feat(PROJ-46): E-Mail als primärer Login-Identifier für Tenant-User

Tenant-User (tenant_id IS NOT NULL) melden sich künftig per E-Mail an statt
per Username — behebt Verwechslungen wie im Support-Fall vom 2026-06-13
(Login schlug trotz Passwort-Reset fehl, weil E-Mail statt Username
verwendet wurde). Nicht-Tenant-User (Superadmin/System) können weiterhin
Username ODER E-Mail nutzen.

Neue Store.VerifyLogin() prüft erst per E-Mail (alle User), fällt dann auf
Username zurück (nur tenant_id IS NULL). VerifyPassword() bleibt für den
IMAP-Server-Login-Pfad (PROJ-26) unverändert. Bewusster Breaking Change für
Tenant-User, Datenqualität vorab geprüft (0 Kollisionen).

Security-Nachtrag: bcrypt-Dummy-Compare im "user not found"-Pfad ergänzt,
um Timing-basierte Identifier-Enumeration zu verhindern.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
sysops
2026-07-03 23:37:20 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 804cd62201
commit 767373b206
18 changed files with 1710 additions and 14 deletions
+213
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@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
package api
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"archivmail/internal/storage"
)
// PROJ-43: Tenant routing rules CRUD + dry-run.
//
// Scope model (see PROJ-55/61/62/63 security fixes):
// - Superadmin (sess.TenantID == nil): may see/manage rules for ALL tenants.
// - Domain admin (sess.TenantID set): may only see/manage rules whose
// tenant_id matches their own tenant. Every {id} path additionally verifies
// ownership via tenantAccessAllowed() to prevent IDOR.
type routingRuleBody struct {
TenantID *int64 `json:"tenant_id"`
MatchType string `json:"match_type"`
Pattern string `json:"pattern"`
Priority int `json:"priority"`
}
// resolveRuleTenant determines the tenant_id a rule must belong to for the
// current session, and reports whether the request is allowed.
// - Superadmin: must specify tenant_id in the body (rules always target a
// concrete tenant); any tenant allowed.
// - Domain admin: tenant_id is forced to their own tenant; a mismatching
// explicit body value is rejected.
func (s *Server) resolveRuleTenant(sess sessionTenant, bodyTenantID *int64) (int64, bool) {
if sess.tenantID == nil {
// superadmin
if bodyTenantID == nil || *bodyTenantID <= 0 {
return 0, false
}
return *bodyTenantID, true
}
if bodyTenantID != nil && *bodyTenantID != *sess.tenantID {
return 0, false
}
return *sess.tenantID, true
}
// sessionTenant is a tiny helper capturing what the handlers need from a session.
type sessionTenant struct {
tenantID *int64
}
func sessTenant(r *http.Request) sessionTenant {
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
return sessionTenant{tenantID: sess.TenantID}
}
// handleListRoutingRules returns routing rules visible to the caller.
// GET /api/admin/routing-rules
func (s *Server) handleListRoutingRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
scope := sessTenant(r).tenantID // nil for superadmin → all rules
rules, err := s.store.ListTenantRoutingRules(r.Context(), scope)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
if rules == nil {
rules = []storage.TenantRoutingRule{}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"rules": rules})
}
// handleCreateRoutingRule creates a new routing rule.
// POST /api/admin/routing-rules
func (s *Server) handleCreateRoutingRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var body routingRuleBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid body")
return
}
tenantID, ok := s.resolveRuleTenant(sessTenant(r), body.TenantID)
if !ok {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "tenant_id required and must match your scope")
return
}
id, err := s.store.CreateTenantRoutingRule(r.Context(), storage.TenantRoutingRule{
TenantID: tenantID,
MatchType: body.MatchType,
Pattern: body.Pattern,
Priority: body.Priority,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
s.auditRule(r, "routing_rule_created", fmt.Sprintf("id=%d tenant=%d type=%s pattern=%s prio=%d",
id, tenantID, body.MatchType, body.Pattern, body.Priority))
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, map[string]interface{}{"id": id})
}
// handleUpdateRoutingRule updates an existing routing rule.
