fix(security): emailsFromHeader fail-closed, domain_auditor-Block, Manticore-Tabellenvalidierung

- emailsFromHeader gibt bei Parse-Fehler nil zurück (fail-closed) statt raw-Header-String;
  verhindert Authorization-Bypass via malformiertem From-Header
- mailBelongsToUser: strings.Contains-Fallback entfernt (war dead code nach dem fix-closed-Fix)
- handleSearch: domain_auditor ohne TenantID wird mit 403 abgewiesen, bevor der globale Index
  abgefragt wird
- manticoreTableName: Regex-Validierung ^emails_(global|tenant_\d+)$ mit panic bei Abweichung

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

internal/api/search_handlers.go

@@ -84,6 +84,14 @@ func (s *Server) handleSearch(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// SEC: domain_auditor without an assigned tenant must not search at all —
+	// they would otherwise fall through to the global index unfiltered.
+	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
+	if sess.Role == userstore.RoleDomainAuditor && sess.TenantID == nil {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
+		return
+	}
+
 	// PROJ-21 Phase 4: Use per-tenant index when available; fall back to
 	// global index + post-filter when the tenant index manager is not wired.
 	tenantID := tenantFromCtx(r.Context())
@@ -140,7 +148,6 @@ func (s *Server) handleSearch(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
 	s.audlog.Log(audit.Entry{
 		EventType: audit.EventSearch,
 		Username:  sess.Username,
@@ -421,13 +428,13 @@ func (s *Server) handleGetRaw(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 // emailsFromHeader parses a mail header value (e.g. From, To, CC) and returns
 // the bare email addresses it contains. Parsing uses net/mail.ParseAddressList
-// for correctness; if parsing fails the raw value is returned as a single
-// lower-cased string so that the caller can still apply a substring fallback.
+// for correctness. If parsing fails, nil is returned (fail-closed): a
+// malformed or attacker-controlled header must not grant access.
 func emailsFromHeader(header string) []string {
 	addrs, err := mail.ParseAddressList(header)
 	if err != nil {
-		// Parsing failed (e.g. malformed header) — return raw value for fallback.
-		return []string{strings.ToLower(header)}
+		// SEC: fail-closed — unparseable header grants no access.
+		return nil
 	}
 	out := make([]string, len(addrs))
 	for i, a := range addrs {
@@ -446,14 +453,10 @@ func mailBelongsToUser(pm *mailparser.ParsedMail, userEmail string) bool {
 	checkHeader := func(header string) bool {
 		parsed := emailsFromHeader(header)
 		for _, addr := range parsed {
-			// Exact match after parsing — preferred path.
+			// Exact match on parsed address — only valid path after fail-closed parsing.
 			if addr == target {
 				return true
 			}
-			// Fallback: if parsing returned the raw value (error path), use substring.
-			if strings.Contains(addr, target) {
-				return true
-			}
 		}
 		return false
 	}

internal/index/manticore.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"database/sql"
 	"fmt"
 	"hash/fnv"
+	"regexp"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
@@ -11,6 +12,10 @@ import (
 	_ "github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql"
 )
 
+// validTableName guards against SQL injection via table name interpolation.
+// Only emails_global and emails_tenant_<digits> are valid Manticore RT tables.
+var validTableName = regexp.MustCompile(`^emails_(global|tenant_\d+)$`)
+
 // manticoreIndex implements Indexer against a single Manticore RT table.
 type manticoreIndex struct {
 	db    *sql.DB
@@ -304,11 +309,19 @@ func hashMailID(id string) uint64 {
 
 // manticoreTableName returns the RT table name for a given tenant.
 // nil / 0 → emails_global, otherwise emails_tenant_<id>.
+// Panics if the resulting name does not match validTableName — this would
+// indicate a programming error, not a runtime condition.
 func manticoreTableName(tenantID *int64) string {
+	var name string
 	if tenantID == nil || *tenantID == 0 {
-		return "emails_global"
+		name = "emails_global"
+	} else {
+		name = fmt.Sprintf("emails_tenant_%d", *tenantID)
 	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("emails_tenant_%d", *tenantID)
+	if !validTableName.MatchString(name) {
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("manticore: invalid table name: %q", name))
+	}
+	return name
 }
 
 // escapeManticoreMatch escapes characters that have special meaning in