP3 not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.pop3Store.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	if acc.Status == "running" {
		writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "import already running")
		return
	}

	go s.pop3Importer.Run(context.Background(), id)

	// Return current account state (status will switch to "running" shortly)
	acc.Status = "running"
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, acc)
}

func (s *Server) handlePop3Progress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if s.pop3Store == nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "POP3 not configured")
		return
	}
	idStr := r.PathValue("id")
	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(idStr, 10, 64)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id")
		return
	}

	acc, err := s.pop3Store.Get(r.Context(), id)
	if err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "account not found")
		return
	}

	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
	if acc.Owner != sess.Username && !auth.HasRole(sess.Role, userstore.RoleDomainAdmin) {
		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
		return
	}

	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, acc)
}

// sshConfigSet sets or replaces a directive in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
// Commented-out lines are left untouched; the active directive is updated or appended.
func sshConfigSet(key, value string) error {
	const path = "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("read sshd_config: %w", err)
	}
	lines := strings.Split(string(data), "\n")
	keyLower := strings.ToLower(key)
	found := false
	for i, l := range lines {
		tl := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(l))
		if strings.HasPrefix(tl, keyLower) && !strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(l), "#") {
			lines[i] = key + " " + value
			found = true
		}
	}
	if !found {
		lines = append(lines, key+" "+value)
	}
	return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), 0644)
}