// PUT /api/admin/routing-rules/{id}
func (s *Server) handleUpdateRoutingRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid rule id")
return
}
// IDOR: load existing rule and verify ownership before mutating.
existing, err := s.store.GetTenantRoutingRule(r.Context(), id)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "rule not found")
return
}
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
if !tenantAccessAllowed(sess, &existing.TenantID) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden")
return
}
var body routingRuleBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid body")
return
}
tenantID, ok := s.resolveRuleTenant(sessTenant(r), body.TenantID)
if !ok {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "tenant_id must match your scope")
return
}
if err := s.store.UpdateTenantRoutingRule(r.Context(), storage.TenantRoutingRule{
ID: id,
TenantID: tenantID,
MatchType: body.MatchType,
Pattern: body.Pattern,
Priority: body.Priority,
}); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
s.auditRule(r, "routing_rule_updated", fmt.Sprintf("id=%d tenant=%d type=%s pattern=%s prio=%d",
id, tenantID, body.MatchType, body.Pattern, body.Priority))
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"ok": true})
}
// handleDeleteRoutingRule deletes a routing rule.
// DELETE /api/admin/routing-rules/{id}
func (s *Server) handleDeleteRoutingRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid rule id")
return
}
existing, err := s.store.GetTenantRoutingRule(r.Context(), id)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "rule not found")
return
}
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
if !tenantAccessAllowed(sess, &existing.TenantID) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden")
return
}
if err := s.store.DeleteTenantRoutingRule(r.Context(), id); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, err.Error())
return
}
s.auditRule(r, "routing_rule_deleted", fmt.Sprintf("id=%d", id))
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"ok": true})
}
type routingDryRunBody struct {
RuleID *int64 `json:"rule_id"` // dry-run an existing rule, OR ...
MatchType string `json:"match_type"` // ... an ad-hoc (match_type, pattern)
Pattern string `json:"pattern"`
Limit int `json:"limit"`
}
// handleDryRunRoutingRule previews which already-archived mails a rule would
// match. Bounded by LIMIT to avoid full-scan timeouts on large archives.
// POST /api/admin/routing-rules/dry-run
func (s *Server) handleDryRunRoutingRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var body routingDryRunBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid body")
return
}
sess := sessionFromCtx(r.Context())
matchType, pattern := body.MatchType, body.Pattern
if body.RuleID != nil {
rule, err := s.store.GetTenantRoutingRule(r.Context(), *body.RuleID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "rule not found")
return
}
if !tenantAccessAllowed(sess, &rule.TenantID) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden")
return
}
matchType, pattern = rule.MatchType, rule.Pattern
}
// Domain admins may only preview mails within their own tenant.
scope := sess.TenantID
res, err := s.store.DryRunRoutingRule(r.Context(), matchType, pattern, body.Limit, scope)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
s.auditRule(r, "routing_rule_dry_run", fmt.Sprintf("type=%s pattern=%s matches=%d", matchType, pattern, res.MatchCount))
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, res)
}
// NOTE: auditRule is defined in archiving_rules_handlers.go and reused here.
+8
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@@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ func (s *Server) routes() {
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/archiving-rules", s.auth(s.requireRole(userstore.RoleSuperAdmin, s.handleCreateArchivingRule)))
s.mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/admin/archiving-rules/{id}", s.auth(s.requireRole(userstore.RoleSuperAdmin, s.handleUpdateArchivingRule)))
s.mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/admin/archiving-rules/{id}", s.auth(s.requireRole(userstore.RoleSuperAdmin, s.handleDeleteArchivingRule)))
// PROJ-43: Tenant routing rules CRUD + dry-run — domain_admin+, tenant-scoped
// (superadmin sees all tenants, domain admins only their own).
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/routing-rules", s.authAdmin(s.handleListRoutingRules))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/routing-rules", s.authAdmin(s.handleCreateRoutingRule))
s.mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/admin/routing-rules/{id}", s.authAdmin(s.handleUpdateRoutingRule))
s.mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/admin/routing-rules/{id}", s.authAdmin(s.handleDeleteRoutingRule))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/routing-rules/dry-run", s.authAdmin(s.handleDryRunRoutingRule))
// PROJ-56c: pro-Mail Löschmarkierung — domain_admin+, tenant-scoped (kein
// Mail-Lesezugriff nötig, daher requireRole statt requireMailAccess).
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/retention/expired", s.authAdmin(s.handleListExpiredMails))
+3 -1
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@@ -74,7 +74,9 @@ func (m *Manager) SetTenantLDAP(tenantLdapStore *ldapcfg.TenantStore, tenantLook
// short-lived pending token that can only be used with ValidateTOTPLogin.
func (m *Manager) Login(username, password string) (token string, user *userstore.User, totpRequired bool, err error) {
// 1. Try local authentication first.
user, err = m.store.VerifyPassword(username, password)
// PROJ-46: VerifyLogin lets tenant users authenticate by email and keeps
// username-login working only for non-tenant users (tenant_id IS NULL).
user, err = m.store.VerifyLogin(context.Background(), username, password)
if err == nil {
if user.TOTPEnabled {
t, e := m.issuePendingTOTPToken(user)
+19 -4
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@@ -243,6 +243,22 @@ func (imp *Importer) fetchBatch(ctx context.Context, c *imapclient.Client, uids
// accountID identifies the IMAP account for PROJ-52 source tracking.
func (imp *Importer) storeAndIndex(raw []byte, tenantID *int64, accountID int64, log *slog.Logger) error {
ctx := context.Background()
// Parse early: needed both for PROJ-43 routing-rule resolution (before Save,
// so the mail is stored under the correct tenant) and for indexing below.
pm, parseErr := mailparser.Parse(raw)
// PROJ-43: pattern routing rules may override the account's default tenant.
// They are more specific than the per-account TenantID, so a match wins.
if parseErr == nil {
recipients := append(append([]string{}, pm.To...), pm.CC...)
if tid, err := imp.mailStore.ResolveTenantByRoutingRules(ctx, pm.From, recipients); err != nil {
log.Warn("routing rule lookup failed", "err", err)
} else if tid != nil {
tenantID = tid
}
}
// Save to file storage (deduplicates by SHA256 automatically)
id, err := imp.mailStore.Save(ctx, raw, time.Now(), tenantID)
if err != nil {
@@ -255,10 +271,9 @@ func (imp *Importer) storeAndIndex(raw []byte, tenantID *int64, accountID int64,
log.Warn("failed to tag source", "id", id, "err", err)
}
// Parse for indexing
pm, err := mailparser.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
log.Warn("failed to parse mail for indexing", "id", id, "err", err)
// Parse for indexing (reuse the early parse from routing-rule resolution).
if parseErr != nil {
log.Warn("failed to parse mail for indexing", "id", id, "err", parseErr)
// Store succeeded, just skip indexing for unparseable mails
return nil
}
+39
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@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ func (d *Daemon) resolveTenantFromRcpts(rcpts []string) *int64 {
// This handles BCC-journaling where RCPT TO is the archive's own address and
// the real sender/recipient domain is only visible in the RFC 2822 headers.
func (d *Daemon) resolveTenant(rcpts []string, raw []byte) *int64 {
// 0. PROJ-43: explicit pattern routing rules take precedence over the plain
// tenant_domains mapping, because they are more specific (wildcard
// domains, exact sender/recipient addresses, priority ordering).
if tid := d.resolveTenantByRules(rcpts, raw); tid != nil {
return tid
}
if d.domainToTenant == nil {
return d.defaultTenantID
}
@@ -144,6 +151,38 @@ func (d *Daemon) resolveTenant(rcpts []string, raw []byte) *int64 {
return d.defaultTenantID
}
// resolveTenantByRules gathers the From address and recipient list (envelope
// RCPT TO plus header To/Cc) and evaluates the PROJ-43 tenant_routing_rules.
// Returns nil when the store is unavailable or no rule matches.
func (d *Daemon) resolveTenantByRules(rcpts []string, raw []byte) *int64 {
if d.store == nil {
return nil
}
var from string
recipients := make([]string, 0, len(rcpts)+4)
for _, r := range rcpts {
recipients = append(recipients, strings.Trim(r, "<>"))
}
if msg, err := mail.ReadMessage(bytes.NewReader(raw)); err == nil {
if addrs, err := mail.ParseAddressList(msg.Header.Get("From")); err == nil && len(addrs) > 0 {
from = addrs[0].Address
}
for _, hdr := range []string{"To", "Cc"} {
if addrs, err := mail.ParseAddressList(msg.Header.Get(hdr)); err == nil {
for _, a := range addrs {
recipients = append(recipients, a.Address)
}
}
}
}
tid, err := d.store.ResolveTenantByRoutingRules(context.Background(), from, recipients)
if err != nil {
d.logger.Warn("SMTP: routing rule lookup failed", "err", err)
return nil
}
return tid
}
// SetIndexCallback sets the function called after each successfully stored mail.
func (d *Daemon) SetIndexCallback(cb IndexCallback) {
d.indexCallback = cb
+2
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@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ func New(cfg Config) (*Store, error) {
_, _ = s.db.Exec(ctx, `ALTER TABLE emails ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS storage_id BIGINT REFERENCES storage_objects(id)`)
// PROJ-51: archiving_rules table + retain_until_source column
s.initRetentionRulesSchema(ctx)
// PROJ-43: tenant_routing_rules table (pattern-based tenant assignment)
s.initTenantRoutingRulesSchema(ctx)
// PROJ-50: DSGVO Löschersuchen
s.initDSGVOSchema(ctx)
}
+383
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@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
package storage
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
)
// PROJ-43: Tenant routing rules — flexible pattern rules that assign an
// incoming mail to a tenant. This complements the simple 1:1 tenant_domains
// mapping (PROJ-21 Phase 5): routing rules are more explicit and therefore
// evaluated *before* the plain domain fallback. Higher priority wins on ties.
//
// NOTE: this is intentionally a separate table from PROJ-51's `archiving_rules`
// (retention categories) — same "rules engine" style, different purpose.
// Routing rule match types.
const (
RouteMatchFromDomain = "from_domain" // domain of the From address
RouteMatchToDomain = "to_domain" // domain of any To/Cc/envelope recipient
RouteMatchFromAddr = "from_addr" // full From address (exact)
RouteMatchToAddr = "to_addr" // full To/Cc/envelope recipient (exact)
)
// TenantRoutingRule assigns matching mails to TenantID.
type TenantRoutingRule struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
TenantID int64 `json:"tenant_id"` // target tenant (always set — a routing rule must resolve to a tenant)
MatchType string `json:"match_type"`
Pattern string `json:"pattern"`
Priority int `json:"priority"` // higher = evaluated first
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
}
func (s *Store) initTenantRoutingRulesSchema(ctx context.Context) {
if s.db == nil {
return
}
_, _ = s.db.Exec(ctx, `
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenant_routing_rules (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
tenant_id BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
match_type TEXT NOT NULL,
pattern TEXT NOT NULL,
priority INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
)`)
_, _ = s.db.Exec(ctx, `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tenant_routing_rules_priority ON tenant_routing_rules (priority DESC)`)
_, _ = s.db.Exec(ctx, `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tenant_routing_rules_tenant ON tenant_routing_rules (tenant_id)`)
}
func validRouteMatchType(t string) bool {
switch t {
case RouteMatchFromDomain, RouteMatchToDomain, RouteMatchFromAddr, RouteMatchToAddr:
return true
}
return false
}
// ── CRUD ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ListTenantRoutingRules returns rules ordered by priority (desc). If tenantID
// is non-nil, only rules for that tenant are returned (tenant-admin scope).
// A nil tenantID returns all rules (superadmin scope).
func (s *Store) ListTenantRoutingRules(ctx context.Context, tenantID *int64) ([]TenantRoutingRule, error) {
if s.db == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: no db")
}
query := `SELECT id, tenant_id, match_type, pattern, priority, created_at FROM tenant_routing_rules`
var args []interface{}
if tenantID != nil {
query += ` WHERE tenant_id = $1`
args = append(args, *tenantID)
}
query += ` ORDER BY priority DESC, id ASC`
rows, err := s.db.Query(ctx, query, args...)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: list routing rules: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []TenantRoutingRule
for rows.Next() {
var r TenantRoutingRule
if err := rows.Scan(&r.ID, &r.TenantID, &r.MatchType, &r.Pattern, &r.Priority, &r.CreatedAt); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: scan routing rule: %w", err)
}
out = append(out, r)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// GetTenantRoutingRule loads a single rule (used for IDOR scope checks and
// dry-run by rule ID).
func (s *Store) GetTenantRoutingRule(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*TenantRoutingRule, error) {
if s.db == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: no db")
}
var r TenantRoutingRule
err := s.db.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT id, tenant_id, match_type, pattern, priority, created_at FROM tenant_routing_rules WHERE id=$1`, id,
).Scan(&r.ID, &r.TenantID, &r.MatchType, &r.Pattern, &r.Priority, &r.CreatedAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: get routing rule: %w", err)
}
return &r, nil
}
func normalizeRoutePattern(matchType, pattern string) (string, error) {
if !validRouteMatchType(matchType) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("storage: invalid match_type %q", matchType)
}
p := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(pattern))
if p == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("storage: pattern must not be empty")
}
return p, nil
}
// CreateTenantRoutingRule inserts a new rule and returns its generated ID.
func (s *Store) CreateTenantRoutingRule(ctx context.Context, r TenantRoutingRule) (int64, error) {
if s.db == nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("storage: no db")
}
pat, err := normalizeRoutePattern(r.MatchType, r.Pattern)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if r.TenantID <= 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("storage: tenant_id must be set")
}
var id int64
err = s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
INSERT INTO tenant_routing_rules (tenant_id, match_type, pattern, priority)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4) RETURNING id`,
r.TenantID, r.MatchType, pat, r.Priority,
).Scan(&id)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("storage: create routing rule: %w", err)
}
return id, nil
}
// UpdateTenantRoutingRule replaces the editable fields of an existing rule.
func (s *Store) UpdateTenantRoutingRule(ctx context.Context, r TenantRoutingRule) error {
if s.db == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("storage: no db")
}
pat, err := normalizeRoutePattern(r.MatchType, r.Pattern)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if r.TenantID <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("storage: tenant_id must be set")
}
tag, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `
UPDATE tenant_routing_rules
SET tenant_id=$1, match_type=$2, pattern=$3, priority=$4
WHERE id=$5`,
r.TenantID, r.MatchType, pat, r.Priority, r.ID,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("storage: update routing rule: %w", err)
}
if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("storage: routing rule %d not found", r.ID)
}
return nil
}
// DeleteTenantRoutingRule removes a rule. Already-archived mails keep their
// assigned tenant (no retroactive re-routing).
func (s *Store) DeleteTenantRoutingRule(ctx context.Context, id int64) error {
if s.db == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("storage: no db")
}
tag, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM tenant_routing_rules WHERE id=$1`, id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("storage: delete routing rule: %w", err)
}
if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("storage: routing rule %d not found", id)
}
return nil
}
// ── Matching ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func routeDomainOf(addr string) string {
addr = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(addr))
// strip a possible "Name <addr>" wrapper
if i := strings.LastIndex(addr, "<"); i >= 0 {
if j := strings.LastIndex(addr, ">"); j > i {
addr = addr[i+1 : j]
}
}
if i := strings.LastIndex(addr, "@"); i >= 0 {
return addr[i+1:]
}
return ""
}
func routeBareAddr(addr string) string {
addr = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(addr))
if i := strings.LastIndex(addr, "<"); i >= 0 {
if j := strings.LastIndex(addr, ">"); j > i {
addr = addr[i+1 : j]
}
}
return strings.TrimSpace(addr)
}
// domainMatches supports exact match and a leading "*." wildcard that also
// matches sub-domains (e.g. "*.kunde.de" matches "mail.kunde.de" and "kunde.de").
func domainMatches(pattern, domain string) bool {
if pattern == "" || domain == "" {
return false
}
if strings.HasPrefix(pattern, "*.") {
base := pattern[2:]
return domain == base || strings.HasSuffix(domain, "."+base)
}
return domain == pattern
}
// routingRuleMatches reports whether a rule matches the given (already
// lowercased-on-store) from address and recipient list.
func routingRuleMatches(r TenantRoutingRule, from string, recipients []string) bool {
pat := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.Pattern))
if pat == "" {
return false
}
switch r.MatchType {
case RouteMatchFromAddr:
return routeBareAddr(from) == pat
case RouteMatchFromDomain:
return domainMatches(pat, routeDomainOf(from))
case RouteMatchToAddr:
for _, t := range recipients {
if routeBareAddr(t) == pat {
return true
}
}
return false
case RouteMatchToDomain:
for _, t := range recipients {
if domainMatches(pat, routeDomainOf(t)) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
return false
}
// ResolveTenantByRoutingRules evaluates all routing rules against a mail's From
// address and recipient list. The highest-priority matching rule wins (lowest
// id on a tie). Returns nil when no rule matches. This is the PROJ-43 explicit
// stage that runs *before* the plain tenant_domains fallback.
func (s *Store) ResolveTenantByRoutingRules(ctx context.Context, from string, recipients []string) (*int64, error) {
if s.db == nil {
return nil, nil
}
rules, err := s.ListTenantRoutingRules(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for i := range rules {
if routingRuleMatches(rules[i], from, recipients) {
tid := rules[i].TenantID
return &tid, nil
}
}
return nil, nil
}
// ── Dry-run ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// RoutingDryRunMatch is a single sample row for the dry-run preview.
type RoutingDryRunMatch struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
MailFrom string `json:"mail_from"`
MailTo string `json:"mail_to"`
Subject string `json:"subject"`
ReceivedAt time.Time `json:"received_at"`
}
// RoutingDryRunResult reports how many already-archived mails would be matched
// by a (match_type, pattern) pair, plus a bounded sample.
type RoutingDryRunResult struct {
MatchType string `json:"match_type"`
Pattern string `json:"pattern"`
MatchCount int64 `json:"match_count"`
SampleLimit int `json:"sample_limit"`
Sample []RoutingDryRunMatch `json:"sample"`
}
// dryRunCondition builds a SQL condition + argument approximating the rule
// against the emails table (mail_from / mail_to are display strings, so we use
// ILIKE containment — this is a preview estimate, not the exact live matcher).
func dryRunCondition(matchType, pattern string) (cond string, arg string, err error) {
p := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(pattern))
if p == "" {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("storage: pattern must not be empty")
}
// "*." wildcard: drop the leading star so ILIKE '%.base' / '%@base' catches
// both the base domain and its sub-domains.
wild := strings.HasPrefix(p, "*.")
base := p
if wild {
base = p[2:]
}
switch matchType {
case RouteMatchFromAddr:
return "LOWER(mail_from) LIKE $1", "%<" + p + ">%", nil
case RouteMatchToAddr:
return "LOWER(mail_to) LIKE $1", "%<" + p + ">%", nil
case RouteMatchFromDomain:
return "LOWER(mail_from) LIKE $1", "%@%" + base + "%", nil
case RouteMatchToDomain:
return "LOWER(mail_to) LIKE $1", "%@%" + base + "%", nil
}
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("storage: invalid match_type %q", matchType)
}
// DryRunRoutingRule counts and samples archived mails that a rule would match.
// sampleLimit bounds the sample (and is applied to the query) to avoid full
// table scans / timeouts on large archives.
// tenantScope, when non-nil, restricts the dry-run to mails already assigned to
// that tenant (enforced for tenant/domain admins so they cannot preview other
// tenants' mails). A nil tenantScope (superadmin) counts across all tenants.
func (s *Store) DryRunRoutingRule(ctx context.Context, matchType, pattern string, sampleLimit int, tenantScope *int64) (*RoutingDryRunResult, error) {
if s.db == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: no db")
}
if !validRouteMatchType(matchType) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: invalid match_type %q", matchType)
}
if sampleLimit <= 0 || sampleLimit > 100 {
sampleLimit = 20
}
cond, arg, err := dryRunCondition(matchType, pattern)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
args := []interface{}{arg}
if tenantScope != nil {
cond += fmt.Sprintf(" AND tenant_id = $%d", len(args)+1)
args = append(args, *tenantScope)
}
res := &RoutingDryRunResult{
MatchType: matchType,
Pattern: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(pattern)),
SampleLimit: sampleLimit,
Sample: []RoutingDryRunMatch{},
}
if err := s.db.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM emails WHERE `+cond, args...,
).Scan(&res.MatchCount); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: dry-run count: %w", err)
}
sampleArgs := append(append([]interface{}{}, args...), sampleLimit)
rows, err := s.db.Query(ctx,
`SELECT id, COALESCE(mail_from,''), COALESCE(mail_to,''), COALESCE(subject,''), received_at
FROM emails WHERE `+cond+fmt.Sprintf(` ORDER BY received_at DESC LIMIT $%d`, len(sampleArgs)), sampleArgs...)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: dry-run sample: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var m RoutingDryRunMatch
if err := rows.Scan(&m.ID, &m.MailFrom, &m.MailTo, &m.Subject, &m.ReceivedAt); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage: dry-run scan: %w", err)
}
res.Sample = append(res.Sample, m)
}
return res, rows.Err()
}
+73
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ const (
RoleSuperAdmin = "superadmin"
bcryptCost = 12
// dummyBcryptHash is used by VerifyLogin to burn bcrypt time when no user
// matched, closing the timing side-channel that would otherwise let an
// attacker distinguish "unknown identifier" from "wrong password" (PROJ-46
// security review). Precomputed hash of a fixed placeholder string — the
// plaintext is never used or compared meaningfully, only the cost matters.
dummyBcryptHash = "$2a$12$C6UzMDM.H6dfI/f/IKcEeO4TW/OZ/6PdTdSU0/eV1JCJXo.0DGvTa"
)
// User represents a user account in the system.
@@ -284,6 +291,59 @@ func (s *Store) VerifyPassword(username, password string) (*User, error) {
return &u, nil
}
// VerifyLogin checks credentials for the web-login path (PROJ-46) and returns
// the user on success. Lookup semantics:
// 1. Match by email (`email = $1`) — valid for ALL users (tenant users AND
// non-tenant users like superadmin/system).
// 2. If no email match, fall back to username (`username = $1`) — but ONLY
// accept the match when tenant_id IS NULL (superadmin/system users).
// Tenant users (tenant_id IS NOT NULL) can therefore no longer log in via
// their username; they must use their email address.
//
// Note: VerifyPassword (username-only) is intentionally left untouched — it is
// used by the IMAP server login path (PROJ-26).
func (s *Store) VerifyLogin(ctx context.Context, identifier, password string) (*User, error) {
// 1. Email lookup — matches any user.
row := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT id, username, email, role, source, active, created_at, tenant_id, totp_enabled, totp_reset_at, totp_reset_by, list_page_size, password_hash
FROM users WHERE email = $1`,
identifier,
)
u, hash, err := scanUserWithHash(row)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("userstore: verify login (email): %w", err)
}
// 2. Username lookup — only accepted for non-tenant users (tenant_id IS NULL).
row = s.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT id, username, email, role, source, active, created_at, tenant_id, totp_enabled, totp_reset_at, totp_reset_by, list_page_size, password_hash
FROM users WHERE username = $1 AND tenant_id IS NULL`,
identifier,
)
u, hash, err = scanUserWithHash(row)
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
// PROJ-46 security review: run bcrypt against a dummy hash even when no
// user was found, so "unknown identifier" and "wrong password" take
// comparable time. Without this, the missing bcrypt call (~150-300ms
// cheaper) lets an attacker enumerate valid identifiers by timing the
// login endpoint.
_ = bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(dummyBcryptHash), []byte(password))
return nil, errors.New("userstore: user not found")
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("userstore: verify login (username): %w", err)
}
}
if !u.Active {
return nil, errors.New("userstore: account disabled")
}
if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hash), []byte(password)); err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("userstore: wrong password")
}
return u, nil
}
// Update applies a partial update to a user record.
func (s *Store) Update(id int64, req UpdateUserRequest) (*User, error) {
ctx := context.Background()
@@ -517,6 +577,19 @@ func scanUser(row pgx.Row) (*User, error) {
return &u, nil
}
// scanUserWithHash scans a full user row that includes the password_hash column
// (used by the login verification paths). The pgx.ErrNoRows sentinel is passed
// through unwrapped so callers can distinguish "not found" from other errors.
func scanUserWithHash(row pgx.Row) (*User, string, error) {
var u User
var hash string
err := row.Scan(&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.Source, &u.Active, &u.CreatedAt, &u.TenantID, &u.TOTPEnabled, &u.TOTPResetAt, &u.TOTPResetBy, &u.ListPageSize, &hash)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
return &u, hash, nil
}
func scanUserRow(rows pgx.Rows) (*User, error) {
var u User
if err := rows.Scan(&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.Source, &u.Active, &u.CreatedAt, &u.TenantID, &u.TOTPEnabled, &u.TOTPResetAt, &u.TOTPResetBy, &u.ListPageSize); err != nil {
+68
View File
@@ -116,6 +116,74 @@ func TestVerifyPassword(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestVerifyLogin covers the full PROJ-46 login-identifier matrix.
func TestVerifyLogin(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
ctx := context.Background()
tenantID := int64(1)
// Tenant user: username "patrick" != email
if _, err := s.Create(userstore.CreateUserRequest{
Username: "patrick", Email: "patrick@perlbach24.de",
Password: "pw-tenant", Role: userstore.RoleUser, TenantID: &tenantID,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Non-tenant user (superadmin/system), tenant_id IS NULL
if _, err := s.Create(userstore.CreateUserRequest{
Username: "superadmin", Email: "superadmin@localhost",
Password: "pw-super", Role: userstore.RoleSuperAdmin, TenantID: nil,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// 1. Tenant user via email → success
u, err := s.VerifyLogin(ctx, "patrick@perlbach24.de", "pw-tenant")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tenant user via email should succeed: %v", err)
}
if u.Username != "patrick" {
t.Errorf("Username = %q, want patrick", u.Username)
}
// 2. Tenant user via username (≠ email) → invalid_credentials
if _, err := s.VerifyLogin(ctx, "patrick", "pw-tenant"); err == nil {
t.Error("tenant user via username should be rejected")
}
// 3. Non-tenant user via username → success
u, err = s.VerifyLogin(ctx, "superadmin", "pw-super")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("non-tenant user via username should succeed: %v", err)
}
if u.Username != "superadmin" {
t.Errorf("Username = %q, want superadmin", u.Username)
}
// 4. Non-tenant user via email → success
u, err = s.VerifyLogin(ctx, "superadmin@localhost", "pw-super")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("non-tenant user via email should succeed: %v", err)
}
if u.Username != "superadmin" {
t.Errorf("Username = %q, want superadmin", u.Username)
}
// 5. Unknown identifier → invalid_credentials
if _, err := s.VerifyLogin(ctx, "ghost@nowhere.tld", "x"); err == nil {
t.Error("unknown identifier should be rejected")
}
if _, err := s.VerifyLogin(ctx, "ghost", "x"); err == nil {
t.Error("unknown username should be rejected")
}
// Wrong password for valid identifier → rejected
if _, err := s.VerifyLogin(ctx, "patrick@perlbach24.de", "wrong"); err == nil {
t.Error("wrong password should be rejected")
}
}
func TestUpdateUser(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
u, _ := s.Create(userstore.CreateUserRequest{